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 Abstract 
Over the last three decades of the Chinese economic reform with a focus on the 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) restructuring, one striking phenomenon is the 
rise of the mixed ownership enterprises (MOEs) in China. The objective of this 
thesis is to analyse the factors that can explain the emergence and the rise of the 
MOEs, to explore the corporate governance of the MOEs, and to assess the 
performance of the MOEs.  
The research finds that the unique experiments and practices of China’s SOEs 
reform in the past 30 years have formed the China Model of SOEs reform, 
China’s mixed ownership has its roots in the China Model. One major 
explanation to the rise of the MOEs is the synergy effect gained from the 
combination of the different advantages of both the private enterprises and the 
state enterprises. The private enterprises have better operational mechanisms and 
the state enterprises have better access to business resources and political 
support.  
The thesis has looked at 5 issues of the institutional arrangements of MOE’s 
corporate governance, named as the SCORE. It is found that the largest 
shareholder in most of the MOEs is still the state, but the control structure is not 
always corresponding to the shareholding structure, and the governmental 
intervention in the business of the MOEs has been reduced although the 
reduction is limited. The thesis shows that there is no noted relationship between 
corporate performance and mixed ownership, but the transfer of corporate 
controlling powers is very important for the ownership-transformed companies 
from whole ownership to mixed ownership to improve the performance. On this 
basis, the thesis argues that China needs to push forward the further 
commercialization of the corporate governance of the MOEs in the future. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1  Why Should the Mixed Ownership Enterprises in 
China Be Taken As an Important Research Object 
In 1978, China’s government and the ruling party, the Communist Party of China 
(CPC), decided to carry out the policy for economic reform, namely, to transform 
China from planning economy to market economy. This decision marked a 
formal start of the economic transition in China. Many other former-socialist 
countries including Russia, Poland, Czech, also experienced economic transition 
in the late 1980s and the 1990s. Within all the transitional economies, China is 
generally regarded as the country taking a gradualist and revisionist approach, 
which is quite different from the radicalist or big-bang approach adopted by 
Russia and many Eastern European countries. These countries launched the full 
privatisation of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). In comparison with the big-bang 
approach, the gradualist and revisionist approach has allowed China to enjoy the 
fast economic development with an average GDP growth of 9.8% per year during 
the period of 1979-2009. 
Enterprises are the basis of economic growth. In many transitional economies, 
the key task of the transition is to restructure the SOEs. Djankov and Murrell 
(2002) studied China’s SOEs restructuring, and emphasized its importance in the 
transition process. As a matter of fact, China has been regarding its SOEs 
restructuring as the pivotal aspect of the economic transition. Studying its SOEs 
restructuring should be very helpful to identify the distinctive characteristics of 
the economic transition in China. 
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During the progress of China’s SOEs restructuring and its impressive GDP 
growth, one striking phenomenon is the rise of the state and private mixed 
ownership enterprises (MOEs) after the 1990s. In 1979, the SOEs dominated 
China’s economy, their output in the total industrial output was as high as 78.5%, 
while the residual 21.5% came from the collective enterprises (State Statistics 
Bureau, 1980). The SOEs at that time were wholly-owned by the state. In 
contrast, as a result of deepening reform towards market economy, the sales of 
state-owned and state-controlled enterprises in 2008 accounted for only 29.9% of 
the total sales of all industrial enterprises (State Statistics Bureau, 2009). 
Furthermore, nowadays there are fewer and fewer wholly-state-owned 
enterprises in China. On the contrary, shareholding companies are prevalent. 
Although there still are some wholly-state-owned companies in China, most of 
them have been restructured by spin-off approach, which means the parent 
enterprises usually remain as wholly-state-owned holding vehicles to hold the 
state shares of their mixed ownership subsidiaries. In fact, since the late 1990s, 
lots of wholly-state-owned enterprises have been privatised to become 
companies who are controlled by non-state shareholders instead of state 
shareholders or are wholly-owned by private owners. This means that a lot of 
wholly-state-owned enterprises have been restructured into MOEs in which there 
are not only state shares but also private shares. For instance, the parent company 
of Lenovo Group Company who is famous for its take-over of IBM PC business 
in 2005, Lenovo Holdings Company, is a MOE originating from the restructuring 
of a wholly-state-owned enterprise. 36% of the total equity of Lenovo Holdings 
Company is owned by the state, 35% is owned by the management and core 
employees, and 29% is owned by a private company. Similarly, another Chinese 
large company, TCL Group Company who is famous for its take-over of Alcartel 
mobile business in 2004, is also a MOE originating from the restructuring of a 
wholly-state-owned enterprise. The pioneer company in the real estate 
development sector in China, Wanke Company, became a MOE from a 
wholly-state-owned enterprise in the 1980s. 
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In addition to those MOEs originating from SOEs restructuring, some private 
enterprises have been transformed to MOEs by taking in state shares. Wantong 
Company, a very famous real estate company in China, used to be a private 
company, but it took in a SOE as a strategic investor and became a MOE in 2004. 
Hainan Airline Group Company, the fourth largest airline company in China, 
used to be a private company. It experienced an ownership restructuring in 2005, 
then a new company called Xinhua Aviation Holdings Company, was established. 
Xinhua Aviation Holdings Company is a MOE. Moreover, the merger and 
acquisition (M&A) market in China is also producing MOEs everyday. In the 
M&A market, some SOEs purchase the shares of private firms or vice versa, then 
MOEs are produced. 
The history of mixed ownership in the world is not short, but mixed ownership 
has not garnered good attention yet. This might be that mixed ownership is not a 
worldwide prevalent phenomenon. However, in its ownership transformation 
campaign, MOEs are emerging rapidly in China, which deserves more attention 
and more studies. The numbers of the MOEs in other countries are not big, and 
those MOEs do not have enough importance in the economy. On the contrary, 
mixed ownership in China is getting more and more prevalent, and the number of 
China’s MOEs is increasing because many large-sized SOEs have been or will be 
restructured into MOEs and some large-sized private firms have taken in or will 
take in some state capital to become MOEs. Those MOEs in China are of great 
importance in many industries. In contrast, the mixed ownership in other 
countries usually exists in particular industries, say, infrastructure or utilities, or 
in specific periods. Sometimes, mixed ownership in some other countries just 
work as an interim tool during the progress of privatisation, and the governments 
usually have the definite plan of consecutive sales of state shares and full 
privatisation. However China is not the case. Moreover, other countries do not 
have a definite strategy of restructuring SOEs into MOEs, but China has a clear 
strategy of the development of mixed ownership and this strategy has been 
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reiterated by the ruling party and the central government in the official 
documents. The 15th party congress of the CPC officially introduced this strategy 
for the first time in 1997. The 15th party congress report said the ownership 
structure should be improved in the future and the public ownership should 
include not only wholly-state-owned enterprises, but also state shares in MOEs 
(Jiang, Zemin., 1997). The 4th plenary session of the 15th party congress of the 
CPC in 1999 pointed out that the large and medium-sized SOEs should be 
restructured into shareholding companies of mixed ownership (The Central 
Committee of the CPC, 1999). The 16th party congress of the CPC pointed out in 
2002 that mixed ownership should be encouraged to a higher extent (Jiang, 
Zemin., 2002). The 3rd plenary session of the 16th party congress decided in 2003 
to strive to develop mixed ownership, and mixed ownership should be regarded 
as the major way of public ownership (The Central Committee of the CPC, 2003). 
Apparently, the strategy of promoting mixed ownership in China is quite clear. 
India used to have some MOEs in the 1960s, but those MOEs were privatised 
afterwards. China is a fast growing-up country in the world, the rise of more and 
more MOEs will draw attention from the world. This is because MOE is different 
not only from the classic capitalist private enterprise but also from traditional 
socialist wholly-state-owned enterprise. From the perspective of corporate 
governance, MOE is more complicated than the conventional 
wholly-private-owned company and wholly-state-owned company since the 
different shareholders with distinguishable ownership attribute may have 
different orientations of interests and different manners of treating management 
and workers. Thus, the MOEs in China should be taken as an important research 
object. 
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1.2  The Definition of the Mixed Ownership Enterprise 
in This Thesis 
Generally speaking, MOE refers to the enterprise containing both state shares 
and non-state shares. But in this research, the MOE refers to the enterprise in 
which there are both a block of state shares and a block of domestic non-state 
shares, and these blocks of shares are not easy to be sold in securities market or 
the block shareholders are not the common securities investors whose purpose of 
holding shares is to earn money by selling securities in secondary market. A 
block of shares in this thesis is generally defined as the block accounting for not 
less than 5% of the total shares in the enterprise, and the purpose of holding these 
shares is not to earn money by selling securities in secondary market. Therefore, 
the MOEs in this research exclude the joint ventures containing foreign shares 
and state shares, and those listed companies without non-state block shareholders. 
The reason for this definition is based on the purpose of this research, which is to 
study the factors driving the emergence of the MOEs as well as the corporate 
governance of the MOEs. The driving factors of establishing joint ventures and 
getting SOEs listed are well known in China, and the corporate governance of 
joint ventures and listed companies is regulated by specific acts and ordinances.  
1.3  Research Objective  
Based on empirical observations, I found that numerous MOEs had emerged in 
China, and they usually were large-sized enterprises and had important positions 
in many industries. The Chinese government has a definite strategy of promoting 
mixed ownership, so that more MOEs are expected to emerge. Against this 
background, the questions are, why have so many MOEs emerged in China? 
Why does not China restructure its SOEs into wholly-private-owned enterprises 
instead of MOEs? Why has the Chinese government chosen the strategy of 
promoting mixed ownership? Probing into the factors driving the emergence of 
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the MOEs in China will help explain the environment in which the MOEs are 
born, to learn the tendency of MOEs’ further evolution, and will be useful to 
understand the different forces affecting China’s economic transition and to put 
forward relevant policy recommendations for expediting China’s economic 
transition. 
As a great number of MOEs have emerged in China and some of them are going 
to the global business arena, the corporate governance of this kind of enterprises 
should be touched on. How is this kind of enterprises governed? Does this kind 
of enterprises establish board of directors? Are the key positions of the board and 
the controlling powers based on the shareholding structure? How do the state 
shareholders and the non-state shareholders exercise their rights and their powers? 
Are the executives selected by the board or still by the government? Does the 
government still play any other role in the MOEs than the state shareholder? All 
these questions are very important and must be answered. Answering these 
questions helps not only to capture the substance of the MOEs and to distinguish 
the characters of the MOEs from other kinds of enterprises, but also to 
comprehend the game rules the MOEs follow and to put forth some 
recommendations about the further reform of the MOEs. 
Furthermore, as numerous MOEs exist in China, how do these MOEs perform? 
Do MOEs outperform SOEs and private companies? These questions should also 
be answered. 
Thus, the research objective of this thesis is to analyze what factors drive the 
emergence and the rise of China’s MOEs, to study the corporate governance of 
China’s MOEs, and to do comparative analysis on the performance of MOEs and 
non-MOEs.  
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1.4  Research Methodology and Research Plan 
The major approach to achieve the objective of this research is the combination 
of empirical studies, theoretical discussions, data collecting and data processing, 
modelling and correlation coefficient analysis.  
Since mixed ownership is a real phenomenon in China’s economic transition, the 
first step to do this research is to observe and comprehend China’s MOEs, and to 
observe and comprehend the practice of China’s economic transition because it is 
closely correlated with the emergence of the MOEs. In order to effectively 
observe and comprehend China’s MOEs and its economic transition, field 
surveys and literature review must be conducted. The literature to be reviewed 
includes publications both in Chinese and in English. The literature significant to 
my research is cited in this thesis. The field surveys involve some typical MOEs 
or their controlling shareholders, including Lenovo Holdings, Fuxing Group, 
Wanke Company, TCL Group, and some government agencies such as local state 
assets supervision and administration commissions. The selection of the 
enterprises and government agencies I visited is based neither on any statistical 
sampling method nor on random selection method, it is only based on my private 
liaison or working connection with them. This selection may not be helpful to 
draw statistical conclusions, but is helpful to comprehend the MOEs and the 
economic transition in China. The major enterprises and government agencies I 
visited are stated in the following chapters, especially in chapter 5, 6, and 7.  
In order to obtain some statistical findings, especially the findings about the 
commonness degree of mixed ownership, about the shareholding structure of the 
MOEs, and about some corporate governance issues, a questionnaire survey was 
also conducted. The survey covers almost 1000 enterprises. The design of the 
questionnaire survey is explained in chapter 4, and the questionnaire itself is 
listed in the appendix in this thesis. The questionnaire survey provides a lot of 
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useful information about the shareholding, the management, the government 
regulations, and some other issues with regards to MOE’s corporate governance. 
By analysing the questionnaire and processing the data, some calculations can be 
done and some conclusions can be drawn. The data from the State Statistics 
Bureau of China and some other sources should also be used to do the statistical 
work, especially the data from Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges is useful 
to study the MOEs in the stock market. The explanations why different datasets 
were used and how the datasets were selected are respectively in chapter 4 and 8. 
Empirical studies are indispensable but not sufficient. Theoretical discussions 
should be undertaken in order to find the driving factor of the emergence of 
China’s MOEs hidden behind the phenomenon, and to find MOE’s governance 
features. Theoretical discussions are combined with the empirical studies in this 
thesis. The theoretical discussions will be pursued on the basis of transitional 
economics and new institutional economics. A comprehensive review of the 
literature on new institutional economics, transitional economics, ownership 
theory, and corporate governance theory, is presented in the thesis. The existing 
literature is discussed to help explain the phenomenon of the rise of China’s 
MOEs, explore the major factors driving the emergence of the MOEs. The 
relevant articles are cited in the following chapters. The theoretical discussions 
are presented almost in all chapters, especially in chapter 3, 5, 6, and 7. The 
theoretical discussions from the perspective of new institutional economics, 
ownership theory, are also presented to explore the institutional foundation of 
corporate governance in chapter 6 and 7. The papers by Williamson (1998, 2000), 
Tirole (2001), and Roe (2003, 2004) are very valuable to this research, I draw on 
their analysis methods and their research results about the institutions of 
corporate governance in my thesis. From the perspective of new institutional 
economics and transitional economics, corporate governance involves not only 
the function of board of directors and general meeting of shareholders, 
information disclosure and corporate transparency, but also the distribution of 
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controlling powers, game rules, contracting, management market and labour 
market, government regulations. The institutional arrangements of corporate 
governance are more important than board, management, and accounting. A basic 
analytical framework for the research of MOEs’ corporate governance in this 
thesis is also based on theoretical discussions and some empirical studies. The 
basic analytical framework is to provide a matrix for MOEs’ corporate 
governance research.  
To estimate the performance of MOEs, the econometric analysis was also 
employed. The econometric estimation will allow the thesis to test the 
performance difference between MOEs and non-MOEs by using the data of the 
listed company in China. The estimation and the explanation for the usage of the 
database are presented in chapter 8.  
The research plan is summarized as follows: 
(1) To conduct empirical studies based on field surveys, interviews, literature 
review, and questionnaire survey. 
(2) To discuss the major factors driving the emergence of China’s MOEs. 
(3) To conduct theoretical discussions and commenting about new institutional 
economics, transitional economics and corporate governance theory. 
(4) To address the issue of the commonness degree of mixed ownership, and the 
mixture degree of the MOEs. 
(5) To analyse the institutional arrangements of the MOEs corporate governance 
in China. 
(6) To compare the performance of MOEs and non-MOEs by modelling and data 
processing of more than 1000 listed companies in China. 
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1.5 The Justification and Discussion of the Methodology 
By literature reviewing, I found there were few mixed ownership enterprises in 
other countries. Some mixed ownership enterprises in Western countries were 
usually in utility and infrastructure sector, they were often established according 
to public-private-parternership (PPP) programs. The existing English literature 
looking at MOEs, especially the corporate governance of MOEs, is very scarce. 
Even in China, the academic literature focusing on why mixed ownership has 
become prevalent and what the corporate governance of the MOEs is like is also 
scarce while newspaper articles talking about the necessity and rationality of 
promoting mixed ownership could be easily found. Therefore, empirical 
observations and analysis are the starting method to build up the necessary 
knowledge and comprehensive understanding of China’s MOEs. Empirical 
observations include not only conducting field surveys but also consulting 
historical documents. The interviews with some famous Chinese MOEs, such as 
Lenovo Group, TCL group, and some famous Chinese private companies who 
had been enthusiastic in mixed ownership while expanding their business, such 
as Fuxing Group, Yili Group, were really very helpful to comprehend why and 
how mixed ownership emerged in China. The consequent analysis includes 
identifying and judging the documents as well as building up some basic 
concepts about the mixed ownership. Considering the scarcity of the existing 
literature on mixed ownership, the method of empirical observations and analysis 
is indispensible and irreplaceable. Based on the empirical observations and 
analysis, I could find that mixed ownership had been spreading in China and 
there were some hidden factors which had been driving the emergence of China 
mixed ownership.  
Empirical observations and analysis could provide real facts. Particularly, field 
interviews and surveys and case studies could help identify the real factors which 
drove the emergence of mixed ownership in China and the material issues of 
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MOEs’ corporate governance. Those are the strengths of empirical observations. 
This research involved lots of field surveys and case studies. But field surveys 
and case studies have their weaknesses. One major weakness is that this method 
could not present an overall picture from statistical perspective. In order to testify 
from the statistical perspective that mixed ownership is prevalent in China, Data 
collection and analysis is necessary. The easy way of doing statistical analysis is 
to take the listed companies in Chinese securities market as the sample because 
any listed companies even in China has to publish its shareholding information 
including large shareholders’ ownership status. Of course I used the published 
information of Chinese listed companies to do the statistical analysis. I selected 
the 300 listed companies which indicate the Shanghai-Shenzhen Component 
Index to analyse the commonness degree and mixture degree of Chinese listed 
companies, because these 300 companies were representative of different sectors, 
including financial sector, energy sector, trade sector, and manufacturing sector. 
Furthermore I conducted a questionnaire survey to look at the non-listed 
companies. The combination of the listed company analysis and non-listed 
company analysis would be more convincible to testify the commonness of 
mixed ownership in China and to tell the distinguishable mixed ownership status. 
The questionnaire was designed by myself intentionally, not only the ownership 
structure but also some issues of the corporate governance, such as the presence 
of board of directors, the position of core managers, the government-enterprise 
relations, were covered by the questionnaire survey. The data analysis of the 
questionnaire survey was very helpful to recognise the distinctiveness of MOEs’ 
corporate governance, and to make further investigations of the institutional 
arrangements of MOEs’ corporate governance. Without the 
intentionally-designed questionnaire survey, no other existing dataset could have 
provided so much useful information regarding the institutional arrangements of 
MOEs’ corporate governance.  
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Empirical observations were useful to build up the basic concepts about China’s 
mixed ownership and the preliminary understandings of China’s MOEs, but were 
not sufficient to explore major driving factors of the rise of China’s mixed 
ownership. In particular, some driving factors closely connected with the 
Chinese-characteristic market economy during the economic transitional process 
could not be easily identified by empirical observations. I combined theoretical 
discussions with empirical observations in this research to explore the driving 
factors and to address some issues of the institutional arrangements of MOEs’ 
corporate governance. Existing literature on firm theory, transaction cost theory, 
incomplete contract theory, principal-agent theory, ownership theory, was helpful 
to explain why the combination of state ownership and private ownership would 
produce positive synergy in the context of China’s economic transition and how 
state assets and private assets could provide their respective advantages. The 
approach of combining empirical observations with theoretical discussions could 
avoid the possible superficiality of empirical observations and the possible 
hollowness of theoretical discussions. Especially, China’s economic transition 
has lasted for long time and generated numerous distinctive practices, I analysed 
the practices of the SOEs reform in China by theoretical discussions and 
generalised the China Model of state-owned enterprises reform. The 
generalisation of the China Model of SOEs reform exactly reflects the approach 
of the combination of empirical observation and theoretical discussions in this 
thesis, and the China Model of SOEs reform in this thesis presents some new and 
material contents of China’s SOEs restructuring. On the background of the China 
Model of SOEs reform, the rise of China’s mixed ownership would be more 
understandable, and the significance of further improvements of MOEs corporate 
governance could be well recognised.  
Theoretical discussions can provide rational analytical framework for practical 
facts and have theoretical power to explain practical facts. Theoretical 
discussions can also be helpful to identify the nature and essence of practical 
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matters. These are the strengths of theoretical discussions. But theoretical 
discussions themselves could not do econometric work. That is the weakness of 
theoretical discussions. One issue of studying China’s MOEs is to assess the 
performance of China’s MOEs. Modelling should be adopted while checking the 
performance of MOEs. The purpose of the modelling in this research was to 
compare the performance of MOEs and non-MOEs, then to find if MOEs 
outperform other enterprises. As many factors may impact on corporate 
performance, this research used the multivariate regression as usual to conduct 
the performance analysis. This method is very common and the analysis results 
are usually reliable. In order to avoid possible inaccuracy of the analysis of any 
single performance indicator, this research adopted a few indicators, including 
return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), Tobin’s Q, to assess the 
performance of MOEs and non-MOEs. I had some hypotheses about the 
correlations between mixed ownership and corporate performance, regression 
analysis was used to test these hypotheses, therefore I could check if mixed 
ownership has positive, negative, or neutral impact on corporate performance. 
Coefficient analysis is based on reasonable dataset. A dataset composed of 
China’s listed companies was used in this research to assess the performance. 
Performance estimation needs panel data which involves time series and a 
reasonable sample of enterprises to bring out reliable results. A dataset of China’s 
listed companies is good to analyse the performance of MOEs and non-MOEs. 
Before 2009, there were almost 2000 listed companies in China’s securities 
market, and China’s securities market has a history of almost 20 years until then. 
The sample of China’s listed companies can satisfy the time series requirement 
and the reasonable size requirement. The time series data also helped analyse the 
possible performance change after the ownership transformation from whole 
ownership to mixed ownership. Modelling itself is only a technical tool to 
conduct econometric analysis, some findings can be drawn from modelling 
analysis, but further explanations and discussions should be made to produce 
valuable conclusions. This research made consequent explanations and 
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discussions about the findings of the modelling analysis, and argued that mixed 
ownership itself would not necessarily lead to better performance although mixed 
ownership had been applauded by many state-owned enterprises and private 
firms. The more important thing than the ownership transformation from whole 
ownership to mixed ownership would be the corporate governance 
transformation. That reflects even modelling analysis also needs theoretical 
discussions to produce meaningful conclusions and policy implications. 
1.6  The Structure of This Thesis 
This thesis includes nine chapters. 
Chapter 1, Introduction  
This chapter discusses why the MOEs in China should be taken as an important 
research object, and the MOE is defined in this chapter. This chapter also 
explains the research objective, the research methods, and the research structure. 
Chapter 2, Literature review  
This chapter conducts comprehensive review on English and Chinese literature 
about the ownership restructuring of SOEs, the development of China’s MOEs, 
and the mixed ownership in other countries. Commenting on the existing 
literature is also made in this chapter.  
Chapter 3, The China Model of state-owned enterprises reform and the 
emergence of the mixed ownership enterprises 
As most of China’s MOEs are related to SOEs reform, this chapter starts with 
China’s SOEs reform and explores why numerous MOEs emerged in China. This 
chapter analyzes the radical control reform and the gradual ownership reform of 
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China’s SOEs. The China Model of SOEs reform is generalized in this chapter, 
and the fact that MOEs are correlated to the China Model is explored. 
Chapter 4, The commonness degree of the mixed ownership in China and the 
mixture degree  
This chapter analyzes the commonness degree of the mixed ownership and the 
mixture degree of China’s MOEs. The commonness degree and mixture degree 
are defined in this chapter. The analysis is carried out both by using the data of 
the questionnaire survey and by using the data of 300 listed companies of 
Shanghai-Shenzhen 300 Component Index in China. This analysis establishes a 
basis for the further research in the following chapters. 
Chapter 5, The major factors driving the emergence of the mixed ownership 
enterprises in China  
This chapter focuses on what particular factors bring about the emergence and 
the rise of numerous MOEs in China. I start with the economic alliance policy 
encouraged by the government in the 1980s in China, then gradually move on to 
SOEs ownership reform, and eventually conclude why so many MOEs emerged 
in China. It is explored why the government and SOEs as well as private firms all 
accept mixed ownership instead of whole state ownership or whole private 
ownership. 
Chapter 6, Understanding the corporate governance of the mixed ownership 
enterprises from the perspective of institutional arrangements  
This chapter carries out the literature review and the theoretical discussions on 
corporate governance from the perspective of new institutional economics, then 
establish a basic framework for the analysis of the institutional arrangements of 
MOEs corporate governance. 
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Chapter 7, The studies on the institutional arrangements of the corporate 
governance of mixed ownership enterprises: some findings  
This chapter uses the basic analytical framework established in chapter 6 to 
conduct the studies on the institutional arrangements of MOEs’ corporate 
governance. The shareholding structure of MOEs, the covenant among 
shareholders and the government, the office of the core managers, the special 
regulations imposed by the government, and the employment relations of the 
workers in MOEs, are analysed in this chapter, and some meaningful findings are 
presented. 
Chapter 8, Do mixed ownership enterprises outperform others: empirical 
estimation 
This chapter uses the data of listed companies in China’s securities market. Some 
hypotheses about the correlations between corporate performance and corporate 
shareholding structure are put forth. Through modelling and data processing, the 
hypotheses are tested.  
Chapter 9, Conclusions and further thinking  
This chapter summarizes the research. The major research findings, the major 
contributions, the academic value and the policy implications of this research are 
highlighted in this chapter. 
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
2.1  Introduction 
Since mixed ownership in China is highly related to the ownership reform of its 
SOEs, the literature review in this chapter will trace back to the SOEs reform and 
will involve some discussions on ownership theory. The literature review on 
mixed ownership is separated to the Chinese literature section and the English 
literature section. The Chinese literature is abundant, and has its own historical 
backdrop and time order, while the English literature is scarce but more 
theoretical and econometrics-styled. The literature review on corporate 
governance is not separated to different sections in chapter 2. The literature on 
MOEs’ corporate governance is scarce since mixed ownership has not arrested 
good attention, therefore I start with a brief overview of corporate governance 
and proceed with discussing the corporate governance literature from the 
perspectives of ownership attribute and shareholding structure. Since chapter 6 
will present some original studies on the corporate governance of China’s MOEs, 
I need to balance the allocation of corporate governance literature review 
between chapter 2 and chapter 6. My solution is that chapter 6 focuses on the 
literature review of corporate governance from the angle of new institutional 
economics, while chapter 2 addresses the general issues of corporate governance. 
The practices and the progress of the corporate governance improvements in 
China and some other countries will be addressed in chapter 6. 
 
 
17
                                         
2.2  The Chinese Literature on the Ownership Reform 
of State-Owned Enterprises 
2.2.1 The Early Studies on the Ownership Reform of 
State-Owned Enterprises  
At the start of China’s economic transition in the late 1970s, the SOEs reform 
went along with the reform of controlling powers (control reform) and did not 
touch the ownership. As a result most of the early Chinese literature on SOEs 
reform focuses on the autonomy of SOEs. Dong, Furen.(1979), stated that there 
were a number of crucial problems related to SOEs: firstly, the enterprises had 
become subsidiary bodies of the administrative organisations; secondly, the state 
had total control to both the revenues and expenditures of the enterprises; thirdly, 
the state monopolised the purchases and sales of products; fourthly, the 
enterprises lacked the minimum power of decision-making for both production 
and management; fifthly, the enterprises had no rights for independent 
accounting; sixthly, the enterprises did not care about their profit or loss. He 
concluded that the most imminent issue was the enforcement of the autonomy of 
SOEs.  
Moreover, Jiang, Yiwei. (1980) put forth “the enterprise standard doctrine” in 
1980. Jiang argued that China’s economic system was based on the Soviet 
Union’s model, the state was directly responsible for managing SOEs. To sum up, 
he stated that the SOEs should have independent power both in operation and 
business accounting, and should be responsible for their own profit and loss. 
Jiang, Yiwei. (1980) then argued that SOEs should enjoy their due rights and 
powers entrusted by the state, which he called “the enterprise standard doctrine”. 
He also created a detailed illustration of the key points of this doctrine: firstly, 
the independent enterprises were the basic units of the economy; secondly, the 
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enterprises should become dynamic bodies with powers for operation; thirdly, the 
enterprises should enjoy independent economic interests and should also be held 
responsible for their own profit and loss; fourthly, governmental functions should 
be separated from the enterprises. Jiang, Yiwei. (1980) argued that the state 
should manage the enterprises just by the following means: formulating 
economic policies and economic laws, making economic plans, using economic 
levers such as price and taxation to regulate the economic activities of the 
enterprises.  
The above studies encouraged the government to start the SOEs reform at that 
time, but the defects of those studies were also obvious. Those studies neglected 
not only the owner’s rights but also the corporate governance. At that time, the 
Chinese economists’ understanding of “the state” was only the role as the public 
administrator, but the role of state assets administration as the owner was 
neglected. Those economists did not realise that the function of the equity 
investor and the function of public administrator could be separated. Thus, 
Chinese scholars had all along emphasized the separation of operation from 
ownership. As the separation went along, it was found that the SOEs were under 
the firm control of the insiders and that brought about corruptions. The autonomy 
argument and “the enterprise standard doctrine” touched on the issue of incentive 
mechanism, but those papers could not clearly define, from the perspective of 
corporate governance, the relationship between the state and SOEs. Jiang, Yiwei. 
(1980) held that the state’s control over the enterprises should be just confined to 
the following aspects: to formulate economic policies and economic laws, to 
make economic plans, to regulate the economic activities of the enterprises by 
using the economic levers such as price and taxation. Obviously, the above 
functions were not in line with the shareholder’s rights, and he failed to mention 
how the state as a shareholder should select and change the managers. 
From the mid-1980s and on, as the defects of the control reform were widely 
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recognised, some Chinese economists began to call for the reform on state 
ownership (ownership reform). Dong, Furen.(1987) argued that the control 
reform would not work well without the ownership reform. The state ownership 
itself meant that SOEs were not responsible for money loss, the soft budgeting 
had become the inborn illness of SOEs. He stated that separating operation from 
ownership could not solve the problem of the soft budgeting. He suggested that 
the government should turn some small-sized SOEs into private or collective 
enterprises, and the large-sized SOEs could try shareholding system. Furthermore, 
he noted that the state should play its role only as a shareholder in the board of 
directors in shareholding enterprises, and could no longer issue orders to those 
enterprises. This is one of the earliest papers that argued the state ownership 
system could be transformed into shareholding system and touched slightly upon 
the issue of corporate governance.  
Although Chinese scholars started to discuss possible ownership reform, the 
privatisation was still forbidden in the 1980s. In the early 1980s, the introduction 
of some non-state shares into SOEs by developing shareholding system was 
welcomed. Tong, Dalin.(1986) called enthusiastically for the shareholding 
system. This paper was published in the official newspaper, People’s Daily. Tong 
himself was a high-level official at the State Economic Restructuring 
Commission. He stated that some cities in China had tried shareholding system 
and argued that socialist enterprises, including SOEs, should be restructured into 
shareholding companies. He also highlighted four patterns of shareholding 
restructuring: the stock issuance to employees, the stock issuance to the public, 
the cross-shareholding among SOEs, and the joint venture invested by SOEs and 
foreign companies. His paper implied the idea of mixed ownership even though 
the word of mixed ownership was not used. Furthermore, his paper implied that 
shareholding enterprises had emerged in reality since then, and the 
cross-shareholding between SOEs and non-SOEs was natural. Thus, as long as 
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shareholding trial was accepted by the government, mixed ownership might 
emerge naturally. 
Since the late 1980s Chinese people shrewdly strove to enhance the political 
legitimacy of mixed ownership by introducing employees’ shareholders. Jiang, 
Zemin. (1992) stated that it was possible to establish the socialist shareholding 
system based on public shares, but he argued that public shares should include 
not only the state shares, but also corporate shares and employees’ shares. He 
raised in clear terms the concepts of the employees’ collective shares and the 
employees’ cooperative shares, and held that these shares were of public 
ownership attribute instead of private ownership attribute. His statement of the 
socialist shareholding system is very interesting. Namely, employees’ 
shareholding is socialist rather than capitalist, and should be encouraged. 
According to Jiang, the employees could own some individual shares in SOEs. 
This statement had a major impact on the policy option. Afterwards, a good 
number of SOEs implemented the “insiders-typed ownership reform”, some state 
shares were sold to employees.  
The literature on shareholding system also touched upon the issue of property 
rights arrangements of SOEs. Chinese economists came to study Western 
theories on property rights since the mid-1980s. Chinese economists think R. 
Coase is the founder of modern property rights theory. In his classical paper “The 
nature of the firm”, Coase (1937) analysed the reason for the existence of firms. 
R. Coase attributed the existence of firms to transaction cost. In his another 
influential paper, “The problem of social cost” (1960), he highlighted the 
importance of property rights. With regard to the theory of property rights, the 
Western economists, H. Demsetz, O. Hart, E. Fama, and B. Holmstrom, also 
have great influence on Chinese economists. Demsetz (1967) summarized the 
function of property rights, saying that the main function was to encourage 
people to internalize the cost. Holmstrom (1982) noted that the moral hazards of 
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the management would impair the efficiency of enterprise, but the ownership 
function could check the moral hazards, so that property rights arrangements are 
relevant. Fama (1980) revealed that the market for managers in capitalist 
economies would put pressure on the management and could create to some 
extent the incentives. Later, Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1990) 
gave another explanation for property rights from the perspective of incomplete 
contract. They held that property rights become significant due to the 
incompleteness of contract and thus property rights should be defined as residual 
control rights. Putterman (1993) highlighted that the efficiency of public 
ownership is not as high as private ownership because the public do not have 
enough motives to monitor the performance of the management. Chinese 
economists widely accepted the research results of these scholars, thinking that 
the property rights system is the most fundamental system of firms and SOEs 
reform could not avoid the reform of property rights arrangements. Chinese 
economists also accepted the property rights analytical framework which has 
been established by Western economists, thinking that property rights can be 
defined as residual claim rights and residual control rights. Ostrom (1990) 
insisted that the public ownership would cause the tragedy of the commons. To 
counter this, Jozef and Van Brabant (1992) argued that the practical way of 
solving the tragedy of the commons problem in SOEs is privatisation. Their 
views also had big influence in China. 
In the early 1990s, some Chinese economists carefully raised the issue of selling 
the state equity to non-state investors. Tang, Fengyi. et al. (1990) stated the lack 
of a clear boundary line of property rights between SOEs and the state, noted the 
soft budgeting of the SOEs, and highlighted the necessity to sell some state assets 
to private investors and foreign investors. 
Since the defects of the control reform had been increasingly recognised and 
some shareholding companies were budding in silence, the early literature on 
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SOEs ownership reform in China appealed to encourage the shareholding system 
and to bring different ownership to mix up in particular enterprises. Some 
literature was influenced by property rights theory from Western countries. The 
advantages of private ownership and the disadvantages of state ownership were 
widely recognised by many Chinese economists, and they argued that partial 
private ownership should be introduced into SOEs so that the state ownership 
could be restructured. Those studies helped the government to clarify its idea, to 
accept the ownership reform. Interestingly, the practice usually went ahead of the 
theory, ownership reform trials and shareholding experiments occurred in reality 
before the economists called for the government to accept the reality and to 
improve its policy. 
2.2.2  The Early Studies on Mixed Ownership 
The issue of developing mixed ownership was originally raised in the mid-1980s. 
The first economist to put forth the concept of mixed ownership is Xue, Muqiao. 
(1987). He found that the ownership patterns of China’s enterprises were 
becoming more and more complicated in reality and were ever-evolving. Joint 
investment and joint business among different enterprises such as SOEs, 
collective enterprises and private firms, were developing quickly. As these 
enterprises had different ownership attribute, the mixed ownership would emerge. 
Although those mixed ownership enterprises were shareholding companies, they 
still belonged to socialist enterprise because the purpose of this kind of 
shareholding was only to identify the investment from different investors. 
Moreover, some SOEs and collective enterprises raised funds by issuing stocks 
to employees. These enterprises which contained state ownership and non-state 
ownership are mixed ownership enterprises. But Xuan still asserted that the state 
ownership should dominate the national economy.     
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It can be learned from Xuan’s studies that the practice of mixed ownership was 
evidently earlier than the theory of the mixed ownership. In 1988, Sichuan 
Economic Restructuring Institute (1988) published an article which was based on 
a field survey. The article stated that mixed ownership was emerging in Sichuan 
Province, and called for the official admission of the mixed ownership. 
In 1992, the 14th party congress of the CPC determined that the direction of 
China’s economic reform was to establish the socialist market economy. In order 
to liberalize the ideology of SOEs reform, an important paper by the China 
Academy of Social Science (1993) was published in 1993 that definitely called 
for developing mixed ownership in order to improve the ownership landscape in 
China. This paper noted that the non-state sector had been showing very positive 
vigour and the boundary between state ownership and non-state ownership was 
becoming vague as different attributes of ownership had been melted together in 
the market. It was impossible to differentiate the firms in terms of ownership 
attribute, and more enterprises would become mixed ownership enterprises. This 
article belongs to the earliest literature about mixed ownership in China. More 
articles on MOEs were published afterwards, but most of them focused on the 
argument of the compatibility of mixed ownership with the socialist system, the 
paper by Dai, Wenbian. (1993) is a typical one. This paper just argued that only 
mixed ownership could successfully combine the socialist system with the 
market economy together. 
A research report by Wu, Jinglian. et al. (1998) made a turning point. The 
purpose of this research was to provide policy recommendations for the 15th 
party congress CPC which was held in the autumn of 1997. This research argued 
that China had to carry out the strategic restructuring of the state sector, namely, 
the state sector should be streamlined and the size of the state sector should be 
dwindled. In order to streamline and diminish the state sector, state equity should 
be withdrawn from competitive lines and some small SOEs in these lines should 
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be sold out, the ownership structure of SOEs should be diversified by introducing 
non-state equity, and these ownership-restructured enterprises should be 
encouraged to establish good corporate governance. The main contents of this 
research were adopted by the 15th party congress of the CPC. This is an 
important research report promoting mixed ownership even though it did not use 
the term of mixed ownership. 
On the basis of that, Zhang, Wenkui. (1999) focused on the issue of restructuring 
SOEs’ shareholding structure. After analysing the enforcement of modern 
corporate system since 1994, he found that the dominant and controlling position 
of the state ownership had not been changed and this had constituted a major 
obstacle for the improvement of corporate governance of SOEs. Therefore, the 
most urgent task was to change the shareholding structure of SOEs and to realise 
the ownership diversification. He clearly stated the realisation of the ownership 
diversification should be based on selling state share. In his paper, ownership 
diversification was almost identical to mixed ownership. 
These studies on mixed ownership played a positive role in liberalizing the 
official ideology and changing the policies in China. However, the above 
literature was based on summarising the practical trials of mixed ownership in 
reality, instead of theoretical creation. The early Chinese literature on mixed 
ownership did not touch upon the driving factors of the emergence of mixed 
ownership. 
2.2.3  The Latter Studies on Mixed Ownership 
Since the 15th party congress held in 1997 and the 4th plenary session of 15th 
party congress held in 1999, the literature on mixed ownership has quickly 
expanded as the two conferences clearly called for developing the mixed 
ownership.  
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He, Lisheng., and Guan, Renqin. (1999), discussed the compatibility of mixed 
ownership and market economy. They stressed the superior compatibility of 
MOEs with market economy. It is regrettable however, they did not provide solid 
empirical evidences to support their claims. Xiao, Liang. (2004) studied some 
obstacles to developing mixed ownership and discussed how the government 
could remove them. Shao, Mingzhao. (2004) discussed the policy tendency of 
promoting mixed ownership in China. 
Since the beginning of the 21st century, Chinese economists have begun to 
conduct some empirical studies on MOEs. However, the empirical analysis with 
credible data and solid logic is scarce. Some empirical papers focused on the 
numbers of MOEs and their contributions to economic growth as well as their 
ownership structure, while a few papers conducted studies on performance 
analysis of MOEs. Wang, Yongnian. et al. (2006) conducted empirical analysis 
on MOEs in Anhui Province, but their definition of MOE referred to those 
registered as joint stock companies, limited liability companies, cooperative 
shareholding companies, joint operation companies and other companies. 
Actually, the MOEs in this paper included all enterprises other than SOEs, such 
as collective enterprises and private firms. This definition is inappropriate. They 
conducted comparative analysis and found that the total assets return ratio, labour 
productivity, and profit ratio of the MOEs were all lower than the SOEs, 
collective firms and private firms. Due to the problematic definition of the MOE, 
their findings were not credible.  
Xu, Shanchang. (2006) also conducted some empirical analysis on MOEs in 
Jiangsu Province and Zhejiang Province, but his study focused only on the 
changing numbers of MOEs in these two provinces. He argued that the basis of 
the development the MOEs in Jiangsu Province was the rise of township and 
village enterprises (TVEs) in the 1980s. For Zhejiang Province however, he 
attributed the development of MOEs to the rise of “red cap enterprises”(RCEs) 
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which were actually private firms but registered as collective firms. Since 1992, 
many TVEs had experienced ownership restructuring and many RCEs had 
experienced the transaction of “taking of the cap”. Then in the late-1990s, more 
than 98% of TVEs and most of the RCEs became MOEs in which private equity 
was usually dominant. In 1997, the MOEs output in Jinagsu Province contributed 
to more than 40% of the local GDP. Until 2003, 98.3% of the SOEs administered 
by local counties and all collective enterprises had finished their ownership 
restructuring, 90% of the ownership-restructured enterprises became MOEs. 
After entering the 21st century, the mixed ownership developed more quickly. In 
2005, the number of registered MOEs in Zhejiang Province was 313,571, which 
accounted for 61％of the total number of all registered enterprises.  
In general, the Chinese literature on mixed ownership has become abundant over 
time since the late-1980s. In the past years, a few papers with empirical analysis 
can be found. The above literature has shortcomings however. The literature 
before the mid-1990s focused on arguing the compatibility of mixed ownership 
with the socialist system. Some latter papers conducted empirical analysis, 
though these papers often focused on the ever-increasing numbers of MOEs and 
their contributions to the local economy. It is difficult to find any studies 
highlighting the factors that drove the emergence of the MOEs and highlighting 
the corporate governance issues of the MOEs, which are exactly the focus of my 
research.  
2.3  The English Literature on Ownership Theory and 
Mixed Ownership 
2.3.1  Literature on Ownership Theory 
In the 1930s, Coase (1937) built up the firm theory by analysing the nature of the 
firm and the transaction cost. Alchian and Demsetz (1972), and Willimsom 
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(1975), developed the firm theory by the approach of transaction cost. In the 
1970s, Jensen and Meckling (1976) established the principal-agency theory, they 
argued that many problems in firm’s operation and management could be 
explained by principal-agency issue. Afterwards many economists used the 
principal-agency theory to analyse the management and the governance of the 
firm. Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) did the multi-task principal-agency 
analysis, and noted that the agency cost might become more complicated in the 
multi-task environment. According to the principal-agency theory, ownership 
matters because ownership may change the agency cost. In the 1980s and 1990s, 
Hart (1988, 1989, 1995a) expanded the theory of the firm by introducing the 
analysis of incomplete contract. He noted that the property rights matter due to 
the incompleteness of contract, and ownership is connected with the residual 
control of the firm. The introduction of the analysis of incomplete contract 
marked the new phase of the studies on the firm theory. Hart and Moore (1990) 
explained that the property rights should be defined on the basis of the 
distribution of corporate control, the nature of the firm should be understood 
from the perspective of the incompleteness of contract. In the past 20 years, the 
principal-agency theory and incomplete contract theory have been widely used to 
discuss the ownership and the control of the firm. Holmstrom and Milgrom 
(1991, 1994) argued that ownership has important impact on the incentive system 
of the firm that could affect firm’s efficiency. Sappington (1991) also held that 
incentive is connected with ownership because of agency cost. Harris and Raviv 
(1991) analysed the relationship between corporate control and corporate capital, 
and noted that the distribution of corporate control and the design of controlling 
powers are very important. Shleifer and Vishny (1994) stepped forward in their 
studies on the state ownership and government interference. They argued that the 
state ownership should be reformed so as to improve corporate efficiency, and 
the privatisation is a suitable choice. Boycko et al. (1996) discussed theoretically 
the significance and the related policies of the state ownership restructuring, they 
believed that the privatisation is helpful to improve the corporate performance. 
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Brada (1996) described the privatisation happening in transitional countries, and 
explained the connection between the economic transition and the privatisation 
of state ownership. Schmidt (2000) even discussed the different styles of the 
privatisation and the corresponding results, and found that the outsider-oriented 
privatisation seems more efficient.  
The above studies on ownership theory demonstrate or imply that private 
ownership has clearer and more efficient property rights arrangements than state 
ownership. But unfortunately, mixed ownership has not arrested enough 
theoretical discussions from the perspectives of transaction cost, principal-agency, 
and incomplete contract. 
2.3.2  Literature on Mixed Ownership 
After reviewing major economic journals, I found only a few papers touching on 
mixed ownership. Brooks（1987）conducted case studies on mixed ownership by 
using the cases of the British Petroleum Company (BP) and the Canada 
Development Investment Company, and found that the governments were liable 
to use the state equity in MOEs to force them to operate in favour of policy 
priorities and then the commercial value was neglected. That means the mixed 
ownership was employed as an instrument of public policy which might impair 
the commercial value. This analysis is enlightening, but its analysis is regrettably 
based only on case studies. Puffer et al.（2000）studied three mixed ownership 
cases. This paper recorded the history of these companies and their business 
activities but did not provide any data or other relevant materials. Schmitz (2000) 
conducted a theoretical study on partial privatisation from the perspective of 
incomplete contract, and argued by the modelling analysis that only if the 
corporate management faces the investment decisions, it may be optimal to 
choose partially privatised ownership instead of whole state ownership and 
whole private ownership. Mattijs et al.（2001）conducted some empirical studies 
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on the major international airline companies with mixed ownership. This paper 
selected 50 airline companies as the sample and found 13 of them were MOEs 
during 1993 to 1997. The empirical studies found that the performance of the 
state-owned airline companies were poorer than private airline companies. The 
shortcoming of this paper is the small sample of the enterprises. 
Some economists studied the practices of partial privatisation. Of course, 
partially-privatised enterprises are usually MOEs. Ramamurti (1997) took the 
case of Argentine Railroads Company and found partial privatisation was more 
acceptable. Matsumura (1998) analysed the partial privatisation in mixed 
duopoly and found partial privatisation would be an optimal choice. Bennett and 
Maw (2003) conducted partial privatisation studies in some transitional 
economies. They found that the governments were sometimes liable to maintain 
some state shares when privatising SOEs. They also found that the maintenance 
of some state shares impacted upon the investment and the production of the 
enterprises. Beladi and Chao（2006） also studied the practices of the partial 
privatisation in some developing countries, and found that the higher the degree 
of privatisation was, the more favourable the privatisation was to the long-term 
growth and long-term employment. 
Pisano (1990) also did studies on partial ownership arrangement or “equity 
linkage”. It was argued that partial ownership would dominate the contractual 
governance when a relationship involves uncertainty, transaction-specific capital, 
and other variables, and it was hypothesized that equity linkages are more likely 
when R&D is to be done during the collaboration, and less likely when there are 
more potential collaborators. The analysis on biotech industry supports these 
claims. Apparently, the studies on mixed ownership in this paper just focus on 
specific industries. Menard (1996) also did some studies on hybrid companies, 
but still looked at the specific industries. 
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In general, there is little English literature on mixed ownership. The reason might 
be mixed ownership is not common in Western countries. Although a few papers 
on mixed ownership were found but these papers focus only on case studies or 
performance analysis. These papers are not directly related to China’s MOEs or 
to my research questions. 
2.3.3  Literature on Public-Private Partnership  
From the early 1990s, public-private partnership (PPP) has enjoyed a growing 
standing, China is one of the countries which introduced PPP in recent years. 
Under PPP system long-term and stable contracts between the government and 
private firms are established. These contracts may concern infrastructure and 
public service. This enables private funds to be introduced while service scale 
and service quality are expected to be improved. 
PPP program usually encourages private investment. The contracts can also set 
future ownership arrangements between governments and private firms, thus a 
company under PPP program may be a MOE or may become a MOE in the 
future. 
Aubert and Laffont (2002) studied the issues of negotiation and contracting of 
PPP programs. They argued that the government and the political system had a 
big impact on the contracting of the investment and the operation of 
infrastructure. Their conclusion implied it was difficult for the companies 
containing some state shares to follow commercial rules. Iossa and Martimort 
(2008) established a basic analytical framework from the economics perspective 
for PPP system. They also studied the ownership arrangements issue of PPP 
program. Bennett and Iossa (2006) studied the ownership issue and the incentives 
of PPP program. They found that the introduction of private ownership increased 
the incentives, reduced the service cost and improved the service quality. That 
means the introduction of the private ownership is significant for the 
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performance improvement. Martimort and Pouyet (2007) established a model to 
analyse the efficiency of PPP program, they found that PPP would reduce the 
agency cost while the positive externality existed between the project builder and 
the manager, but the ownership arrangements were not so important. Some 
scholars, such as Guash (2004), Engel et al. (2006) studied the impact of the 
government activities on contract achievement and service quality. They found 
that the government might act against the contract in pursuit of the political 
interests, which had a negative impact on the service price and quality. Therefore, 
if PPP depended only on the contract and the ownership arrangements were not 
involved, the uncertainty of the political system would increase the risk of PPP 
program. That means even under PPP program, ownership is still important. 
Empirical analysis by Brench et al. (2005), and by Guasch et al. (2006), 
substantiated the above arguments. Furthermore, the paper by Hammami et al. 
(2006) noted that the political system and institutional environment was very 
crucial to the seriousness of the PPP contract. In the countries with the stable 
political system and sound institutional environment, the PPP contracts were 
usually enforced. From this perspective, ownership matters because the degree of 
the social respect to ownership is usually much higher than the degree of the 
social respect to contract in many countries. De Bettignies and Ross (2007) 
studied PPP from the perspective of incomplete contract, they argued that the 
introduction of private ownership was significant. Hart (2003) also conducted 
studies on PPP from the perspective of incomplete contract, and noted that the 
state ownership had a lot of disadvantages and the introduction of the private 
ownership could offset these disadvantages to some extent. Hart et al. (1997) 
argued that private investments and private operations could be introduced even 
in the jailing sector. 
The literature on PPP is much more abundant than the literature on mixed 
ownership. The reason is that PPP developed very quickly in the Western 
countries, while China is the only country where mixed ownership grew up 
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quickly due to China’s distinctive system. PPP may result in mixed ownership, 
but usually involves contracting issue. Nevertheless, much literature points out 
ownership arrangements are still significant even under serious contracts and the 
introduction of private ownership can enhance the incentives and improve the 
efficiency. The control structure does not depend fully on the ownership 
arrangements, the political system and the government priorities may impact on 
the control structure. This means the governance under PPP can not avoid the 
impact from the government and the politics. 
2.3.4  The Empirical Studies on Mixed Ownership Enterprises 
Some scholars studied the MOEs originating from ownership restructuring of 
state owned enterprises. Mihalyi (1996) found that some SOEs were restructured 
into MOEs rather than private firms in the early stage of Hungary’s economic 
transition, but the government did have a clear plan to sell the residual state 
shares in the MOEs. Some scholars conducted studies on China’s SOEs reform 
and the performance of China’s MOEs. Liu and Woo (2001) found that the 
ownership structure of SOEs in China moved in the direction of ownership 
diversification since its entrance to WTO. The introduction of non-state equity 
was useful not only to raise more funds but also to improve corporate governance 
and to enhance their market competence. Although the authors did not mention 
the causes of the rise of the MOEs in China, their conclusions implied that all the 
institutions would be helpful to the enterprises as long as these institutions could 
promote the development of enterprises and encourage the enterprises to follow 
market rules. This paper is very valuable to my research because it points out the 
opening-up of the ownership structure of SOEs and the introduction of non-state 
capital is helpful for the enterprises to raise funds and to change the institutions. 
Xu and Wang (1999) conducted empirical analysis on the companies listed in 
Shanghai Stock Exchange. They analyzed the correlation between the ownership 
structure of the companies and their performance, found the lower the proportion 
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of state ownership was, the higher the performance was. Those papers are 
valuable to my research. But unfortunately, those papers did not touch upon the 
driving factors of the emergence of China’s MOEs, their corporate governance, 
and the performance comparison. 
2.4  Literature on Corporate Governance 
2.4.1  An Overview of Corporate Governance 
There is plenty of literature on corporate governance since it is a very important 
research issue in both economics and law. This concept however, has been 
defined quite differently. Generally speaking, economists think that corporate 
governance is related to principal-agency problem.  
Principal-agency problem originates from the separation of ownership and 
control. Berle and Means (1932) described the impacts of the separation of 
ownership and control. Jensen and Meckling (1976) summarized the relationship 
between owner and controller after the separation as the principal-agent 
relationship. This paper laid the foundation for the corporate governance theory. 
But the first economist who initially used the concept of governance structure 
may be Williamson (1975). But in his paper, the term of governance structure 
was not identical to corporate governance. Cochran and Wartick（1988）gave a 
clear definition of corporate governance, argued that corporate governance was 
to handle the issues of responsibilities, powers and interests among managers, 
shareholders, board of directors, and the stakeholders. The essential issues 
include: Who actually get the interests from the company’s decision-making and 
transactions? Who ought to get the interests? How should the disagreements be 
solved? According to Monks and Minow (2001), corporate governance is usually 
regarded as the role of board of directors, the role of management, the role of 
owners, and the role of stakeholders. In addition, corporate transparency, 
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corporate compliance, the independence of corporate business and corporate 
finance, and the safety of corporate assets, are also the important issues of 
corporate governance (OECD, 2004). 
But from the perspective of institutional economics, corporate governance means 
more. Hart（1995b）emphasized the importance of control structure in corporate 
governance. He based the analysis on the theory of incomplete contract. His 
research pushed forward the studies of corporate governance and was helpful for 
people to understand corporate governance from the perspective of economics, 
rather than from the perspective of law. Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Becht et al. 
(2002), studied corporate governance from the perspective of the protection of 
investors’ interests, and found that good corporate governance usually involved a 
set of institutions to protect investors’ interests. Tirol (2001) developed an 
economic analysis of the concept of shareholder value, described its approach, 
and discussed some questions including monitoring structure, control structure, 
and managerial incentives. He pointed out that the traditional shareholder value 
approach is too narrow for an economic analysis of corporate governance, and 
defined corporate governance as the design of institutions that induce or force 
management to internalize the welfare of both shareholders and stakeholders.  
It is meaningful to explore who will be liable to harm shareholder welfare. 
Existing literature finds that insiders are liable to promote their own interests 
instead of investors’ interests. Studies by Hall and Murphy（2002）showed that 
the CEOs’ compensations of some American companies increased by two fold in 
the period of 1994 to 2001, a figure much higher than the increase of the 
performance and the shareholders’ return. This means managers are more 
interested in increasing their own interests instead of shareholders’ interests. 
They also found that executives sometimes misled investors through accounting 
manipulation. Bergstresser and Phlippon（2005）found that the executives in some 
large companies manipulated the stock price through accounting fraud and 
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exercised the stock option favourably in order to increase their own interests. 
These activities undoubtedly are harmful to shareholders’ interests and hurt the 
best practices of corporate governance. 
It was the Cadbury Report published in the early 1990s that aroused the global 
attention to corporate governance. Cadbury Report believed that the bankruptcy 
of some companies listed in the stock market resulted from specific problems 
related to the corporate governance of these firms. The report held that in order to 
improve corporate governance of the firms in the UK, it was necessary to 
intensify the role of the board of directors, to establish auditing committee and to 
increase the number of the outside directors. The Greenbury Report was 
published in 1995, raising the suggestions about the reform in executive 
compensations and the promotion of transparency. This report is another very 
important piece of literature on corporate governance. 
Many studies on the function of the board of directors and its check on 
executives have been conducted since then. Bebchuk and Fried (2004) found that 
the boards in many companies collaborated, sometimes even colluded, with 
executives, and were liable to convey interests to each other instead of promoting 
shareholders interests. The boards did not monitor the executives effectively but 
were more interested in pleasing executives in order to be reappointed. The 
boards might help the executives to block M&As which would challenge their 
positions. Yermak（2004）found the poor  corporate transparency was very 
harmful to corporate governance. This means information disclosure should be 
enhanced in order to protect investors’ interests and to obtain the trust of 
investors. Transparency is of course a very important standard of good corporate 
governance. 
Blair (1995) held that corporate governance should cover a wider scope. She 
argued that corporate governance should be regarded as an integrated organism 
which governs the distribution of the enterprise controlling powers and risks as 
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well as the guarantee of the employees’ interests. She emphasized in particular 
the importance of employees who are the enterprises’ stakeholders, and pointed 
out it is very important to safeguard the interests of employees for the long-term 
and healthy development of the enterprises. Since then more scholars accepted 
her assertion. O’Sullivan and Lazonic (2005) analyzed the crucial standing of 
insiders, they argued that the rights of insiders should be more enhanced in 
corporate governance. 
2.4.2  Shareholding Structure and Corporate Governance 
Shareholding structure is undoubtedly one of the major research issues for 
corporate governance. Apart from the initial studies of the relationship between 
ownership structure and agency cost by Jensen and Meckling (1976), some other 
scholars conducted in-depth research on corporate governance from the 
perspective of shareholding structure. Many people thought that shareholding 
structure has a direct impact on firm value and the effectiveness of corporate 
governance. Morck et al. (1998) believed that the disagreement between the 
decisions made by the managers and the interests of outside investors was very 
common and when the managers’ shareholding proportion increased, the 
agreement between the managers’ interests and the outside shareholders’ interests 
would gradually be raised. The empirical studies by McConnel and Servaes 
(1995) showed that the proportion of the shares held by insiders was highly 
related to Tobin’s Q. Cho (1998) also made empirical studies and came to the 
conclusion that firm’s value was closely related to insiders’ shareholding  
proportion.  
Other scholars studied the relationship between shareholding structure and the 
effectiveness of corporate governance from different perspectives. Many 
economists viewed the impact of shareholding concentration on corporate 
governance as an important issue. The shareholding concentration differs widely 
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by countries, it is very high in some countries and very low in other countries. 
Franks et al. (1996) found that a number of large companies in many continental 
European countries including France, Germany, Italy and Sweden, had high 
shareholding concentration. This was very true in Italy, where more than 50% of 
equity for most listed companies was held by one particular shareholder, and the 
position of small shareholders in corporate governance was very weak. 
Holderness and Sheehan (1988) made comparative studies on the listed 
companies with a particular shareholder grabbing the controlling powers and the 
listed companies with ownership diversification. They found the company 
performance did not have any direct relation with shareholding structure and 
believed it was hard to say ownership diversification or shareholding 
concentration had any material impact on corporate performance or corporate 
value. Faccio and Lang (2002) analyzed statistically the shareholding 
concentration ratio of the companies with a sample of 5,232 listed corporations 
in thirteen Western European countries, and found that 54% of these companies 
had only one large shareholder with strong control over the company. Claessens 
et al. (2000) conducted similar statistical analysis on 2,980 listed companies in 
nine Eastern Asian economies, found that those companies also had a high 
shareholding concentration ratio, more than half of those companies had only one 
large shareholder who strongly controlled the company affairs. But La Porta et al. 
(1998) found that the listed companies in the US and the UK had a much lower 
shareholding concentration ratio in comparison with Eastern Asian companies 
and continental European companies, and it was difficult to find a large 
shareholder who controlled the company affairs in the listed companies in the US 
and the UK. In contrast, the executives usually controlled the companies. 
Economists are also concerned about the correlation between the shareholding 
concentration ratio and corporate performance, but research conclusions differ 
enormously. Holderness and Sheehan (1988) conducted comparative studies on 
the listed companies with and without the controlling shareholders and found that 
there was no noted correlation between shareholding concentration ratio and 
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corporate performance. But studies by McConnel and Servaes (1990) showed 
that corporate performance was strongly correlated to shareholding concentration 
ratio, the corporate value was related not only to the shareholding concentration 
but also to insiders’ shareholding proportion. They argued that corporate 
performance was correlated to shareholding structure. 
From the above literature review it can be found there are different views about 
the correlation between corporate governance and shareholding structure. 
Furthermore, the definition of shareholding structure in the above literature is 
also different. It refers to the proportions of the equity held separately by insiders 
and outside investors in some literature, but to the concentration of the equity 
held by a particular shareholder in other literature. All those understandings of 
shareholding structure are different from the definition of shareholding structure 
in this thesis.  
2.4.3  Ownership Attribute and Corporate Governance 
Alchian and Demsetz (1972) studied the difference between socialist and 
capitalist enterprise. They found that the supervision cost of socialist enterprise 
was very high due to the laziness and inadequate incentives of the management. 
Boycko et al. (1996) made theoretical discussions and modelling analysis on 
privatisation. They believed that only privatisation could solve the problems of 
the laziness and corruption of the management. Through privatisation the 
corporate operation could be quickly commercialised. Shleifer (1998) further 
illustrated the significance of privatisation. He argued that it did not stand for the 
state to adhere to state ownership under the excuse of realising social goals. He 
held that some of the social goals should be shouldered by the government itself 
instead of by SOEs. He claimed privatisation could greatly improve efficiency 
and help alleviate the financial burden. Allen and Gale (1999) conducted studies 
on the correlation between corporate governance and competition. Although their 
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studies did not touch ownership attribute, they implied that state ownership was 
not helpful in establishing a competitive market or in improving corporate 
governance. 
Some Chinese economists have paid good attention to China’s SOEs reform from 
the perspective of ownership attribute and corporate governance. Zhang, Weiying. 
(1994) made a systematic analysis on the principal-agency relationship of 
China’s SOEs. His research indicated that the decentralization of the state sector 
could be helpful to enhance the incentives of the management. He summarized 
the features of the principal-agency relationship for China’s SOEs into two caste 
systems: the authorisation chain of the first caste system is from the initial 
principal to the “central” principal with an upward principal-agency direction; 
the authorisation chain of the second caste system is from the “central” principal 
to the insiders of the enterprise (final agent) with a downward principal-agency 
direction. Apart from the initial principal and insiders, each person in the two 
chains has dual status of both the principal’s agent and the agent’s principal. His 
research indicated that the supervision activism of the initial principal and the 
working endeavour of the final agent will decrease with an increased degree of 
public ownership and increased size of public ownership within the economy. 
Decentralization of the public ownership will increase the supervision activism 
of the initial principal and the working endeavour of the final agent. He held that 
this conclusion can explain why the decentralisation in terms of the SOEs reform 
can promote the efficiency of the SOEs. His studies did not give adequate 
illustrations, however, to the issues related to corporate governance. Qian, Yingyi 
(1994) made a special study on corporate governance in China’s SOEs reform. 
He illustrated the changes of the governance structure of China’s SOEs since the 
1980s, found that a large share of controlling powers and residual claims of 
SOEs had been transferred to the managers through decentralization. On the 
basis of that, some informal privatisation occurred, that led to insiders’ control. 
By informal privatisation, he referred to the fact that when the government was 
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the nominal owner, the managers received high income through the contracting 
or leasing system without being responsible for any losses. In other words, when 
the nominal ownership was not changed, the managers obtained lot of interests 
from the SOEs by employing their controlling powers. He also believed that the 
informal privatisation and the insiders’ control in China were not as serious as in 
Russia or Eastern Europe. One reason for this was that the Chinese Communist 
Party, as the ruling party, still had the final decision-making power for the 
appointment and removal of the SOEs’ managers. Therefore, the party’s power 
on the managers’ appointment and removal was an important force to check the 
insiders’ control. However, the party did not depend on the managers’ economic 
performance as the criteria for appointing and removing the managers. He 
considered that China’s SOEs options for ownership reform and corporate 
governance improvement should include the following methods: the small-sized 
SOEs should be sold to the mangers and employees and some of the large- and 
medium-sized SOEs should take in some foreign capital and turn into joint 
ventures. With regard to other large-sized and medium-sized enterprises where 
corporate governance improvement would be difficult, the non-banking financial 
institutions and banks should play their roles in the governance reform of the 
SOEs.  Aoki (1994), a Japanese economist, came up with the proposition of 
“checking the insiders’ control”. He held that the corporate governance reform of 
the SOEs during the transitional period meant that some of the conditions 
inherited from the planning economy had a major impact upon corporate 
governance reform. In the planning economy, the management of the SOEs was 
appointed by the government, and during the transitional period the ownership of 
the SOEs would undergo some changes and the government would no longer 
hold the power for the appointment and removal of the SOEs managers. Through 
analysing the cases in Russia and Eastern Europe, Aoki pointed out that the 
insiders’ control was a common issue during the transitional period. He 
suggested that in order to check the “insiders’ control” and to improve the 
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corporate governance, one option was to play the role of the banks and other 
financial institutions as the outside supervisors. 
However, the research jointly conducted by Kang and Stulz (1998) found that the 
Japanese banks did not do much to improve the corporate governance of 
Japanese enterprises. On the contrary, they provided unnecessary loans for 
enterprises bogged down in financial difficulties. The studies by Weinstein and 
Yafeh（1998）found that the Japanese main banks did not play the expected role in 
improving corporate governance and caused the banks and the insiders to join 
their hands in resisting corporate restructuring.  
Even by the end of the 1990s, many Chinese economists still focused on how to 
make use of the outside financial institutions to check the “insiders’ control”. Wu, 
Jinglian. et al. (1998) held that the issue of “insiders’ control” during the process 
of SOEs reform stood side by side with the non-implementation of the autonomy 
of enterprises. They suggested that China should allow banks to hold some shares 
of the SOEs. Their studies also touched upon the relations between the “new 
three committees” and the “old three committees”. The “new three committees” 
refer to the general meeting of shareholders, the board of directors, and the board 
of supervisors, while the “old three committees” refer to the party committee of 
the CPC, the workers’ congress, and the trade union. But since entering the 2000s, 
more deep-going studies have been conducted on the issue of corporate 
governance in SOEs reform. Tenev and Zhang (2002), the experts from the 
World Bank, were also highly concerned about the conflicts between the “new 
three committees” and the “old three committees”. They carried out surveys 
mainly on ownership-diversified enterprises and found that, even if the 
ownership structure had realized a certain level of diversification, the conflicts 
between the “new three committees” and the “old three committees” were still 
very serious. They also found that the power boundaries and decision-making 
procedures were not very clear and the literal powers and decision-making 
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procedures became a mere formality. Under many circumstances, corporate 
governance was still associated with the traditional methods and means. For 
instance, party meetings or management meetings still occupied an important 
place in decision-making while the position of the board of directors was still 
weak. In spite of the realisation of ownership diversification, the relationship 
between the enterprises and the government did not have any substantial change. 
The government still kept some key powers, including the power for the 
appointment and the removal of the management. The government still played 
the role of the arbitrator for the internal conflicts of the enterprises. To some 
extent, the management and the staff were pursuing the government’s 
intervention because they did not want to free themselves from the patriarchal 
protection by the government. Zhang, Chunlin. (2003) further claimed that it was 
necessary to establish a board of directors system in compliance with the 
international norm and to rely on the board of directors.  
Some scholars conducted studies on the issue of corporate governance of 
privatised SOEs in transitional countries. Boycko et al. (1994) conducted an 
empirical study on the privatisation in Russia. Their research indicated that, in 
comparison with the voucher privatisation in Russia, the privatisation in Eastern 
Germany and Hungary was more successful for raising the efficiency of 
corporate governance. Estin and Wright (1999) made a comparison between the 
privatisation of Ukraine and some other countries. They held that it was 
recommendable to sell enterprises directly to outside investors.  
Boycko et al. (1996) sharply pointed out that the successful realisation of the 
ownership reform of SOEs was not as simple as transferring the ownership to 
non-government institutions or individuals. They believed that this process 
should include two transfers: first, the decision-making power should be 
transferred from the government to the professional management so that the 
management could make commercialised decisions and could undertake 
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accountabilities for the performance; second, the controlling powers for cash 
flow should be transferred from the government to the professional management 
and social shareholders so as to form a rational incentive mechanism. It is 
obvious that they are highly aware of the importance of corporate governance for 
SOEs ownership reform. Sachs et al. (2000) held that, apart from the necessary 
ownership transfer, the basic market competition system and market rule system 
were also crucial to establish the framework for corporate governance. D’ Souza 
et al. (2001) also conducted some empirical studies on privatised enterprises, 
concluding that while ownership was transferred, it was necessary to 
substantially restructure the enterprises and to establish proper corporate 
governance. Kim, T. K. (2003) took the privatisation of some Korean SOEs as 
the example, indicating that the successful reform of SOEs depended on the 
proper corporate governance, the diversified ownership structure, and the 
professional management. 
It can be found that the issue of corporate governance in SOEs ownership reform 
has been highly raised. It is quite clear that the establishment of good corporate 
governance is crucial during the process of SOEs ownership reform. 
2.4.4 The Corporate Governance of Mixed Ownership 
Enterprises 
Many economists are concerned about the corporate governance of China’s 
enterprises as those enterprises are becoming more and more commercialised. 
Clarke（2003）tried to conduct some studies on the corporate governance of 
China’s enterprises, but he just delineated the current conditions and pointed out 
how the political system might jeopardize good corporate governance. Shirley 
and Xu（2001）conducted some studies on the performance of China’s enterprises 
and on the relationship between the enterprises and the government. Their studies 
are useful for people in understanding the corporate governance of China’s 
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enterprises. Bai et al. (2004) conducted studies on the corporate governance of 
China’s enterprises, but they only focused on listed companies. Pistor and Xu 
(2005) conducted studies on the corporate governance of listed companies in 
China, the sample included some state-controlled listed companies. Liu (2006) 
studied the corporate governance of China’s enterprises from the perspective of 
law and politics, and pointed out that China’s enterprises usually did not have 
enough transparency or clear enterprise-government relationship, and their 
transactions sometimes did not follow the law. Fan and Wong (2007) studied the 
corporate governance of some privatised SOEs in China and found that the 
managers of those companies were still controlled by the politically-orientated 
government. Aivazian et al.（2005）studied the corporatisation issue of China’s 
SOEs and the corporate governance of those companies. However, these studies 
did not involve mixed ownership. 
MOE is a special kind of enterprise. The distinctive ownership structure usually 
leads to distinctive corporate governance (Lin, 2000). But it is regrettable that 
existing literature hardly touches upon the corporate governance of MOEs. Only 
a few papers touching on the corporate governance of the MOEs in China were 
found. Tong, Dalin. (1986) may be the earliest economist in China to mention the 
corporate governance of MOEs. His article appealed that China’s SOEs should 
be restructured to shareholding companies and should introduce some non-state 
equity. He further suggested that the board of directors should be established in 
these companies so that a new system could be set up. He argued that most of the 
directors should be the representatives of the shareholders, but some outside 
experts could also be appointed as directors. The State Economic and Trade 
Commission (1993) published an article putting forward the idea that the 
corporations in China should establish congress of shareholders and board of 
directors. But this article also emphasized that the function of the communist 
party committee in these corporations. The early literature on the corporate 
governance of MOEs usually focused on the functions of the board of directors, 
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board of supervisors, the congress of shareholders as well as the communist party 
organisations. In 1993, the first Company Law was enacted in China, there were 
no more legal obstacles of establishing board of directors and boards of 
supervisor as well as congress of shareholders. Latter on, some papers on the 
corporate governance of MOEs emerged. The paper by Li, Zhengtu. (2005) is 
one of them. However, this paper was short of basic academic regularity. The 
author asserted that he employed the theory of stakeholder as the basis of his 
studies and then argued that the stakeholders of MOEs should include the owners 
of factory buildings, the owners of money, the owners of human capital and the 
owners of market resources. He argued that the traditional company emphasizes 
the interests of shareholders, but the MOEs should emphasize the interests of 
stakeholders. Yao, Shengqun., and Ma, Jian. (2008) also studied the corporate 
governance of MOEs. They did some empirical studies, but the so-called ‘MOEs’ 
in this paper were actually listed companies. They talked about some traditional 
corporate governance issues such as insiders’ control, but no special issues about 
MOEs were touched upon. 
In short, I found that little Chinese and English literature had touched on the 
corporate governance of MOEs. There are some articles in Chinese touching on 
the corporate governance of MOEs, but their academic regularity and academic 
value are quite poor. 
2.5  Concluding Remarks 
This chapter provides a comprehensive review of the Chinese and English 
literature on ownership restructuring of SOEs and mixed ownership. It is found 
that the number of Chinese articles on mixed ownership has increased over time 
since the mid-1990s, but most of these articles focused on asserting the 
compatibility of mixed ownership with the socialist system, and on appealing the 
government to build up the political legitimacy of mixed ownership. There are 
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only a few articles that pursue the empirical research. There is hardly any English 
literature on the corporate governance of MOEs, only a few English papers are 
found but these papers focus on case studies. Studies on the factors driving the 
emergence of China’s MOEs as well as the corporate governance of China’s 
MOEs are an undeveloped land. However, plentiful literature on the relationship 
between corporate governance and ownership structure, and on the relationship 
between ownership attribute and corporate governance, is still enlightening 
although the definition of the ownership structure in the above literature is not 
related to mixed ownership. 
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Chapter 3 
The China Model of State-Owned Enterprises 
Reform and the Emergence of the Mixed 
Ownership Enterprises 
3.1  Introduction 
The background of the emergence of China’s MOEs is its economic transition 
since 1978. It is impossible to understand the rise of China’s MOEs if its 
economic transition is not understood well since most of the MOEs originated 
from the ownership restructuring of SOEs. Actually, SOEs reform has been 
regarded as the key task of the economic transition by the government. 
Since the 1980s, economic transition has taken place in many countries, such as 
China, Russia, Eastern European countries and Vietnam, and SOEs reform was 
usually the top priority of the transition agenda. Interestingly, apart from the 
transitional economies, some other countries, including Western European 
countries such as Britain and France, Northern European countries such as 
Sweden and Norway, and many developing countries such as Brazil and 
Argentina, have also experienced SOEs reform since the early 1980s. With the 
exception of China and Vietnam (Vietnam copied China’s reform), almost all of 
the above-mentioned transitional and non-transitional countries chose definite 
and planned path of privatisation in their SOEs reform. According to the studies 
by Kikeri and Nellis (2002), the worldwide privatisation movement advanced 
enormously in the 1990s. The ratio of SOEs output within GDP in 
middle-income countries stood around 11% in the mid-1980s, privatisation 
however pulled this ratio down to about 5% in 1997. The privatisation movement 
in low-income countries was even more aggressive. Studies by Chong and 
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Lopez-de-Silances (2005) showed that the ratio of SOEs output in GDP in 
low-income countries was pulled down from about 15% to about 3% over the 
same period by the privatisation movement. 
Nellis (1994) raised the question whether privatisation is necessary in the 
transitional process. It is widely believed that the worldwide privatisation 
movement was not accidental, though privatisation in Russia and Eastern 
European countries was caused mainly by the political quake. It is undeniable 
that the poor efficiency of SOEs has been criticised in the world. In the 1960s, 
Friedman (1962) criticised state ownership. The survey by the World Bank (1995) 
demonstrated the poor efficiency of SOEs. Boycko et al.（1996）argued that only 
privatisation could solve the problems of weak incentives and strong 
governmental interference. La Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes (1999) asserted the 
benefit of privatisation of SOEs. The studies by Megginson and Netter (2001) 
testified that the privatisation in some circumstances was very helpful for 
enterprises to operate by market rules. Studies by Megginson et al (1994) showed 
that privatisation was helpful in improving the performance of enterprises. 
Shleifer（1998）asserted that SOEs had many disadvantages and privatisation was 
undoubtedly necessary. It is fair to say, the worldwide privatisation movement is 
not only the result of the political changes since the 1980s, but also the result of 
the studies testifying the poor efficiency of SOEs. 
China is an exception however. Firstly, the process of the SOEs reform in China 
is very long. The SOEs reform in China has lasted for more than thirty years to 
date, from 1978, without a conclusion. Secondly, China does not follow a 
definite and planned path of privatisation, although as a matter of fact many 
SOEs have been privatised since the mid 1990s. In fact, the government rejected 
privatisation for a long time after 1978. Thirdly, most transitional countries 
suffered drastic output decline after SOEs privatisation, but China’s state sector 
survived and experienced output growth. While the non-state sector expanded 
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over time, the state sector still maintains one-third of the total industrial output 
nowadays. The present state sector in China however does not mean 
wholly-state-owned enterprises any more. As a matter of fact, most of the 
so-called SOEs are those enterprises with the majority of the equity owned by the 
state but some shares owned by non-state shareholders. Although there are still 
some wholly-state-owned enterprises, they usually have a strange organizational 
structure in which the parent company is wholly-owned by the state but the 
subsidiaries are MOEs.  
In chapter 2 it is mentioned that privatisation is not admitted officially during 
China’s transitional process, but the government has established a strategy of 
promoting mixed ownership. Promoting mixed ownership is undoubtedly the 
product of China’s ideology and its politics. However, it remains unclear whether 
selecting mixed ownership is only due to the political obstacles of privatisation, 
or whether there are other some driving factors. Considering the fact that mixed 
ownership emerged in reality before it was justified and admitted by the 
government, there were certainly some other factors than the government 
strategy and the political system which had driven the emergence of the MOEs. 
This chapter reviews and analyses China’s SOEs reform first, then explains the 
China Model of SOEs reform and ponders on the linkage between the emergence 
of China’s MOEs and the China Model of SOEs reform. 
3.2  The Formation of the China Model of State-Owned 
Enterprises Reform 
3.2.1  The Radical Reform in the Control of State-Owned 
Enterprises 
In 1977, the output of the state sector constituted about 80% of the total 
industrial output in China. Most of the SOEs produced goods according to the 
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state plan and the products were distributed by the government, while the profits 
should be remitted to the government and the possible deficits would be offset by 
the government. Workers were employed according to state plan while their 
salary and welfare were determined by the government. The literature（Dong, 
Furen., 1999）showed that the government began to accept the market mechanism 
in 1977. This was to encourage SOEs to increase the output and produce more 
manufacturing goods according to the market signal. These initial motivating 
policies played a pilot role for the following nationwide SOEs reform.  
In response to the requests from six SOEs, the Sichuan Provincial Government at 
the end of 1978 agreed to conduct a trial reform program to grant those six SOEs 
some operational powers. According to the program, those SOEs were allowed to 
operate according to market demand and to retain certain profits for 
self-development and for workers’ bonus. The implementation of the trial reform 
quickly led to the increase of the output. This trial program was called 
“delegating powers and conceding profits”. The enterprises obtained the 
autonomy to manufacture more products and then retained some profits (Zhang, 
Dicheng., 2006). The policy of delegating powers and conceding profits belongs 
to the reform in the control of SOEs (the control reform). The early trial of the 
control reform of SOEs resulted soon in the increase of both output and workers’ 
income, and then more enterprises and local governments followed automatically 
this new policy. The central government accepted this new policy later on. In 
July of 1979, the State Council, namely the central government, issued the 
Ordinance on Expanding SOEs Operational Autonomy. As a result, the policy of 
increasing SOEs autonomy was swiftly adopted nationwide. In 1984, the State 
Council issued the Ordinance on Further Expanding SOEs Operational 
Autonomy, stipulating that SOEs had ten items of autonomy including the 
decision of production, the sales of products, the purchase of raw materials, the 
outlay of retained funds, the disposal of assets, the set-up of internal departments, 
the employment of workers, the pricing of products, the determination of salary, 
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and the decision of business alliance (Dong, Furen., 1999). In 1992, the State 
Council issued the Ordinance on the Transformation of Operational Institutions 
of SOEs, stipulating SOEs had fourteen items of autonomy. The four extra items 
were the decision of investment, the decision of M&As, the rights of import and 
export, and the rights to reject unlawful charges (Dong, Furen., 1999). 
The literature by the State Statistics Bureau (1998) showed that the policy of 
delegating powers and conceding profits had a very good effect nationwide. The 
output of the manufacturing sector increased enormously year by year, the 
profitability of SOEs and the income of workers also increased. It is fair to say 
that the control reform was very successful. 
It is necessary to comprehend the background and the purpose of the policy of 
delegating powers and conceding profits in order to understand well the huge 
success of the control reform of China’s SOEs. The background is that, after the 
Cultural Revolution during 1966-1976, China was suffering a severe shortage of 
manufacturing goods, the top priority of China’s government was to increase the 
supply of industrial goods. The very purpose of SOEs reform at that time was to 
try everything possible to motivate the production of SOEs. Would this purpose 
be served by privatisation or granting autonomy? Even without ideological 
considerations, privatisation was not a suitable option.  
For privatisation to occur, the expertise in corporate assets distribution, the 
financial markets, are indispensable. These were not very easy to come by at that 
time in China. Under the circumstances of the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
privatisation would also have led to grave uncertainty. If the SOEs were 
privatised, who would own the enterprises and how would the management be 
selected? What would be the arrangements for ordinary workers? Should the 
enterprises receive subsidies from the government or should the government let 
them go bankrupt when they made losses? These problems might be easily 
solved in the Western countries, but this was not the case with China, where 
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private ownership and market mechanism had not taken deep roots. In the 
process of transition, uncertainty was regarded as the critical and decisive issue 
to the success of the transition by Dewatripont and Roland (1995). They argued 
that the results of privatisation and liberalisation were not convincible due to the 
uncertainty of the progress and the effect. They went on to say that partial and 
trial reforms would produce information feedback in order for people to deal 
with the uncertainty to some extent and then to revise or speed up the reform 
program. The reform of delegating powers and conceding profits in China was a 
very good example of this. Sanders and Chen (2005) also argued that outright 
privatisation was not a good choice for China. The positive feedback of the trial 
reform in Sichuan Province and the huge success of the nationwide practice were 
very significant to the consequent reform of China’s SOEs.  
On the contrary, the policy of delegating powers and conceding profits would not 
cause much uncertainty. It was easy for the government departments, the 
managers and the workers to comprehend what results the control reform would 
bring to them: the government departments would see more supply of 
manufacturing goods, the managers would see more controlling powers and more 
cash flow, and the workers would see higher income although they might work 
harder. Although the state ownership was not touched, the revolutionary 
significance of the control reform at that time is beyond doubt. Studies by Groves 
et al. (1994) showed that the autonomy reform was very useful in providing 
motives and initiatives for managers and workers. Studies by Hay et al.（1994）
showed that the autonomy reform in the 1980s in China promoted competition 
and improved incentives, although the reform did not impact upon state 
ownership. In their book “Comparative Economic Systems: a Decision-making 
Approach”, Neuberger and Duffy (1985) created a DIM analytical framework to 
examine economic systems from the perspectives of decision-making, 
information and motives. When using the DIM framework, it is easy to identify 
the institutional changes spurred by the control reform. Firstly, the control reform 
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enabled SOEs to gain certain autonomy of decision-making that was previously 
gripped by the government. On this basis, SOEs could respond to market 
information, meaning price signals began to matter and market mechanisms 
came into force. Moreover, against the backdrop of the severe shortage in 
manufacturing goods, enterprises could effortlessly develop their business in the 
market. With more autonomy, SOEs began to enjoy economic gains, to retain 
more profits and increase employees’ income. In this way, the initial reform in 
the control of SOEs brought in positive feedback effect, which spurred the 
enterprises to ask for more autonomy. 
However, the positive effect of delegating powers and conceding profits 
gradually diminished over time. The substance of delegating powers and 
conceding profits is the contracting between the SOEs and the government. Hart 
and Moore (1990) found that the incompleteness of contracting and argued that 
ownership matters. That implies the SOEs reform based on contracting must lead 
to renegotiation between the SOEs and the government, and the struggle between 
the SOEs and the government can not be solved by contracting itself. 
Renegotiation first resulted from the struggle of the profits conceding of SOEs. 
As the initial trial of profits concession was impossible to be stipulated for a 
reasonable ratio, two or three years latter, the government found that the profit 
retention in SOEs and the income of the workers increased rapidly but the 
government revenue stopped increasing from 1979 to 1982. The government then 
asked to renegotiate with the SOEs about the profit distribution (Dong, Furen., 
1999). In 1981, the State Council issued the Ordinance on the Economic 
Responsibilities System of Industrial Production. The so-called ‘economic 
responsibilities’ here were actually the responsibilities of the remittance of SOEs’ 
profits. This ordinance stipulated that the SOEs had to guarantee the remittance 
of the profits by way of a profit sharing program. In 1984, the State Council 
decided to carry out a new trial policy of transforming profits to taxation (Dong, 
Furen., 1999). In 1986, the State Council launched the contracting and leasing 
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system (Dong, Furen., 1999). The core of the contracting system was to regulate 
the submission of SOEs profits. The SOEs had to submit a fixed amount of 
profits to the state, the rest could be retained. The contracting system was a 
radical reform in the control of SOEs and led to increased autonomy of SOEs. 
The leasing system was even more radical, lessees were not obliged to submit 
economic residuals to the state. Although the contracting and leasing system 
overcame the problem of stagnant fiscal revenue, it could not handle the issue of 
the loss-making of some SOEs. The contracting and leasing system went to the 
end in 1993. After the contracting and leasing system, the radical control reform 
still continued in other ways. 
Although the contracting and leasing system belongs to control reform, this 
system began to touch upon the rights of the residual claims of the SOEs. 
According to Demsetz (1988), residual claims are related to ownership. In 1979, 
when the policy of delegating powers and conceding profits was launched 
nationwide, the distribution system of the SOEs’ profits was not on the agenda of 
the government, who was too preoccupied with motivating the SOEs to increase 
the output. Afterwards, the residual claims of the SOEs were becoming the 
critical issue between the government and the SOEs. In the repeated negotiations 
with the SOEs’ insiders, the state gained nothing, and the residual claims were 
gradually grabbed by the insiders under the cloak of the control reform. That 
means the control reform would lead to informal ownership reform. 
However, not all the policies of radical control reform could be completely 
implemented at the local level. As a matter of fact, there has been a long-lasting 
dispute about the distribution of the controlling powers of the SOEs. On one 
hand, the government has always been making complaints that it had lost the 
total control on the SOEs and the insiders’ control had been gone too far. But on 
the other hand, the SOEs have always been making complaints that the 
government had still been trying to interfere in SOEs’ business. In reality, the 
 
 
55
                                         
excessive delegating of the controlling powers could be interwoven with the 
inadequate delegating of the controlling powers. The radical control reform could 
transfer most items of the official controlling powers from the government to the 
managers of the SOEs and the governmental official control on the SOEs could 
gradually tapered off, but some of the government departments might seek to 
increase the unofficial control on the SOEs. On the whole though, the radical 
control reform facilitated the transfer of the controlling powers from the 
government to the insiders of the SOEs. 
3.2.2  The Gradual Ownership Reform 
Although the government did not want to touch the state ownership, the 
ownership reform occurred spontaneously. Unofficial ownership reform was 
initiated by SOEs’ insiders. By the mid 1980s, some small SOEs in retailing 
sector began experimenting with “degrading ownership”, turning state ownership 
into collective ownership, and collective ownership into private ownership. 
According to Liu, Mingsan. (1985), by the end of 1984, the ownership of 55,892 
small SOEs in the retailing sector had been degraded, accounting for 55.2% of 
the small SOEs in this sector. According to Changzhou Economic Restructuring 
Commission (1985), in Changzhou City of Jiangsu Province, the government 
turned 20% of the state-owned industrial enterprises, 80% of the state-owned 
retailing enterprises, 97% of the state-owned restaurants and 100% of the 
state-owned coal ball shops, into collectively-operational firms. Some nominal 
collective ownership enterprises were actually owned by the employees. Except 
for “degrading ownership”, some SOEs also went for official ownership reform 
by issuing stocks. A typical case was Tianqiao Department Store of Beijing, 
which was turned into a shareholding firm in 1984. After the ownership reform, 
the state owned 50.0% of the total equity, a bank owned 25.9%, Tianqiao 
Department Store of Beijing itself owned 19.7%, and the employees owned 4.4%. 
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In the same year, Shanghai Feile Diansheng Factory issued stocks to the public 
for the first time in China. 
Since the mid 1980s, Chinese economists have been calling for the official 
ownership reform, but the central government was not determined to launch the 
nationwide official ownership reform except for some local experiments. 
Privatisation was strictly forbidden. The 14th party congress held in the fall of 
1992, spelled out the target of China’s economic transition. This was to establish 
the socialist market economy (Jiang, Zemin., 1992). In 1993, the 3rd plenary 
session of the 14th party congress determined that the direction of China’s SOEs 
reform is to establish the modern enterprise system featuring “clear property 
rights, well defined powers and responsibilities, separation of enterprises from 
government, scientific management” (The Central Committee of CPC, 1993). In 
the same year, the first Company Law of the People’s Republic of China was 
promulgated. The declaration of establishing the modern enterprise system 
marked the first step of the official ownership reform for SOEs. Afterwards, the 
financial difficulties of the state sector in the mid-1990s prompted the official 
ownership reform. In the mid-1990s, more and more local governments began to 
carry out audacious ownership reform, the driving factor was that a great deal of 
SOEs fell into financial distress and became a burden to the governments (China 
Group and Company Promotion Association, 2003). Zhucheng City, Shandong 
Province, was one of the audacious localities. In 1993, many small and 
medium-sized SOEs in Zhucheng City were sold due to their running at a loss for 
many years. Ownership reform of the small and medium-sized SOEs in 
Zhucheng City was mainly done through insiders’ privatisation, lots of the small 
SOEs were sold to the managers and the workers, usually at a preferential price.  
The approach of the SOEs reform in Zhucheng City changed the roadmap of 
China’s SOE reform, shifting the radical control reform to official ownership 
reform. The ownership reform of insiders’ privatisation in Zhucheng City was 
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quickly copied by lots of localities across China. For the same reason, by the 
mid-1990s, most of the TVEs in Jiangsu Province went for insiders’ privatisation, 
serving as another powerful example. In the late-1990s, the financial troubles of 
the SOEs intensified, which justified the privatisation of the small-sized SOEs 
and medium-sized SOEs. Correspondingly, outside investors were provided with 
more and more opportunities to buy SOEs or state shares, and then the 
privatisation towards outsiders officially went to the arena. From 1998 to 2000, 
lots of SOEs were closed and a great number of SOEs were ownership-reformed 
(Chen Qingtai, 2008). At that time, the mainstream pattern of ownership reform 
was partially privatisation for insiders, some portion of the shares of SOEs were 
sold to the management and employees. Also, some small SOEs were fully 
privatised.  
Based on local experiments and pushed by local enthusiasm, the central 
government then decided to carry out the nationwide official ownership reform 
of the SOEs. The 15th party congress held in 1997 was a very important event for 
the ownership reform of China’s SOEs. This conference called for the strategic 
restructuring of the state sector (Jiang, Zemin., 1997). Actually, the so-called 
strategic restructuring refers to the ownership restructuring in China. This call 
enormously expedited the ownership reform of China’s SOEs. Small SOEs were 
allowed to be sold to both insiders and outsider investors, including private firms, 
individuals, and foreign investors. Medium-sized and large-sized MOEs were 
allowed to be partially privatised and be restructured into MOEs. According to 
the statistical data covering twenty-one provinces (State Economic and Trade 
Commission, 1999), by August 1998, 47,613 small and medium-sized SOEs 
were ownership-transformed. Among those 47,613 SOEs, 10,769 (22.6%) 
adopted cooperative shareholding system, 3,893 (8.2%) were sold in all, 3,470 
(7.3%) were leased out, 2,197 (4.6%) were contracted, 2,982 (6.2%) were turned 
into joint stock companies, 2,098 (4.4%) were consolidated, and 1,340 (2.8%) 
were declared bankrupt. 
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The 15th party congress in 1997 called for the all-out development of 
shareholding ownership for the first time. In 1999, the 4th plenary session of the 
15th party congress again declared that the state sector should be streamlined, and 
the state capital could withdraw from competitive industries, even medium-sized 
SOEs could be “let go”, large-sized SOEs could try ownership reform to be more 
activated. Afterwards, more and more medium-sized and large-sized SOEs were 
officially transformed into MOEs. Since entering the 21st century, the ownership 
reform has sped up, most of the small SOEs have been sold, and many large and 
medium-sized SOEs have been restructured into MOEs. 
Since the ownership reform of China’s SOEs occurred on the basis of the 
long-term radical control reform, its ownership reform is path dependent. Path 
dependence is a concept initiated by North and Thomas (1973), it refers to the 
institutional evolution process that depends on the prior path. Before the 
ownership reform program, China’s SOEs reform had experienced the radical 
control reform, including the policy of delegating powers and conceding profits, 
and the contracting and leasing system. The radical control reform for long time 
conceded lots of controlling powers to the management and the workers of the 
SOEs, some of the conceded powers, say, the decision about recapitalization and 
dividend distribution as well as ownership restructuring, were also 
inappropriately held by the management and the workers. Namely, SOEs were 
insiders-controlled. Radical control reform accumulated enough driving force to 
start the insiders-favoured unofficial ownership reform and evolved to gradual 
official ownership reform. Consequently, when ownership reform occurred, 
ownership reform program was usually mastered by the management and the 
workers because the ownership reform process depended on the prior control 
reform process. It is imaginable that the ownership reform proposal would 
naturally be resisted or sabotaged by the management and the workers if it was 
not mastered by and then not desirable with the management and the workers. 
That is the power of path dependence. As a result, the ownership reform in China 
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often leads to insiders’ shareholding. Many SOEs, especially small and 
medium-sized enterprises, were bought out by the management at preferential 
price, this approach is called MBO in China. Actually, some of them were bought 
out jointly by the management and the employees, this approach is called EMBO. 
MBO and EMBO are the major patterns of ownership transformation for small 
and medium-sized SOEs. Although the insiders’ buy-out of SOEs also occurred 
in some other countries such as Poland and Russia, the insiders-mastered 
ownership reform was more obvious and lasted for longer time in China.  
The ownership reform since the late 1990s also catalysed the reform in workers’ 
employment status of SOEs. Employment status transformation is quite unique 
and extremely significant in China’s SOEs reform, the same reform can not be 
found in other transitional countries. The employment status transformation was 
not designed and promoted by the government, but occurred spontaneously. In 
the era of planning economy prior to the 1990s, Chinese SOEs had to apply to 
the governmental labour administrative department for planned quota when 
recruiting employees, who actually received permanent employment status upon 
entering the enterprises until their retirement. All managers were appointed by 
the party or the government departments, and enjoyed the status of “state cadre”. 
The wage of SOEs’ employees also had to get approved by government. In the 
era of planning economy before the 1990s, the employment status of the workers 
and managers in SOEs can be generalized as the “three irons”: the iron rice bowl, 
the iron chair, and the iron wage. Iron rice bowl means workers enjoy the 
permanent employment without the possibility of firing, iron chair means 
managers can keep their positions without the possibility of demotion, and iron 
wage means workers should receive their standard wages on time even if the 
enterprises are out of funds. In addition, the status of the employees in SOEs 
brought a sweeping welfare system and traditional security system, the 
apartments of SOEs workers were provided by SOEs, their medical expenses 
were fully reimbursed by SOEs, their heating expenses in winter were subsidized 
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by SOEs, and some SOEs might also have welfare kindergartens, elementary 
school and middle schools free of charge. Moreover, Chinese government might 
often issue red-headed documents to provide for the welfare of SOEs employees, 
such as transportation allowance, housing allowance, or allowance for buying 
books and newspapers. Employees enjoyed corporate security but not social 
security, the retirement wages of SOEs’ employees were paid by the enterprises 
instead of social pension system, and their medical expenses were also 
reimbursed by the enterprises instead of social security system. While ownership 
reform occurs, the new private shareholders usually request that the employment 
status of SOEs’ employees should be transformed at the payment of 
compensation fees. The transformation of employment status usually means that 
the permanent employment is transformed to contractual employment, 
employees’ retirement wages and medical reimbursement are transferred to the 
social security system, and the employees’ welfare burden extended from the era 
of the planning economy should not continuously be assumed by the enterprises 
after the ownership reform. However, workers are usually unwilling to be 
status-transformed unless the acceptable compensation fees are paid to them. 
Thus the employment status transformation is costly. Compensation fees greatly 
increase the cost of ownership reform, and the payment of compensation fees 
become a very uncertain factor impacting the progress of the ownership reform 
of China’s SOEs. As the ownership reform in China usually involves not only 
ownership transformation itself, but also employment status transformation, 
ownership reform is also called systematic transformation (Gai Zhi) or dual 
transformation.   
Dual transformation means ownership reform involves two aspects. One is to 
introduce non-state capital to SOEs, including partial and full privatisation. The 
other is to transform the employment status from the traditional status of 
permanent employment and the non-pensioned retirement treatment to 
contractual employment and pensioned retirement treatment. 
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3.3  Defining the China Model 
China’s SOEs reform has taken a unique path and unique measures, formed a 
special model over the three decades. However, how to define and identify this 
uniqueness is not easy. There has been a huge division about it in the literature. 
Ramo（2004）argued in his famous article “Beijing consensus” that China’s 
transitional experience repudiated the traditional transition model featuring 
privatisation. Yusuf et al.（2006）on the other hand, argued that China’s SOEs 
reform since the late 1990s involved privatisation. Interestingly, Sanders and 
Chen (2005) pointed out that “fuzzy property rights” served China well. I think 
the uniqueness of China’s SOEs reform should not be identified only by 
privatisation or non-privatisation. The experiments and experiences over the last 
three decades have formed the China Model of SOEs reform. On the basis of 
these experiments and experiences, I define the China Model of SOE reform in 
the following aspects. 
First, the China Model means pragmatist doctrine, radical control reform and 
gradual ownership reform. The success of the policy of delegating powers and 
conceding profits led many people to believe that the Chinese people have 
outstanding wisdom to replace ownership reform with radical reform in 
controlling powers. The reform was largely guided by pragmatic thinking. Over a 
long period of time, China’s SOE reform sought to resolve the urgent practical 
challenges, rather than to determine a specific ultimate goal. The 
pragmatist-oriented reform produced prompt and positive results in each stage of 
the reform progress because the reform measures were able to resolve the urgent 
problems. As Hay and Liu（1997）pointed out, the introduction of competition 
was very helpful in improving SOEs performance, even without the ownership 
reform in the early stage of China’s SOEs reform progress. Pragmatist, however, 
usually leads to opportunist, which was confined to overcoming pressing 
dilemma without taking a long-term perspective to root out deep-seated problems. 
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That is why each round of reform gave rise to new problems requiring further 
rounds of reform. Pragmatist thinking and the shunning of ownership reform 
went hand in hand and reinforced each other. The ownership reform progress has 
been very gradual. Ownership reform started with small SOEs and gradually 
spread to medium-sized and large-sized SOEs, started with insiders’ shareholding 
and gradually spread to outsiders’ shareholding, started with small proportion of 
private shareholding and gradually spread to large proportion of private 
shareholding. 
Second, the long-standing radical control reform spontaneously evolved into the 
long period of gradual ownership reform, which led to the path dependence of 
the ownership reform progress and to the massive insiders’ shareholding. Before 
the official ownership reform program, China’s SOEs reform had experienced the 
long-term radical control reform. The long-term radical control reform brought 
the SOEs to a situation of insiders’ control. While ownership reform occurred, 
the management and workers were usually able to master the ownership reform 
proposal, and insiders’ shareholding proposals were more likely to be accepted. 
MBO and EMBO were greatly welcomed by the management and workers of the 
small and medium-sized SOEs. Even if the SOEs were sold to outsiders, the 
ownership transformation proposals had to be approved by the insiders. 
Third, the SOEs reform cashed in on the competition effect and the 
demonstration effect of the ever-growing non-SOEs. Since the SOEs reform has 
been very gradual and moved along for long time, the non-state sector has 
enough time to develop to larger and larger scale. That is not the case with most 
of other transitional countries. The good performance of non-SOEs served as an 
example for SOEs and helped the government introduce market rules to SOEs. 
The epidemic of the contracting and leasing system in TVEs, as well as the MBO 
experiments in TVEs, directly produced the demonstration effect for the SOEs. 
The rise of private firms and TVEs also drove the SOEs into increasingly fierce 
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competition, many SOEs were trapped in the financial difficulties, the fierce 
competition brought about tremendous pressure on SOEs. The rise of non-state 
sector also provided buffer effect for the ownership reform. From 1998 to 2003, a 
great number of SOEs experienced ownership reform and financial restructuring. 
The data from the State Statistics Bureau and Ministry of Labour and Social 
Security (2005) showed that 309 millions of SOEs’ workers were laid-off during 
this period. Many of these workers were re-employed by non-state enterprises. 
According to Ren, Wenyan. (2004), the Vice Chairperson of the National 
Association of Industries and Commerce, from 1994 to 2004, the number of 
re-employed workers by private enterprises for each year was as high as 100 
million. When the private sector grew up, it provided not only competition effect 
and demonstration effect, but also other resources, say, employment 
opportunities and investment funds, to support to the restructuring of the state 
sector (Wang, Mengkui., 2003). 
Fourth, the ownership reform is usually combined with the employment status 
transformation. The prevalence of dual transformation in China is very creative. 
Radical control reform and gradual ownership reform incurred huge costs. 
According to Chen, Qingtai.(2008), the reform costs of SOEs include two aspects: 
reorganisation cost, and privatisation cost. The funds for offsetting SOEs’ bad 
loans reached 20 billion Yuan in 1996, and rose to 30 billion Yuan in 1997. The 
above is just a small part of the reorganization cost. Privatisation cost is mainly 
the payment for the placement of laid-off workers, the compensation fees of 
employment status transformation. Although the privatisation in other countries 
is also costly, the composition of the costs in China is much more complicated. 
Moreover, China’s long odyssey of SOEs reform increases these costs 
enormously.  
The existing literature about China’s SOEs reform is very fluent, and some 
authors have analysed the characteristics and uniqueness of China’s SOEs reform 
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(Lin, et al, 1998; Gu, 2001; Mengistae and Xu, 2004; Yusuf et al, 2006; Garnaut 
et al, 2006), including the competition, the radical control reform and gradual 
ownership reform, the incentives to managers. Nevertheless, it is still necessary 
to summarise and clarify these characteristics. Moreover, it is valuable to define 
the China Model of SOEs reform on the basis of refining the existing findings 
and exploring new findings. My definition of the China Model of SOEs reform is 
unprecedented not only because I combine the above 4 aspects together, but also 
because the analysis of the employment status transformation and the reform cost 
is original. Employment status transformation is unique and extremely significant 
in China’s SOEs reform, no existing literature did notable studies on it and 
counted it in while addressing the characteristics of China’s SOEs reform. The 
employment status reform has big impact on the institutional arrangements of 
MOEs’ corporate governance which I will discuss in chapter 6 and 7. Besides, 
my definition of the China Model of SOEs reform includes the path dependence 
of the ownership reform of China’s SOEs, and it is pointed out that the path 
dependence lead to strong insiders’ mastering in the ownership reform and then 
the intense insiders’ shareholding. This analysis is also original. 
3.4  Mixed Ownership Is Rooted in the China Model 
The China Model brought about the emergence of MOEs. One aspect of the 
China Model is the gradualism of the ownership reform. Roland (2000) argued 
that the gradual ownership reform was helpful in smoothly commercialising 
China’s SOEs. Yusuf et al. (2006) studied the progress of China’s SOEs reform 
and found that gradual ownership reform was the unique feature. Gradualism 
implies that the ownership reform approach for many SOEs is not the outright 
full sale, instead the correct approach is to diversify the ownership structure and 
gradually decrease the proportion of state ownership. As a result, mixed 
ownership emerges. Gradualism also implies that the ownership reform generally 
starts with small SOEs before spreading to large SOEs, the latter is liable to 
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adopt mixed ownership. Even for the former, its ownership reform usually 
happens to insiders, and the insiders are short of funds to fully buy out the SOEs, 
resulting in mixed ownership. TCL Group Company, a famous Chinese company, 
experienced a long and gradual ownership reform, which introduced both the 
insiders’ capital and the outsiders’ capital step by step, and became a MOE. Even 
now, the local government still has some shares in this company.  
In order to contain the future business uncertainty of the ownership-reformed 
SOEs and to reduce the ideological risk, it is an important strategy for the 
government to maintain large enterprises in mixed ownership. Therefore, most 
MOEs maintain their mixed ownership structure for long time instead of short 
time, and the government does not have any clear plan to fully privatise the 
MOEs. Generally speaking, mixed ownership can build up a relatively opening 
ownership structure, so that the long-term tendency is that the state shareholding 
proportion will decrease over time while the non-state shareholding proportion 
will increase. 
3.5  Why Did the China Model Occur the Way It Did? 
Why did this model emerge in China? As stated in the previous paragraphs, the 
direct purpose of China’s SOE reform in the early stage was to promote SOEs 
enthusiasm in order to tackle the shortage of manufacturing goods at that time, 
which was based on the pragmatic reform thinking. Therefore, it is understanable 
why the policy of delegating powers and conceding profits was a reasonable 
option. But why did the control reform last for such a long time? Why was the 
ownership reform so gradual? It must be remembered that ownership reform was 
put forward by Chinese economists in the mid and late 1980s (Dong, Furen., 
1987) while some local small enterprises were also experimenting with 
privatisation-oriented ownership reform at that time (Liu, Mingsan, 1985). 
Meanwhile, the ownership reform of SOEs had not yet begun in the Soviet Union 
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or Eastern Europe. The following explanations make sense: ideological restraint, 
pragmatist doctrine, and too much scruple about uncertainties and risks, were the 
foremost factors in shaping the China Model.  
Given the ideological restraint, emancipating the minds was particularly 
important for China’s SOEs reform. Pragmatist thinking derives from China’s 
profound cultural tradition. Deng Xiaoping was a typical pragmatist. It seems 
pragmatist thinking led China’s SOEs reform to a world where there were only 
winners, but no losers (Lau et al. 2000), and the problem-solution-oriented 
reform was highly praised (Studwell, 2002). Although pragmatism was good, its 
efficacy in the initial period of reform backfired, as it became ossified. 
Pragmatism is actually opportunism, which means the perfunctory policy 
orientation. Too much caution about uncertainties and risks dominated the 
process of China’s economic transition. As an underdeveloped country, China 
needed the reform that could promote the economic development and eliminate 
the poverty. Would privatisation effectively promote the economic development 
and yield good results immediately? The answer may not always be yes. On the 
contrary, the reality may be embarrassing: after radical privatisation reform, 
Russia and Eastern European countries experienced years of recession. 
Dewatripont and Roland（ 1995） argued that the direct result of radical 
privatisation and liberalisation is indeed uncertain, the result may be output 
increase, but may easily be the opposite. Sachs et al.（2000）conducted empirical 
studies on over twenty countries, and found that besides ownership transfer, 
market competition, good regulation system and good corporate governance all 
matter to the efficiency improvement and the economic growth. Liu, Shaojia., 
and Li, Ji. (1998) explored the confines of privatisation from the perspective of 
beyond property rights argument. They asserted that property rights 
arrangements were not versatile and privatisation could not help improve their 
performance without a competitive market environment. They argued that there 
were three basic factors that influence market competition, the first was the 
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contestability of enterprises’ target, the second was the cost of default and the 
benefit of cooperation, the third was the asymmetry among enterprises. They 
asserted that competition was not only based on private ownership, creating a 
competitive market had nothing to do with private ownership. Vining and 
Boardman (1992) got similar findings from their studies. Wallsten (2001) also 
conducted studies on the impact of privatisation and competitive market on the 
performance of enterprises. Vickers and Yarrow (1991) studied privatisation from 
a macroeconomic perspective. It has been shown that the correlation between 
privatisation and enterprise performance is very complicated (Harper, 2002), 
many factors, including privatisation and market competition, will impact upon 
enterprise performance. Many studies have emphasized the complexity of the 
effect of ownership reform in transitional economies (Otchere and Zhang, 2001; 
Pohl et al, 1997; Sachs and Woo, 1997). In comparison with other countries such 
as Russia and Eastern European countries, China tends to deliberate more before 
taking a reform action: will it mobilize the enthusiasm and achieve its expected 
purpose? What kind of measures will increase certainty and reduce uncertainty? 
At the inception of launching the policies for the rural household contracting 
system and the control reform of the SOEs, these questions actually had ready 
answers, which could be retrieved from the memory of farmers, enterprises 
managers and government officials. These policies were once adopted in the 
1950s and early 1960s and proved successful. The actual results of these policies 
in the 1950s and the early 1960s were output increase and fast growth. In the 
mid-1980s, odd privatisation transactions occurred in China, but these 
transactions mainly happened in retailing and services sector. The main cause 
was in the 1950s those firms in retailing and services sector were usually 
privately-owned. That exactly illustrates that the selection of reform measures in 
China were guided by memory and empirical knowledge, instead of theory and 
book knowledge. However, after the initial stage of reform, further answers 
could not be retrieved from the past experiences, and had to draw on the 
international experiences and theories. In addition to ideological disputes, the 
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scruple about uncertainties and risks was a very important factor. China once 
experimented with radical pricing liberalization in 1988, but the result was an 
unexpected inflation that doomed the big-bang price reform into a complete 
failure. Without doubt, the unpleasant memory of this reform kept both the public 
and the politicians alert to a new system.  
A big uncertainty about ownership reform of the SOEs was the strong resistance 
to privatisation from SOEs workers in China. They stuck strongly to the 
permanent employment status of SOEs, known as the iron bowl, and enjoy the 
master role of the SOEs. For the promoters of ownership reform, the risks came 
not only from the uncertainties of its results, but also from the political system, 
the social environment and the corruption in the reform process. Ownership 
reform is liable to bring up corruption and state assets loss as well as 
unemployment, all these will cause risks. Nevertheless, China has a delicate way 
of reducing uncertainties and risks, that is to allow a few who are willing to take 
risks, to conduct a regional experiment, so as to see the result and test how the 
bureaucratic system and the public react (Chen, Qingtai, 2008). Experimenting is 
deemed as a good approach (Roland, 2000). Fortunately, the fact there were 
numerous SOEs across many regions, made regional tests possible. With the state 
sector trapped in growing financial problem in the 1990s and pushed by the 
momentum of insiders’ ownership reform, ideological restraint, ossified 
pragmatism, and scruple about uncertainties and risks, all weakened. It is the 
combination of these factors that nurtured the China model. 
Although the scruple about uncertainties and risks protracted the process of 
SOEs reform, it did help increase SOEs output and stimulate the economic 
growth. Sustained growth of the output was realised during the ownership reform 
process. The China model, which may have various flaws, minimized the sense 
of uncertainties for SOE insiders, thereby effectively avoided a decrease in 
output. Radical privatisation would surely lead to fears and loss of future 
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expectations for SOEs. Sudden privatisation would make insiders feel worried: 
they did not know who would be their bosses, whether they would keep their job 
or how much they would earn in the future. As Arrow (1984) revealed in his 
study, personal choices under uncertainties are very difficult and may involve 
questions such as non-cooperative game, and shirking may be the workers’ best 
option. The China model adopted certain measures, such as the policy of 
delegating powers and conceding profits, the contracting and leasing system, so 
that insiders could clearly calculate how much they would gain after an increase 
in output. Hence, workers would work hard, leading to higher output. Even 
during the gradual ownership reform in the mid and late 1990s, output growth 
and improved performance were widely reported. Moreover, gradual ownership 
reform led to insiders’ shareholding, which decreased the uncertainty sense of 
insiders. Even if outsiders’ shareholding occurred, in many instances the 
ownership reform proposals should be approved by insiders. Even for those 
SOEs without ownership reform, the output growth has still maintained. One 
reason is the incentive mechanism of delegating powers and conceding profits 
still works, and the improved calibre of the entrepreneurs of SOEs almost 
coincides with the development of China’s market economy. Moreover, for those 
enterprises that superficially stick to state ownership, some degree of ownership 
reform has actually realised through devious ways such as the partial 
privatization of their subsidiaries, joint ventures and listing. 
However, the output growth was realised at the cost of sacrificing social equity. 
Radical control reform increasingly shifted the balance towards insiders, whose 
interests eroded the profits. After 1993, SOEs even stopped submitting profits to 
the state. Gradual ownership reform led to tremendous reform costs. All these 
costs have to be borne by the public. Although pro-insiders ownership reform 
was a feasible option under the backdrop of path dependence, it still jeopardized 
the social equity. 
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3.6  Concluding Remarks 
As mixed ownership derives mainly from the ownership reform of China’s SOEs, 
probing the process of China’s SOEs reform and the features of the reform is 
necessary while studying the driving factors of the emergence of China’s MOEs. 
It is found that in the past thirty-two years, the reform process has formed the 
distinctive China Model of SOEs reform. Mixed ownership is rooted in the China 
Model of SOEs reform.  
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Chapter 4 
The Commonness Degree of the Mixed 
Ownership in China and the Mixture Degree 
4.1  Introduction 
As stated in chapter 1, during the process of China’s SOEs restructuring and its 
GDP growth, a striking phenomenon is the emergence of the MOEs. The mixed 
ownership in many other countries usually exists in particular industries and in 
specific time period. This chapter analyses the commonness degree of the mixed 
ownership in China and the mixture degree of the MOEs, and shows that mixed 
ownership in China is indeed very common. 
This chapter first outlines the conditions of the mixed ownership in some specific 
regions according to the existing documents, then analyses the commonness 
degree of the mixed ownership nationwide and investigates the mixture degree. 
In this chapter two indicators are established. The first is commonness degree of 
mixed ownership, it is the percentage of the number of the MOEs against the 
total number of all enterprises in a specific sample. The commonness degree is 
denoted as Pm. The second indicator is mixture degree of a specific MOE or the 
MOEs in a specific sample, it is the quotient of the state shareholding proportion 
against the non-state shareholding proportion, or the quotient of the non-state 
shareholding proportion against the state shareholding proportion, the bigger 
proportion figure should be the denominator while calculating mixture degree so 
that mixture degree will be between 0 and 1. The closer the quotient is to one, the 
higher the mixture degree is. The mixture degree is denoted as Qm. 
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4.2  The Conditions in Some Localities 
The conditions of mixed ownership in some localities have been examined by 
existing literature. Xu, Shangchang. (2006) found that 98% of the TVEs in 
Jiangsu Province during the late 1990s had been restructured to MOEs in which 
the non-state shareholders were usually the major shareholder. In 1997, the 
output of MOEs in Jiangsu Province accounted for over 40% of the local GDP. 
Until the end of 2003, 98.3% of all county-administered SOEs and urban 
collective enterprises had been ownership-reformed, 95% of which became 
MOEs. In 2005, the number of MOEs in Zhejiang Province reached 313,571, 
accounting for 61% of its total enterprises. Huang, Zhong. (2007) conducted 
studies on the commonness of mixed ownership in Zhejiang Province, but his 
definition of MOE included cooperative shareholding enterprises, other 
joint-operation enterprises, limited liability corporations, joint-capital and 
cooperative enterprises in the category of Hong Kong and Taiwan capital 
enterprises, and foreign enterprises. He found that the industrial value-added of 
MOEs accounted for 31.5% of the total industrial value-added of all above-scale 
industrial enterprises in 1998. He also found that between 2001 and 2004, the 
number of MOEs in this province increased from 42,000 to 240,000, accounting 
for 54.9% of total enterprises in 2001 and 59.4% in 2004. The revenue of these 
enterprises was 2001.1 billion RMB Yuan in 2001 and 3983.3 billion RMB Yuan 
in 2004, accounting for 66.4% of total revenue of all enterprises in 2001 and 
78.4% in 2004. These enterprises employed 6.94 million people in 2001 and 
10.68 million in 2004, accounting for 24.8% of the total employment in 2001 and 
35.7% in 2004. Ning, Lixin. (2005) conducted studies on the commonness of 
mixed ownership in Harbin City and found that the MOEs accounted for 10% of 
total enterprises in 2004.  
The above studies are helpful in identifying the commonness of mixed ownership. 
But it is difficult to find the literature that shows the overall commonness of the 
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mixed ownership nationwide and shows the mixture degree. Moreover, the 
definition of mixed ownership in the above documents is problematic or unclear.  
4.3  The Questionnaire Survey and Data Analysis 
A nationwide survey is organised by me in an attempt to overcome the 
shortcomings of the existing literature. As many MOEs originated from the 
ownership reform of SOEs, the survey was designed to check how many 
ownership-reformed SOEs were restructured into MOEs. As the ownership 
reform is usually called systematic transformation (Gai Zhi), the term of 
ownership reform was identical to ownership reform in this survey. The 
systematic transformation (Gai Zhi) was defined in the questionnaire as the 
transaction that introduces non-state equity to SOEs through selling existing state 
shares or issuing new shares, this transaction then accomplishes full privatization 
or partial privatization. Questionnaires were circulated to 5,103 enterprises, in 
which 1,524 enterprises used to be administered by the State Assets Supervision 
and Administration Commission of the Central Government (central SASAC), 
and others used to be administered by local SASACs of Beijing, Chongqing, 
Heilongjiang, Liaoning, Hebe, Henan, Shandong, Jiangsu, Jiangxi, Hubei, Hunan, 
Guangdong, Guangxi, Shanxi, Gansu, and Sichuan. The reason why the 
enterprises administered by the 16 local SASACs were selected is that those 16 
localities were listed as the key regions for the ownership reform trial, and those 
key regions were determined by the central government. Those central SOEs 
were also in the list of the ownership reform trial.   
2,696 filled-out questionnaires was received, 1,184 of these 2,696 enterprises had 
been systematically-transformed. But within those 1,184 enterprises, 950 
provided full and reliable data. These 950 enterprises are the sample for my 
analysis.  
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The sample provides the information of their first largest shareholders, the 
second and third largest shareholders, and the ownership attribute of these 
shareholders. In the sample, 652 enterprises, accounting for 68.6% of the total 
sampled enterprises, are found to have the state first largest shareholders, and 
others have the non-state first largest shareholders. 
Table 4-1  The Ownership Attribute of the First Largest Shareholders 
(The Sample of 950 Enterprises) 
 
 The Number of the 
Enterprises 
The Percentage in the 
Sample 
The First Largest Shareholder is of 
State Ownership Attribute 
652 68.6% 
The First Largest Shareholder is of 
Non-State Ownership Attribute 
298 31.4% 
Total 
 
950 100.0% 
The further analysis is to look at the specific status of their first largest 
shareholders. There are 486 enterprises whose first largest shareholders are SOEs; 
there are 123 enterprises whose first largest shareholders are state assets 
management companies; there are 91 enterprises whose first largest shareholders 
are employees; there are 64 enterprises whose first largest shareholders are 
private firms; there are 63 enterprises whose first largest shareholders are 
individuals; there are 48 enterprises whose first largest shareholders are the 
management; there are 43 enterprises whose first largest shareholders are 
governmental organisations; there are 13 enterprises whose first largest 
shareholders are foreign companies. 
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Table 4-2  The Specific Status of the First Largest Shareholders 
(The Sample of 950 Enterprises) 
 
The Specific Status of the First 
Largest Shareholders 
The Number of 
the Enterprises 
The Percentage 
in the Sample  
SOE 486 51.2 % 
State Assets Management Company 123 12.9 % 
Employees 91 9.6 % 
Private Firm 64 6.7 % 
Individual 63 6.6 % 
Management 48 5.1 % 
Governmental Organisation 43 4.5 % 
Foreign Company 13 1.4 % 
Others 19 2.0 % 
The shareholding proportions of the first largest shareholders are also calculated. 
When the management is the first largest shareholder, the average shareholding 
proportion is 34.4%. When governmental organisations, state asset management 
companies, SOEs, private firms, foreign companies, and employees are the first 
largest shareholders, their average shareholding proportion exceeds 60%.  
Table 4-3  The Average Shareholding Proportions of the First Largest 
Shareholders 
(The Sample of 950 Enterprises) 
 
The Specific Status of the First 
Largest Shareholders 
The Average Shareholding Proportion 
Governmental Organisation 69.8% 
Private Firm 65.3% 
SOE 63.6% 
Employees 62.4% 
State Assets Management Company 61.9% 
Foreign Company 60.7% 
Management 34.4% 
Others 42.0% 
Moreover, the studies on the commonness degree of mixed ownership and the 
mixture degree can be conducted by data analysis. The commonness degree is 
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denoted as Pm, and shows the percentage of the number of the MOEs against the 
total number of all enterprises in the sample. The number of MOEs in the sample 
is denoted as Nm while the total number of the enterprises in the sample is 
denoted as Ns. Thus the Pm is: 
           Pm = Nm/Ns (%) 
Nm is the number of MOEs in the sample. 
Ns is the total number of the sampled enterprises 
It is found that most of the enterprises in the sample have the ownership structure 
of multi-shareholders, namely, no matter whom the first largest shareholder is, 
they do not be able to hold the entire equity of the company. Instead they co-own 
this company with other shareholders. Once the status of those shareholders and 
their ownership attribute are identified, the commonness degree of mixed 
ownership and their mixture degree can be figured out. 
In the sample, while governmental organisations and state assets management 
companies or SOEs are the first largest shareholders, there are the second largest 
shareholders. 33.2% of them have the state as the second largest shareholder, 
31.7% of them have the employees as the second largest shareholder, 9.2% of 
them have the private firm as the second largest shareholder, 8.9% of them have 
the individuals as the second largest shareholder, 2.8% of them have the foreign 
companies as the second largest shareholder, and 1.5% of them have the 
management as the second largest shareholder. It must be pointed out that 
although 33.2% of the second largest shareholder is state shareholder, these 
enterprises are still MOEs because they have introduced non-state equity through 
ownership reform. This means there must be non-state shareholders in these 
enterprises, the non-state shareholders may not be the second largest shareholders 
but may be the third or fourth largest shareholders. 
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While private firms, management, employees or foreign companies are the first 
largest shareholder, the ownership structure of multi-shareholders is also very 
common. Furthermore, different shareholders usually have different ownership 
attribute. There are 298 enterprises whose first largest shareholders are non-state 
shareholders. In these 298 enterprises there are 83 enterprises whose second 
largest shareholders have state ownership attribute. That means the 83 enterprises 
are MOEs 
As mentioned, in the 950 enterprises, there are 652 enterprises whose first largest 
shareholders are state shareholders. All these 652 enterprises should be MOEs 
because they have been ownership-reformed and have introduced non-state 
shareholders. There are other 83 MOEs. Thus, at least 735 enterprises in the 
sample of 950 enterprises are MOEs, accounting for 77.3% of the total sample.  
The commonness degree of the mixed ownership in the 950 sampled enterprises 
is: 
Pm=77.3% 
There should be some other MOEs who are not included in the above 735 
enterprises. Some of the enterprises whose first and second largest shareholders 
are all non-state shareholders may have the state-owned third largest 
shareholders. Those are also MOEs. While counting in those enterprises, the 
commonness degree of mixed ownership in the sample should be around 80%. 
It must be pointed out that the 77.3% commonness degree of mixed ownership is 
calculated from the sample of questionnaire-surveyed enterprises. This figure is 
not fitting to all ownership-reformed SOEs in China, because the questionnaire 
survey does not cover those ownership-reformed enterprises which used to be 
administered by city and county governments. According to my field surveys 
however, most of those ownership-reformed enterprises of county and city level 
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have been fully privatised, meaning most of those enterprises are whole private 
companies, rather than MOEs. Therefore, the nationwide commonness degree of 
mixed ownership is likely to be much lower than 77.3%. But it is still fair to 
claim that the mixed ownership is highly prevalent in China. In particular, 
large-sized SOEs usually opt for mixed ownership while conducting ownership 
reform. Lenovo Holdings Company and TCL Group Company are large-sized 
MOEs originating from the ownership reform of large-sized SOEs.  
The mixture degree of the MOEs in the sample can also be analysed. All shares 
in a MOE can be divided into two categories: state shares and non-state shares. 
The total shareholding proportion of these two categories of shares should be 
100%. It is easy to calculate the total shareholding proportion of all state shares 
in a MOE, which is denoted as Es, and the shareholding proportion of all 
non-state shares, which is denoted as Ep. To calculate the quotient, or the mixture 
degree, the higher proportion figure is set as the denominator while the lower is 
set as the numerator. Therefore the mixture degree is: 
Qm= Ep/Es when Es > Ep 
Qm= Es/Ep when Es < Ep 
Thus, the highest possible value of Qm is 1, in that case both the proportion of 
state shareholding and the proportion of non-state shareholding are respectively 
50%. The lower the Qm is, the lower the mixture degree is. It must be noted that 
the mixture degree is only a measurement. I do not imply the higher mixture 
degree is better.   
In order to distinguish whether the state shareholding proportion is higher than 
the non-state shareholding proportion while reading Qm, I denote the Qm with 
state shareholding proportion higher than non-state shareholding proportion as 
Qms, and the Qm with non-state shareholding proportion higher than state 
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shareholding proportion as Qmp. If the mixture degree of a MOE is Qms = 0.25, 
the state shareholding proportion for this MOE must be 80% while the non-state 
shareholding proportion must be 20%. The privatisation degree is therefore low. 
If the mixture degree of a MOE is Qmp＝0.25, the non-state shareholding 
proportion for this MOE must be 80% while the state shareholding proportion 
must be 20%, the privatisation degree here is high.  
On this basis, the mixture degree of the 950 enterprises in the sample can be 
analysed. According to the specific status of the first largest shareholders, the 950 
enterprises can be categorized into a few groups. The enterprises whose first 
largest shareholders are government organisations are classified to the “GV 
Category Enterprises”, The enterprises whose first largest shareholders are state 
asset management companies are classified to the “SA Category Enterprises”, the 
enterprises whose first largest shareholders are SOEs are classified to the “SE 
Category Enterprises”, the enterprises whose first largest shareholders are private 
firms or individuals are classified to the “PE Category Enterprises”, the 
enterprises whose first largest shareholders are the management are classified to 
the “MG Category Enterprises”, the enterprises whose first largest shareholders 
are employees are classified to the “EP Category Enterprises”, and the 
enterprises whose first largest shareholders are foreign companies are classified 
to the “FI Category Enterprises”. Within the 950 enterprises, 868 enterprises 
provided full information about their ownership attribute and the shareholding 
proportions of the first, second and third largest shareholders. These 868 
enterprises are divided into groups of GV, SA, SE, PE, MG, EP and FI, and then 
the analysis on the shareholding structure of these groups of enterprises can be 
undertaken. When calculating Ep and Es, I just consider the first the second, and 
the third largest shareholders. The average Ep and Es can also be calculated 
according to the shareholding proportions of the first, second and third largest 
shareholders. The results are shown in table 4-4. 
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Table 4-4  The Es and Ep of 868 Enterprises 
 
Group Es（%） Ep（%） 
GV Group 79.1 20.9 
SA Group 69.3 30.7 
SE Group 70.2 29.8 
PE Group 10.6 89.4 
MG Group 3.7 96.3 
EP Group 8.8 91.2 
FI Group 18.3 81.7 
On the basis of the above table, the Qm of each group can be figured out. The 
results are shown in table 4-5. 
Table 4-5  The Qm of 868 Enterprises 
 
Group Mixture degree 
GV Group Qms＝0.26  
SA Group Qms＝0.44 
SE Group Qms＝0.43 
PE Group Qmp＝0.12 
MG Group Qmp＝0.04 
EP Group Qmp＝0.10 
FI Group Qmp＝0.22 
In order to measure the mixture degree of these 868 enterprises more clearly, the 
mathematical average Qm and the weighted average Qm of them can be 
calculated. The mathematical average Qm is calculated from the average amount 
of every group, and the weighted average Qm is calculated from the weighted 
average Es and Ep of those 868 enterprises. The results are shown in table 4-6.  
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Table 4-6  The Mathematical and Weighted Average Qm of the 868 Enterprises 
 
The Mathematical Average Qm The Weighted Average Qm 
0．23 0.81 
It is clear to see that there is a big gap between the mathematical average mixture 
degree and the weighted average mixture degree. The major cause of the gap is 
that the state shareholding proportion in the enterprises whose first largest 
shareholders are management is very low, so that the Qm of this group of 
enterprises is also very low. The same is true for the enterprises whose first 
largest shareholders are employees. These two groups bring the mathematical 
average mixture degree down. However, the numbers of enterprises within these 
two groups is not high, and their weight is not significant in calculating the 
weighted average mixture degree. 
Generally speaking, the ownership-reformed enterprises in China have a noted 
feature of mixed ownership, and their mixture degree is quite high.  
4.4  The Commonness Degree and Mixture Degree of 
China’s Listed Companies 
While assessing the commonness degree of mixed ownership in China, using the 
sample of 950 surveyed enterprises is not very representative because this sample 
only covers the enterprises with systematic transformation (Gai Zhi) but excludes 
the enterprises without systematic transformation. As many 
systematically-transformed enterprises are MOEs in China with the prevalence of 
partial privatization, therefore the sample of 950 systematically-transformed 
enterprises undoubtedly exaggerates the commonness of mixed ownership in 
China. In order to offset this shortcoming, the studies on the listed companies in 
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China’s stock market have been taken. At the end of July of 2008, there are 1,573 
listed companies in China’s A-share market. The 300 companies of 
Shanghai-Shenzhen Component Index  is chosen as the sample of listed 
companies to analyse the commonness of mixed ownership of China’s listed 
companies, because these 300 companies are carefully selected by China 
Securities Regulation Commission (CSRC) and Shanghai and Shenzhen 
Exchanges at the consideration of representing different industries and different 
company sizes. These 300 companies publish their information of shareholders, 
including the names of the first to the tenth largest shareholders and their 
shareholding proportions as well as the types of their shares. Based on the 
published information, the commonness degree and the mixture degree of these 
300 companies are examined.  
The examination is based on the data of the first to the tenth largest shareholders. 
That means the calculation excludes the negotiable stocks, therefore the 
calculated commonness degree and mixture degree here for the listed companies 
are not accurate enough. Nevertheless, these are still credible measurements. 
The shares of the first to tenth largest shareholders are categorised as state shares, 
state corporate shares, domestic corporate shares, overseas corporate shares, 
negotiable shares, and other shares. The state shares are included in state 
ownership class, the domestic corporate shares are included in the non-state 
ownership class.  
In order to simplify the calculation, the shares held by investment funds and the 
shares below the proportion of 2% is disregarded. The calculation results are 
shown in table 4-7. 
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Table 4-7  The MOEs in 300 Listed Companies of Shanghai–Shenzhen 
Component Index 
(As of June 30 of 2008) 
 
The Serial 
Number 
 
The Corporation 
Name 
The Name of the First Largest Shareholder 
and Its Shareholding Proportion 
The Mixture Degree of the 
Top 10 Largest Shareholders 
The first largest state shareholder: Shanghai 
Shangshi Stock Company 
The shareholding proportion : 6.8％ 
1 Haitong 
Securities 
Company 
The first largest non-state shareholder: 
Dongfeng Group Industrial Stock Company 
The shareholding proportion: 5.1％ 
The state shareholding 
proportion: 29.6％ 
The non-state shareholding 
proportion: 13.9％ 
Qms=0.47 
The first largest state shareholder: Jiuzhitang 
Group Company 
The shareholding proportion: 27.4％ 
2 Guojin 
Securities 
Company 
The first largest non-state shareholder: Yongjin 
Investment Holdings Company 
The shareholding proportion: 15.9％ 
The State shareholding 
proportion: 45.3％， 
The non-state shareholding 
proportion: 39.9％ 
Qms=0.88 
The first largest state shareholder: Anhui 
Power Group Company 
The shareholding proportion : 54.5％ 
3 Wanneng Power 
Company  
The first largest non-state shareholder: Anhui 
Xinneng Chuangye Investment Company 
The State shareholding 
proportion: 54.5％ 
The non-state shareholding 
proportion: 11.2％ 
Qms=0.21 
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The shareholding proportion : 7.6％ 
The first largest non-state shareholder: 
H.I.FOOD PRODUCTS LIMITED 
The shareholding proportion: 35.2％ 
4 Guangming 
Dairy Company  
The first largest state shareholder: Shanghai 
Dairy Group Company 
The shareholding proportion: 25.2％ 
The non-state shareholding 
proportion: 49.0% 
The state shareholding 
proportion: 25.2％ 
Qmp=0.51 
The first largest non-state shareholder: 
Chuanghua Group Company 
The shareholding proportion: 16.1％ 
5 Southwestern 
Stock 
Company  
The first largest state shareholder: Kaihua 
County State Assets Management Company 
The shareholding proportion: 7.7％ 
The non-state shareholding 
proportion: 16.1% 
The state shareholding 
proportion: 7.7％ 
Qmp=0.48 
The first largest non-state shareholder: 
Qingdao Haier Investment  Company 
The shareholding proportion: 16.0％ 
6 Changjiang 
Securities 
Company  
The first largest state shareholder: Hubei 
Power Group Company 
The shareholding proportion: 11.6％ 
The state shareholding 
proportion: 34.9％ 
The non-state shareholding 
proportion: 30.7％ 
Qms=0.88 
7 Changcheng 
Development 
The first largest state shareholder: 
Changcheng Science and Technology 
Company 
The state shareholding 
proportion: 49.6％ 
The non-state shareholding 
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The shareholding proportion: 49.6％ Company  
The first largest non-state shareholder: Fuxu 
(Hong Kong) Limited  Company 
The shareholding proportion: 8.3％ 
proportion: 8.3％ 
Qms=0.17 
The first largest state shareholder: Tianjin 
Taida Construction Company 
The shareholding proportion: 23.3％ 
8 Jinbin 
Development 
Company 
The first largest non-state shareholder: Tianjin 
Huatai Group Holdings Company 
The shareholding proportion: 4.8％ 
The state shareholding 
proportion: 23.3 
The non-state shareholding 
proportion: 7.0％ 
Qms=0.30 
Th
Iron a
e first largest state shareholder: Hualing 
nd Steel Group Company 
The shareholding proportion: 33.9％ 
9 Hualing Iron 
and Steel 
Company  
The first largest non-state shareholder: 
ARCELORMITTAL 
The shareholding proportion: 33.0％ 
The state shareholding 
proportion: 33.9％ 
The non-state shareholding 
proportion: 33.0％ 
Qms=0.97 
The first largest state shareholder: Xinjiang 
Wind Power Science and Technology 
Company 
The shareholding proportion: 18.3％ 
10 Jinfeng Science 
and Technology 
Company  
The first largest non-state shareholder: 
Yuanjing Xinfeng Investment and Consulting 
Company 
The state shareholding 
proportion: 36.2％ 
The non-state shareholding 
proportion: 20.2％ 
Qms=0.56 
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The shareholding proportion: 4.4％ 
The first largest state shareholder: Baoli South 
Group Company 
The shareholding proportion: 49.0％ 
11 Baoli Land 
Company  
The first largest non-state shareholder: 
Huamei International Investment Group 
Company 
The shareholding proportion: 8.7％ 
The state shareholding 
proportion: 49.0％ 
The non-state shareholding 
proportion: 11.2％ 
Qms=0.22 
The first largest state shareholder: Weicai 
Group Holdings Company 
The shareholding proportion: 14.9％ 
12 Weicai Dongli 
Company  
The first largest non-state shareholder: Peixin 
Holdings Company 
The shareholding proportion: 4.5％ 
The state shareholding 
proportion: 21.5％ 
The non-state shareholding 
proportion: 14.8％ 
Qms=0.69 
The first largest state shareholder: Jilin Yatai 
Group Company 
The shareholding proportion: 30.6％ 
13 Dongbei 
Securities 
Company 
The first largest non-state shareholder: Jilin 
Trust Investment Company 
The shareholding proportion: 23.0％ 
The non-state shareholding 
proportion: 36.3％ 
The state shareholding 
proportion: 33.3％ 
Qmp=0.92 
14 Yasheng Group 
Company  
The first largest state shareholder: Gansu Salt 
Chemical Group Company 
The State shareholding 
proportion: 14.7％ 
The non-state shareholding 
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The shareholding proportion: 14.7％ 
The first largest non-state shareholder: 
Hengsheng Agriculture Development 
Company 
The shareholding proportion: 4.5％ 
proportion: 4.5％ 
Qms=0.31 
The first largest state shareholder: China 
Zhongse Group Company 
The shareholding proportion: 33.3％ 
15 Zhongse Stock 
Company  
The first largest non-state shareholder: 
Wanxiang Resourses Company 
The shareholding proportion: 7.8％ 
The state shareholding 
proportion: 33.3％ 
The non-state shareholding 
proportion: 7.8％ 
Qms=0.23 
The first largest state shareholder: Huajing 
Chemical Group Company 
The shareholding proportion: 51.1％ 
16 Liaotong 
Chemical 
Company 
The first largest non-state shareholder: Naixi 
Investment Company 
The shareholding proportion: 3.8％ 
The state shareholding 
proportion: 51.4％ 
The non-state shareholding 
proportion: 23.5％ 
Qms=0.46 
The first largest state shareholder: Baoding 
Tianwei Group Company 
The shareholding proportion: 51.1％ 
17 Tianwei 
Baobian 
Company  
The first largest non-state shareholder: 
Baoding Huiyuan Consulting Company 
The state shareholding 
proportion: 51.1％ 
The non-state shareholding 
proportion: 5.5％ 
Qms=0.11 
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The shareholding proportion: 5.5％ 
The first largest state shareholder: Northeast 
University Industrial Group Company 
The shareholding proportion: 17.6％ 
18 Neusoft Group 
Company 
The first largest non-state shareholder: Huixu 
Science and Technology Company 
The shareholding proportion: 17.2％ 
The non-state shareholding 
proportion: 42.1％ 
The state shareholding 
proportion: 27.5％ 
Qmp=0.65 
The first largest state shareholder: Changsha 
Construction Machinery Research Institute 
Company 
The shareholding proportion: 41.9％ 
19 Zhonglian 
Zhongke 
Company 
The first largest non-state shareholder: Jiazhuo 
Group Company 
The shareholding proportion: 11.2％ 
The state shareholding 
proportion: 41.9％ 
The non-state shareholding 
proportion: 11.2％ 
Qms=0.27 
The first largest non-state shareholder: 
Shenzhen Baoan Holdings Company 
The shareholding proportion: 8.3％ 
20 China Bao’an 
Company 
The first largest state shareholder: Shenzhen 
Baoan District Investment Management 
Company 
The shareholding proportion: 7.0％ 
The non-state shareholding 
proportion: 8.3％ 
The state shareholding 
proportion: 7.0％ 
Qmp=0.84 
21 Zhenhua 
Harbour 
Machinery 
The first largest state shareholder: China 
Transportation Construction Stock Company 
The state shareholding 
proportion: 24.9％ 
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The shareholding proportion: 24.9％ Company 
The first largest non-state shareholder: 
Zhenhua Engineering Company 
The shareholding proportion: 18.0％ 
The non-state shareholding 
proportion: 18.0％ 
Qms=0.72 
The first largest state shareholder: Chongqing 
Beer Group Company 
The shareholding proportion: 32.3％ 
22 Chongqing beer 
company 
The first largest non-state shareholder: S&N 
Asia Company 
The shareholding proportion: 17.5％ 
The state shareholding 
proportion: 32.3％ 
The non-state shareholding 
proportion: 19.7％ 
Qms=0.61 
The first largest state shareholder: Shanghai 
Broadcast and Television Development 
Company 
The shareholding proportion: 45.2％ 
23 Orient Pearl 
Company 
The first largest non-state shareholder: 
Shanghai Culture and Broadcast Media Group 
Company 
The shareholding proportion: 10.1％ 
The state shareholding 
proportion: 45.2％ 
The non-state shareholding 
proportion: 13.4％ 
Qms=0.30 
The first largest state shareholder: Hailuo 
Group Company 
The shareholding proportion: 45.7％ 
24 Hailuo Cement 
Company 
The first largest non-state shareholder: Hailuo 
Changye Investment Company 
The state shareholding 
proportion: 45.7％ 
The non-state shareholding 
proportion: 16.3％ 
Qms=0.30 
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The shareholding proportion: 16.3％ 
The first largest non-state shareholder: Ping’an 
ust Company Tr
The shareholding proportion: 6.7％ 
25 Nanbo 
Company (A 
share) 
The first largest non-state shareholder: Citic 
Securities Company 
The shareholding proportion: 6.7％ 
The non-state shareholding 
proportion: 17.9％ 
The state shareholding 
proportion: 11.9％ 
Qmp=0.66 
Th
Stee
e first largest state shareholder: Baotou 
l Group Company 
The shareholding proportion: 36.7％ 
26 Baotou Steel 
Rare Metal 
Company 
The first largest non-state shareholder: Jiaxin 
Limited Company 
The shareholding proportion: 12.1％ 
The state shareholding 
proportion: 36.7％ 
The non-state shareholding 
proportion: 12.1％ 
Qms=0.33 
The first largest state shareholder: Dongguan 
Highway and Bridge Development Company 
The shareholding proportion: 41.5％ 
27 Dongguan 
Holdings 
Company 
The first largest non-state shareholder: Yumin 
Development Company 
The shareholding proportion: 28.0％ 
The state shareholding 
proportion: 41.5％ 
The non-state shareholding 
proportion: 28.0％ 
Qms=0.67 
28 Xianmen 
wolfram 
company 
The first largest state shareholder: Fujian 
Melting Holdings Company 
The shareholding proportion: 33.6％ 
The state shareholding 
proportion: 33.6％ 
The non-state shareholding 
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The first largest non-state shareholder: Japan 
United Material Corporation 
The shareholding proportion: 9.4％ 
proportion: 9.4％ 
Qms=0.28 
The first largest state shareholder: Capital 
Airport Group Company 
The shareholding proportion: 20.3％ 
29 Huawen Media 
Company 
The first largest non-state shareholder: 
Shanghai Huawen Investment Company 
The shareholding proportion: 14.6％ 
The state shareholding 
proportion: 20.3％ 
The non-state shareholding 
proportion: 14.6％ 
Qms=0.72 
The first largest state shareholder: Citic Group 
Company 
The shareholding proportion: 62.3％ 
30 Citic Bank 
The first largest non-state shareholder: 
Spanish Foreign Bank 
The shareholding proportion: 4.8％ 
The state shareholding 
proportion: 77.3％ 
The non-state shareholding 
proportion: 4.8％ 
Qms=0.06 
The first largest non-state shareholder: ING 
Bank 
The shareholding proportion: 16.1％ 
31 Bank of Beijing 
The first largest state shareholder: Beijing 
State Assets Management Company 
The shareholding proportion: 10.4％ 
The non-state shareholding 
proportion: 22.2％ 
The state shareholding 
proportion: 20.2％ 
Qmp=0.91 
32 China Pacific The first largest state shareholder: Huabao The state shareholding 
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Investment Company 
The shareholding, proportion: 17.4％ 
Insurance 
company 
The first largest non-state shareholder: Parallel 
Investors Holdings 
The shareholding proportion: 13.7％ 
proportion: 45.4％ 
The non-state shareholding 
proportion: 17.3％ 
Qms=0.38 
The first largest non-state shareholder: Huawei 
Electronics Company 
The shareholding proportion: 22.2％ 
33 Shengyi Science 
and Technology 
Company 
The first largest state shareholder: Dongguan 
Electronics Company 
The shareholding proportion: 17.9％ 
The state shareholding 
proportion: 26.9％ 
The non-state shareholding 
proportion: 24.7％ 
Qms=0.92 
The first largest state shareholder: Ministry of 
Finance 
The shareholding proportion: 26.5％ 
34 Communication 
Bank 
The first largest non-state shareholder: 
Shanghai HSBC 
The shareholding proportion: 18.6％ 
The state shareholding 
proportion: 28.5％ 
The non-state shareholding 
proportion: 18.6％ 
Qms=0.65 
The first largest state shareholder: Bureau of 
Finance of Ningbo city 
The shareholding proportion: 10.8％ 
 
35 Ningbo Bank 
The first largest non-state shareholder: 
The non-state shareholding 
proportion: 43.2% 
The state shareholding 
proportion: 18.0％ 
Qmp=0.42 
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Singapore Alien Bank 
The shareholding proportion: 10.0％ 
The first largest state shareholder: Nanjing 
State Assets Management Company 
The shareholding proportion: 13.0％ 
36 Nanjing Bank 
The first largest non-state shareholder: BNP 
PARIBAS 
The shareholding proportion: 12.6％ 
The non-state shareholding 
proportion: 27.1% 
The state shareholding 
proportion: 13.0％ 
Qmp=0.48 
The first largest state shareholder: Shenhuo 
Group Company 
The shareholding proportion: 25.2％ 
37 Shenhuo Stock 
Company 
The first largest non-state shareholder: 
Shangqiu Putian Economic and Trade 
Company 
The shareholding proportion: 11.9％ 
The state shareholding 
proportion: 25.2％ 
The non-state shareholding 
proportion: 24.8％ 
Qms=0.98 
The first largest state shareholder: Huanan 
Jinxin Gold Group Company 
The shareholding proportion: 44.0％ 
38 Chengzhou 
Mining 
Company 
The first largest non-state shareholder: Beijing 
Qingyuan Changye Company 
The shareholding proportion: 9.5％ 
The state shareholding 
proportion: 44.0％ 
The non-state shareholding 
proportion: 28.1％ 
Qms=0.64 
39 Lutian Coal The first largest state shareholder: 
Zhongdiantou Huolinguo Coal and Electricity 
The state shareholding 
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Company 
The shareholding proportion: 70.5％ 
Company 
The first largest non-state shareholder: Jilin 
Niusente Industrial Company 
The shareholding proportion: 5.6％ 
proportion: 78.5％ 
The non-state shareholding 
proportion: 5.6％ 
Qms=0.07 
The first largest state shareholder: Bureau of 
Finance of Fujian Province 
The shareholding proportion: 20.4％ 
 
40 Fujian Industrial 
Bank 
The first largest non-state shareholder: 
Hengsheng Bank 
The shareholding proportion: 12.8％ 
The state shareholding 
proportion: 26.4％ 
The non-state shareholding 
proportion: 22.2％ 
Qms=0.84 
The first largest state shareholder: Capital 
Steel Company 
The shareholding proportion: 14.0％ 
41 Huaxia Bank 
The first largest non-state shareholder: Dutch 
Bank 
The shareholding proportion: 11.3％ 
The state shareholding 
proportion: 36.4％ 
The non-state shareholding 
proportion: 23.3％ 
Qms=0.64 
The first largest state shareholder: China News 
Development Shenzhen Company 
The shareholding proportion: 13.9％ 
42 Tianyin Holding 
Company 
The first largest non-state shareholder: China 
The state shareholding 
proportion: 31.4％ 
The non-state shareholding 
proportion: 16.7％ 
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Huajian Investment Company 
The shareholding proportion: 9.5％ 
Qms=0.53 
It is found that within these 300 enterprises, there are 42 MOEs, accounting for 
14% of the 300 enterprises. Thus the commonness degree of mixed ownership of 
the 300 listed companies of Shanghai-Shenzhen Component Index is: 
              Pm = 14% 
It is fair to say 14% is not low since very small portion of China’s enterprises can 
get listed in the stock market. The 14% of the commonness degree is more 
representative of the mixed ownership in China than the 77.3% of the 
commonness degree for the sample of 950 systematically- transformed 
enterprises. The mixture degree of these 42 MOEs is: 
 Qms = 0.53. 
4.5  The Recent Development of Mixed Ownership in 
China 
The most recent development of the mixed ownership in the localities shows that 
the number of the MOEs in China is still rising. A field survey of Jiangxi 
Province in 2008 found that the provincial government had decided to launch a 
new round of ownership reform for local SOEs1. In May of 2008, the provincial 
government launched the program of speeding up the systematic transformation 
in Jiangxi Provincial state-owned enterprises. This program stipulated that 
systematic transformation of provincial SOEs should be finished within 2 years, 
the breakthrough point of the systematic transformation should be ownership 
reform, and the direction of ownership reform was to transform the 
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wholly-state-owned enterprises to MOEs. In 2008, an important 
wholly-state-owned enterprise in Jiangxi Province, Jiangxi Wolfram Company, 
finished its ownership reform and became a MOE. Jiangxi SASAC held 70% of 
the total equity and Shanghai Wanchao Investment Company, a private firm, held 
30% of the total equity of Jiangxi Wolfram Company. Another wholly 
state-owned enterprise, Jiangzhong Group Company, was on the track of 
ownership reform at that time and its reform program was approved by the 
provincial government. According to the approved plan, both the management 
and an outside strategic investor would hold some shares in post-reform 
Jiangzhong Group Company. The company would then become a MOE. The 
provincial SASAC would sell some state shares, resulting in its holding of 37% 
of the total equity, and the management would hold 30%, Jiangxi China 
Traditional Medicine College would hold 3%, China Defence Science Academy, 
collaborating with Jiangzhong Group Company, would hold 10%, and the other 
20% would be sold to another non-state strategic investor. Jiangxi Coal Group 
Company, another wholly-state-owned company, was preparing to bring in a 
private firm, Zhonghong Zhuoye Investment Company, as a new shareholder. As 
these examples illustrate, the new round of ownership reform of the SOEs will 
bring more MOEs in China. 
Mixed ownership is not only the government’s favourite choice, but also the 
favourite choice of some private firms. A visit was paid to a private company 
called Yili Resources Group Company, who is one of the largest and most 
famous private companies in China2, and it is found that in the past few years, 
Yili Resources Group Company had accomplished a huge business expansion by 
adopting mixed ownership. Moreover, the company had a plan to develop more 
mixed ownership subsidiaries. It is a company with only just ten years history, 
but its sales in 2008 exceeded 10 billion RMB. Five years ago, however, Yili 
Resources Group Company was much smaller. Since then it has taken a strategic 
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decision to enter the sectors of coal mining, coal chemistry, power generation, 
cement, and salt chemistry, by cooperating with large-sized SOEs and 
establishing MOEs. Shenghua Yili Power Limited Company was established to 
run the coal mining and power generation businesses, they are co-owned by 
Shenghua Group Company, the largest coal company and one of the first tier 
SOEs in China. Yili Chemistry Company was established to conduct the PVC 
processing business, which is co-owned by Shenghua Group Company, Shanghai 
Huayi Group Company, a very famous SOE in the chemistry sector, and Yili 
Resources Group Company. Yili Jidong Cement Company was established to do 
the business in the cement manufacturing market, which is co-owned by Jidong 
Cement Company, one of the largest cements enterprises in China and also a 
SOE, and Yili Resources Group Company. Zhongyan Yili Chemistry Company 
was established to do the business of salt chemistry, which is co-owned by China 
Salt Company, a very famous SOE, and Yili Resources Group Company. The 
president of Yili Resources Group Company admitted that the cooperation with 
SOEs and the establishment of the MOEs helped overcome some shortcomings, 
such as the lack of the funds and the professional people. Furthermore, mixed 
ownership helped go around the rigid regulation when entering the sectors of 
coal mining and power generation. Since Yili Resources Group Company is 
located and originated in E’Er’duosi city, which is very famous for its coal 
resource, it has very deep relations with the local government. Furthermore, it 
had made very big contributions to treating the deserts, so that the local 
government often supports the business development of Yili Resources Group 
Company. These advantages could not be obtained by Shenghua Group Company 
or other investors from outside even they are large-sized SOEs. Therefore, when 
those state-owned investors such as Shenghua Group Company, China Salt 
Company, went to E’Er’duosi city to develop their business, they were willing to 
cooperate with Yili Resources Group Company by means of mixed ownership. 
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4.6  Concluding Remarks 
This chapter discusses how common the mixed ownership is in China. A sample 
of 950 surveyed enterprises is employed to analyse the commonness degree and 
mixture degree. In the sample 77.3% of the enterprises are MOEs. Another 
sample of 300 listed companies of the Shanghai-Shenzhen Component Index is 
also employed to examine the commonness degree and the mixture degree of the 
listed companies, 14% of them are MOEs. The mathematical average mixture 
degree of the MOEs in the 950 enterprises is 0.23, while the weighted average 
mixture degree is 0.81. The mixture degree of the 42 listed MOEs is 0.53. But in 
most of the MOEs the state is still the majority shareholder. As mixed ownership 
is quite common in China, the further question is, what factors drive the rise of 
the mixed ownership in China? This will be discussed in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 5 
The Major Factors Driving the Emergence of 
the Mixed Ownership Enterprises 
5.1  Introduction 
The analysis on the China Model of SOEs reform is helpful to understand that 
the mixed ownership has its roots in China’s unique economic transition. 
However, until now it is unknown yet what specific factors drive the emergence 
of the mixed ownership in China. There is hardly any existing literature 
addressing this issue. A few articles touched upon this issue but it is hard to find 
convincing and valuable explanations. Wu, Xinxin. (2005) tried to analyse the 
causes of the MOEs’ emergence in Ningbo City, Zhejiang Province. He stated 
that the major causes of the development of MOEs in Ningbo City were related 
both to the government and to the enterprise, they adopted a flexible attitude 
towards the property rights arrangements in an attempt to promote the business 
expansion. Furthermore, the flexible attitude towards the property rights 
arrangements is related to the distinctive cultural traditions in Ningbo area that 
features the openness, the innovation, and the pragmatism. But those 
explanations were not substantial. It is necessary to conduct systematic and deep 
analysis on the driving factors of the emergence of the mixed ownership in China. 
As the emergence of China’s MOEs is an empirical phenomenon, this chapter 
first analyses the driving factors of China MOEs from the perspective of 
empirical observations, then make some discussions. 
 
 
100
                                         
5.2  The Horizontal Economic Alliance and the Origin 
of Mixed Ownership 
Chapter 3 highlights that the gradual ownership reform leads to mixed ownership. 
To a large extent, mixed ownership grew up alongside the China Model of SOEs 
reform. However, in the early-1980s, there were some MOEs emerging in China 
and these MOEs had nothing to do with the ownership reform, although they 
were not noticed by many people. Probing into the reason why mixed ownership 
emerged in the early-1980s will be very helpful to comprehend the causes of the 
early origin of China’s mixed ownership. 
Historical documents show that the origin of mixed ownership in the early-1980s 
was related to the advocacy program of the economic and technological 
co-operation as well as horizontal alliance, which was encouraged by the 
government. The economic and technological co-operation and horizontal 
alliance was very prevalent in the 1980s among enterprises across different 
industrial sectors, different administrative regions, and different ownership 
sectors. The specific patterns include collaborative manufacturing, collaborative 
R&D, joint investment, and collaborative operation. The objective of this 
advocacy program was to re-allocate the resources among different enterprises 
and to accomplish the mutual supplements of different advantages of different 
enterprises. It is easy to understand the mixed ownership might emerge when the 
collaborations occurred between the enterprises with different ownership 
attribute although the term of mixed ownership was not used at that time. Three 
officials in the State Economy Commission, Yang, Xuguang., Xu, Changzhong., 
and Zhang, Wenguang. (1983), described in detail the major patterns: technology 
service, compensation trade, technology transfer, and joint investment. Gao, 
Shangquan. (1983), the vice president of the State Economic Reform Office, 
argued in his article that the state must allow co-operation and joint investment to 
go ahead among enterprises of different ownership attributes. The practices had 
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shown that keeping state ownership dominant but introducing other kinds of 
ownership as supplementary, was fitting to China’s conditions and useful in 
promoting economic prosperity and employment. Since there were few private 
firms at that time, the economic and technological co-operation and horizontal 
alliance usually occurred among SOEs across different industrial sectors and 
administrative districts. However, as TVEs began to emerge, some SOEs did 
co-operate with TVEs, and the collaboration began to develop from co-operative 
manufacturing to joint investment and new enterprises were established. Joint 
operation and joint investment among SOEs, collective firms and private firms 
occurred, then MOEs containing state ownership and collective ownership as 
well as private ownership emerged. The advantage of mixed ownership in the 
form of joint investment and co-operative management was clear according to 
Gao Shangquan’s article, that was the economic prosperity and the rising 
employment. Thus Gao Shangquan called for the government to “allow” the 
emergence of those new forms of economic collaborations. It is clear to see that 
mixed ownership grew up in reality then the government was urged to admit the 
emergence of mixed ownership. 
The article by the State Light Industry Ministry (1986) recorded the case of 
Zhanjiang Home Electrical Apparatus Company in Guangdong Province. This 
company was a SOE, and expanded its business very quickly in the early-1980s. 
As a result, it faced a shortage of factory buildings, equipments and workers. The 
company wanted to construct new factory buildings, to buy new equipments and 
to hire more workers but failed to get enough regulatory quotas in time. 
Therefore, it decided to set up horizontal economic alliance with the thirteen 
factories administered by Zhanjiang Second Light Industry Bureau. Those 
thirteen factories were collective firms. The pattern of the horizontal economic 
alliance involved joint investment and joint operation. Those collective firms 
invested fixed assets, including equipments and factory buildings, while 
Zhanjiang Home Electrical Apparatus Company invested some cash, to set up a 
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new joint-capital company. The profits of the new company were shared between 
the two sides, and the board of directors was set up. The new company was 
managed by a factory chief, supervised by the board. This article also recorded 
that the employment shareholding was introduced to this new company 
afterwards, enabling employees to buy stocks of the new company. It was further 
stipulated that the dividends must be paid to them every year. This new company 
was of course a MOE, because it contained not only state ownership, but also 
collective ownership and private ownership. 
By analysing these documents, it can be substantiated that the early mixed 
ownership was related to the advocacy program of the economic and 
technological co-operation and horizontal alliance. Mixed ownership tended to 
emerge spontaneously. There was no government strategy or plan to develop 
mixed ownership, but once the economic and technological co-operation and 
horizontal alliance proceeded forward, it could not be confined within SOEs, the 
joint investment and joint operation among SOEs and collective firms as well as 
private firms would happen, resulting in the origin of MOEs. Xuan, Muqiao 
(1987) also stated that the joint investment and joint operation among enterprises 
with different ownership attributes had happened in reality. In this article, he 
used the term of mixed ownership for the first time in China. 
As a matter of fact, the non-state enterprises, including TVEs, other collective 
firms and private firms, had more flexible operational mechanisms since they had 
less governmental control. For example, they had flexible options regarding 
marketing, money spending, and making payments. As a result of this flexibility, 
SOEs were willing to co-operate with them. However, SOEs also had their own 
advantages in terms of technology and funds, and SOEs could get more trust 
from banks, clients. Thus non-SOEs were also willing to co-operate with SOEs. 
Namely, the alliance between SOEs and non-SOEs was able to produce benefits 
from the mutual supplements of different advantages. It is fair to say that the 
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mixed ownership in this circumstance was catalysed by the voluntary activities 
of two sides. The major factors driving the two sides to set up MOEs were as 
follows: SOEs had the advantage for business resources while non-SOEs had the 
advantage for operational mechanisms, the combination of the two kinds of 
advantages enabled them to accomplish mutual supplements.  
5.3  The Ownership Reform of State-Owned Enterprises 
and the Rise of Mixed Ownership  
The above-mentioned mixed ownership was only the start of the emergence of 
China’s MOEs. More MOEs originated from the ownership reform of SOEs. In 
the early stage of SOEs ownership reform, some small SOEs were wholly sold to 
private firms or individuals. Some large SOEs on the other hand were reformed 
by way of mixed ownership. According to Liu, Mingshan. (1985), 55,892 small 
SOEs in the retailing and service sector were let go in 1984, in which 5,500 firms 
were turned to collective firms, and 5,800 were leased to individuals. For those 
turned to collective firms, some state assets were sold to employees, but the state 
still kept some shares, thus those enterprises became MOEs. In 1984, Beijing 
Tianqiao Department Store undertook the ownership reform, the reform also 
adopted mixed ownership. After the ownership reform, the state shareholding 
proportion was exactly 50%, and employees’ shareholding proportion was 4.4%. 
The residual shares were owned by other shareholders. 
Why was the mixed ownership adopted at the early stage of SOEs ownership 
reform? At that time the government did not choose mixed ownership as a 
strategic policy. The most important cause was that full privatisation at that time 
was ideologically forbidden and might incur big political risk. As stated while 
analysing the China Model of SOEs reform, reform itself is a risky venture. 
Especially in the early stage of the economic transition, the political risk was 
very high. Political risk mainly came from the ideological constraints. The 
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literature (Chen, Qingtai, 2008) showed that the concern how to carry out SOEs 
reform was once a very sensitive and rigid political choice. Thus, in order to 
decrease political risk and to avoid ideological confines, adopting a balanced and 
ambiguous strategy of partial privatisation through the introduction of non-state 
shares instead of full privatisation, was much politically safer. Of course, the 
ownership reform in the early stage was also constrained by the shortage of 
private capital. At that time the non-state shareholders introduced to SOEs were 
likely to be employees, who did not have enough funds to buy out the SOEs, but 
buying a small proportion of shares was the most feasible choice. 
Some people initiatively opted for mixed ownership, that was not the case of the 
ideological confines or the shortage of non-state capital. Studying the case of 
Wanke Company, the largest real estate company in China, could shed light on 
this point（Twenty First Century Herald, 2008）. The predecessor of Wanke 
Company was Shenzhen Xiandai Science and Technology Instrument Exposition 
Centre, an independent business department of Shenzhen Special Zone 
Development Company, who was a SOE. This centre was established in 1984 by 
Mr. Wang Shi, a former government official. He struck an agreement with 
Shenzhen Special Zone Development Company to set up the centre, Shenzhen 
Special Zone Development Company did not invest any funds but agreed to 
provide the business license and bank account to help Wang Shi to conduct 
business. It is worth noting that no state funds were invested in this centre. Wang 
Shi himself was able to obtain the quota of imports and exports in order to 
develop the business. This centre was actually privately operated but wore a “red 
cap”. Without the red cap, Wang Shi said that his business would not have 
developed so quickly. His business faced some other troubles as a result of this 
“red cap” however. Wang Shi reportedly recognised that state ownership could 
bring extra facilities to his business, including lower entrance barriers, more 
resources and more protection. On the other hand, however, he also recognised 
the constraints of the state ownership. Therefore, when he read a government 
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circulation about the ownership reform experiment, he decided to carry out 
ownership restructuring. However it was very difficult to define the property 
rights of the assets of this centre because neither government funds nor SOEs 
funds were invested in this center. Actually, all investments in this centre came 
from individuals, but its trademark and brand name, as well as its bank account, 
came from the SOE. The Deputy Mayor of Shenzhen City put forward a plan, 
supported by Wang Shi, to divide the ownership of this centre between 
employees and the state, at the proportion of 40:60. This centre accomplished the 
shareholding restructuring in 1988 and became a MOE and changed its’ name to 
the present one. Later on, Wanke Company was listed and the state shareholding 
proportion declined to 30%. In 1998, Shenzhen Special Zone Development 
Company decided to sell all of its state shares in Wanke Company but agreed the 
buyer could be selected by Wanke Company itself. Thus, Wang Shi had the 
chance to fully privatise Wanke Company by selecting a private company to buy 
these shares. Surprisingly, he selected another SOE, Huarun Group Company. 
Wang Shi himself publicly declared that he liked Huarun’s background of being a 
SOE. According to published information, in 2008, the first largest shareholder 
of Wanke Company was Huarun Group Company, its shareholding proportion 
stood at 14.6% and the employees union held some shares. Wanke Company is a 
MOE now. It is fair to say that the mixed ownership of Wanke Company was the 
choice of Mr. Wang Shi because he recognised that the fast development of 
Wanke Company benefited both from SOE’s advantage for business resources, 
and from the ability of the management. Wang Shi still decided not to fully 
remove the state ownership. 
Another important factor of Wanke Company’ opting for mixed ownership was 
the managers’ contribution to the formation of the corporate assets, fortunately, 
the contribution was recognised by the government, who agreed that their 
contribution could be converted to individual equity shares. Although the 
predecessor of Wanke Company was a business department of Shenzhen Special 
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Zone Development Company, but Shenzhen Special Zone Development 
Company did not invest any funds in that department. Nevertheless, Shenzhen 
Special Zone Development Company facilitated the business expansion of the 
department by providing the license and trademark as well as bank account. The 
enterprises like Wanke Company, during the process of their business 
development, received little or no funding from the government, namely, the 
assets formation benefited from the successful operation of the managers instead 
of the input of state funds. However, the business operation of those enterprises 
still depended, to some extent, on the support from SOEs, especially in terms of 
soft assets and preferential policies. Some preferential policies such as import 
and export quotas proved difficult for private companies to obtain. Therefore, 
while launching ownership reform, the management usually asked for the 
compensation for their contributions to the assets formation, the government 
accordingly agreed to grant some shares to the management. It is fair to say, one 
factor driving these enterprises to become MOEs was managers’ contribution to 
assets formation, their contribution was compensated by shares grants.    
A field survey on another prominent MOE in China, Lenovo Holdings 
Company3,  was conducted. While launching the ownership reform of Lenovo 
Holdings Company, the managers’ contribution to the assets formation was 
recognised by the government and their contribution was compensated by shares 
grants. Established in the mid-1980s, Lenovo Holdings Company was supervised 
by China Science Academy. Mr. Liu Chuangzhi, the founder of Lenovo Holdings 
Company, and his colleagues, borrowed 200,000 RMB from China Science 
Academy in order to set the company up but returned the full amount in the 
following year. Lenovo Holdings Company was registered as a 
wholly-state-owned enterprise at that time. As the company developed and the 
assets expanded, the management appealed to China Science Academy for shares 
grant. The government rejected this request of shares granting, but agreed to 
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grant the rights of claiming the dividends of 35% of the total equity. This was the 
first step in the transition. In 2001, the State Council eventually approved the 
ownership reform proposal of Lenovo Holdings Company. Then Lenovo 
Holdings Company became a MOE, the management and core employees bought 
35% of the shares. The State Assets Management Company of China Science 
Academy held 65% of the total shares. The State Assets Management Company 
of China Science Academy did not intervene in the business affairs of Lenovo 
Holdings Company. The board of directors of Lenovo Holdings Company had 
six members at that time, one was from The State Assets Management Company 
of China Science Academy, and other five were the managers of Lenovo 
Holdings Company. Lenovo Holdings Company was controlled by the minority 
shareholder, instead of the majority shareholder.     
A field survey of TCL Group Company4, another prominent Chinese MOE, was 
also conducted. This case has more meaningful implications than the Lenovo 
example, though they are similar. TCL Group Company was established by a few 
individual founders in the early 1980s. Though there was no financial investment 
from the government, it was registered as a wholly-state-owned enterprise at that 
time. To encourage the development of this enterprise, the local government 
struck an agreement with the management in 1997, stipulating that the 
management should guarantee the yearly increment ratio of the state assets of 
this company would not be lower than 10%, the management would get specific 
proportions of shares grant while the yearly increment ratio of the state assets 
was really higher than 10%. From 1998 onwards, management began to hold 
some shares, and their shareholding proportion increased over time. Since then, 
due to the introduction of outside strategic investors and the issuance of new 
stocks to the public, the state shareholding proportion declined from 100% in 
1997 to 58% in 2002, 40.97% in 2003, 25.22% in 2004, and 15.22% in 2005. 
Since 2005, the state shareholding proportion has remained stable. There is no 
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government plan to decrease its shareholding proportion anymore. It seems that 
the mixed ownership of this example is beneficial to all sides. 
Since the mid-1990s, the ownership reform of SOEs, or the so-called systematic 
transformation (Gai Zhi), has sped up enormously. The questionnaire survey 
shows that the government tended not to sell all of state shares when carrying out 
the systematic transformation. As a result lots of SOEs were transformed into 
MOEs.  
The questionnaire survey covered 950 enterprises, in which 77.3% are MOEs. In 
many ownership-reformed enterprises, the government was not willing to sell all 
of the state shares. Instead, the government often opted to keep some state shares 
in the ownership-transformed enterprises, known as “retaining a hand”. 
Retaining a hand can not be fully explained by political or ideological factors.  
A few field surveys were conducted with some cases. These cases illustrated why, 
and how, the government retains a hand. A visit was paid to a very famous 
private company group in China, Fuxing Group Company, and one of its 
subsidiaries, Nanjing Iron and Steel Company which used to be a SOE before it 
was taken over by Fuxing Group Company in 20035. Fuxing Group Company 
was established in 1993, and has become one of the largest private companies in 
China, its business covers different sectors such as steel, power, finance and 
retailing. Its revenue exceeds 30 billion RMB in 2008. In 2003, Fuxing Group 
Company invested 1.65 billion RMB in Nanjing Iron and Steel Company and 
became its majority shareholder. Originally, Fuxing Group Company planed to 
take over 100% of the equity of Nanjing Iron and Steel Company, but the local 
government had a definite strategy of “retaining a hand”, refused to sell all of its 
shares. Eventually, Fuxing Group Company and the government reached an 
agreement. In the post-restructuring company, Fuxing Group Company held 60% 
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of the total shares while the government and management held some shares. 
Nanjing Iron and Steel Company was a MOE containing private ownership, state 
ownership and the management ownership. In my interview, Fuxing Group 
Company acknowledged that the continuous existence of some state shares had 
been playing a positive role. Keeping some state shares was useful for the 
company to attain the trust of local government, and to use this trust to get the 
support from the power supply department, the transportation department, the 
land administration department, the environment administration department, the 
taxation department, and other governmental departments. 
Since benefiting from the mixed ownership, in 2007, Fuxing Group Company 
selected to adopt the mixed ownership pattern when participating in the 
ownership reform of Hainan Iron Mine Company, who used to be a 
wholly-state-owned enterprise. After the take-over, Fuxing Group Company held 
60% of the total shares in Hainan Iron Mine Company, the local government held 
40%. In 2008, Fuxing Group Company singed an agreement with Tianjian 
Municipal Government to take over Tianjin Steel Company, a large SOE, and 
proposed a mixed ownership structure in which 47.5% of the shares would be 
held by Fuxing Group Company and some share would be held by the local 
government.  
5.4  Why Does the Government Want to Retain Some 
State Shares? 
Why does the government want to retain a hand and maintain some state shares 
while carrying out the ownership reform of SOEs? 
It is found from the field surveys, that in the late-1990s, and even at present, the 
ownership reform of SOEs is still politically sensitive. The ruling party and the 
central government do not have any clear expression of promoting privatisation. 
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Instead, privatisation is still an ideologically forbidden area and is regarded to be 
identical to capitalism and full westernization. As for the ownership reform, both 
the ruling party and the central government have used ambiguous words to 
express their intention to let go small and medium-sized SOEs. It is unclear 
however what the term “let go” definitely means. However, the ruling party and 
the central government explicitly declared that mixed ownership is fully 
encouraged, and the shareholding system should be the major pattern of state 
ownership. Therefore, selecting mixed ownership, namely, partial privatization, 
instead of full privatization, will undoubtedly decrease political risk.  
Some SOEs however were still fully privatised. In 2007, Shuanghui Group 
Company, a very large and important SOE in Luohe City, Henan Province, was 
fully privatised. This means that not all government officials are confined by the 
traditional ideology and will avert political risk while carrying out the ownership 
reform of SOEs. The question is, whether there are other causes for the 
government to “retain a hand” besides ideological factor or political risk. 
This issue can be illustrated by case studies. In 2004, Little Swan Company in 
Wuxi City, Jiangsu Province, experienced the ownership reform. A field survey 
was conducted and some facts were found6. Little Swan Company used to be a 
very large SOE in Wuxi City and owned a very famous brand name, Little Swan. 
The local government requested that this company should develop its business in 
Wuxi City instead of moving to other regions and the brand name should be kept 
intact after the ownership reform. The participant of the ownership reform, 
Siweite Company, a private company, made three no-change commitments to the 
government: there would be no change to the business sector or the brand name, 
no change to the management, and no change to the business regional location. 
Meanwhile, Siweite Company proposed a very ambitious plan for the 
post-privatisation business expansion of Little Swan Company. The revenue of 
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the Little Swan Company would reach 14 billion RMB in 2004, 19.5 billion in 
2005 and 50.3 billion in 2008. Originally, the government planned to sell 100% 
of the state shares to Siweite Company, with the prerequisite of the three 
no-change commitments. Eventually, the government decided to retain 35% 
equity. Some comments pointed out the retention of this 35% state equity was 
because the government did not fully trust Siweite Company, a private firm 
(Yang, Kairan. 2004). The conclusion demonstrated the government’s incomplete 
trust. Eighteen days later after the transfer of the shares, Siweite Company broke 
the commitments and changed the chairman and the deputy chairman of the 
board. The cause of changing the chairman and deputy chairman was the division 
about the development strategy. The original management argued that the 
company should continue to develop the existing business of home electricity 
apparatus, but Siweite Company argued that the company should concentrate its 
resources to develop IT business. IT was the major business of Siweite Company. 
Three years later, Siweite Company was caught in a financial crisis. As the local 
government retained 35% stake, it took over all the controlling powers as the 
second shareholder and forcibly resumed the 65% state shares from Siweite 
Company. 
In China, the government bears the responsibilities of developing local economy. 
The economic development determines, to some extent, the promotion of local 
officials. Therefore, the government has some expectations for those enterprises 
after ownership reform. First, the government expects that the enterprises would 
not relocate after the ownership reform; second, the government expects that they 
would keep the original brand name; third, the government expects that the 
strategic investors would invest further funds in order to expand the business; 
fourth, the government expects that the new controlling shareholders would 
retain the original management and keep the employment of all workers in order 
to prevent social instability. However, the government does not fully trust private 
firms about those issues. It seems that the reality often justifies its incomplete 
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trust. Incomplete trust can lead to the incomplete selling of state shares, thus the 
government will “retain a hand”. 
The government may sometimes keep a golden share. The term “golden share” 
refers to a single stock held by the government. The golden share provides the 
same voting rights as normal shares but gives the government a veto power on 
pre-agreed issues. The golden share highlights the government’s incomplete trust 
in private ownership. It is found in my field survey7, that the golden share system 
was adopted in the ownership reform of Huayi Electrical Apparatus Company, a 
famous company in Jiangxi Province. This golden share was held by the SASAC 
of Jingdezhen City, Jiangxi Province, and it has the rights to reject four issues of 
affairs: moving the business to other regions; changing the business sector; 
changing the placement plan of the employees; changing the plan of debts 
disposal. When the government holds one golden share, it implies a lack of full 
trust in the private investor about those four issues.  
There is also another reason for the government to “retain a hand”. That is, the 
government is not willing to entirely give up its controlling powers and its 
influences on those enterprises even after the ownership reform. After the 
long-term radical control reform, there are less and less controlling powers left in 
the hand of the government, but the government still keeps some powers, say, the 
power of selecting senior managers. These controlling powers are very precious 
to the government. The government also has some influences on the SOEs. The 
government can still put some pressures on the enterprise to follow and to 
accomplish their objectives of the local development, to use the enterprises as a 
source of the financial income. All in all, the controlling powers can bring some 
benefits to the government departments and the officials. On one hand, the 
government recognises that SOEs need to be ownership-reformed. But on the 
other hand, the government is reluctant to give up its controlling powers of the 
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SOEs, especially the large and important SOEs (Zhang, Delin. 2007). 
Introducing some non-state shares can vitalise the enterprises and enhance the 
budgeting constraint, but retaining some state shares will allow the government 
to retain some controlling powers. Therefore mixed ownership is a rational 
option for the government. 
5.5  Why Do Private Enterprises Accept the Retention 
of Some State Shares and Why Do Private Enterprises 
Want to Bring in the State Ownership? 
Why do some private enterprises accept the retention of the state shares? Some 
private firms even proposed mixed ownership while participating in SOEs 
ownership reform. Moreover, some private firms actually invite state 
shareholding to change the wholly-private-owned firms to MOEs. The case of 
Tianwei Yingli Company is very convincing. Tianwei Yingli Company was 
established by a private firm, Yingli Group Company, and a SOE, Tianwei 
Baobian Company. The published document (He, Yifang. 2007) showed that 
Yingli Group Company wanted to develop a photovoltaic project, but the support 
of government funds had to be obtained. In fact, the funds were distributed by the 
State Development Bank, and private firms did not have any opportunities to get 
the funds. Due to this circumstance, Yingli Group Company transferred 60% of 
its equity in 1998 to Baoding Development Area Administration Commission to 
set up a new mixed ownership company, Yingli Stock Company. But Baoding 
Development District Administration Commission would not intervene in the 
business affairs of Yingli Stock Company. In 1999, Yingli Stock Company won a 
bid of a project and needed 150 million RMB, but Yingli Stock Company did not 
have enough funds. A SOE, Tianwei Baobian Company who had gained a large 
amount of funds from the stock market, bought some shares from Yingli Group 
Company. Beijing Zhongxing Liye Science-Technology Investment Company 
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also bought some shares. Baoding Development District Administration 
Commission exited from this company. It occurred in 2002. Within the new 
company, Tianwei Yingli Company, Tianwei Baobian Company held 49% of the 
total shares, Yingli Group Company held 45%, and Beijing Zhongxing Liye 
Science-Technology Investment Company held 6%. In 2004, Tianwei Yingli 
Company needed 400 million RMB to invest in new projects and asked Tianwei 
Baobian Company to provide guarantee for the borrowing from banks, but the 
latter proposed to absolutely control Tianwei Yingli Company. Then Yingli 
Group Company transferred 2% of the total equity of Tianwei Yingli Company to 
Tianwei Baobian Company, but reached an agreement that Tianwei Baobian 
Company would not intervene in the business affairs of Tianwei Yingli Company. 
Thus, 51% of the total equity of Tianwei Yingli Company was held by Tianwei 
Baobian Company. In 2005, Tianwei Yingli Company prepared to be listed in the 
New York Stock Exchange, but the proposal could not be approved by the 
government because it was a state majorly-owned company. In 2006, Yingli 
Group Company increased its shareholding proportion in Tianwei Yingli 
Company from 43% to 51% without the contention of Tianwei Baobain 
Company, and then was listed in the New York Stock Exchange. In 2007, The 
Chinese Weapon and Equipment Group Company, the parent company of 
Tianwei Group Company, and the grandfather company of Tianwei Baobian 
Company, proposed to resume the 51% shareholding proportion, and wanted to 
control Tianwei Yingli Company so that it could enter the photovoltaic sector 
through the access of Tianwei Yingli Company. The Chinese Weapon and 
Equipment Group Company clearly declared that if this proposal could not be 
accomplished quickly, it would suffocate the development of Tianwei Yingli 
Company. 
Tianwei Yingli Company is not the only private firm who initially select the 
mixed ownership, the same is true for Suntech Company8. In 2001, Mr. Shi 
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Zhengrong, an expert on photovoltaic sector, came to Wuxi City, Jiangsu 
Province, to start his photovoltaic business. He lacked sufficient funds however 
and invited the local government to invest funds in order to set up his company. 
Eight SOEs, encouraged by local government invested funds, resulting in the 
formation of a MOE, Suntech Company. Fortunately, when Suntech Company 
was preparing to be listed in New York Stock Exchange, Shi Zhengrong managed 
to convince the government to urge the eight SOEs to withdraw their shares from 
Suntch Company, and he succeeded.  
The cases of Tianwei Yingli Company and Suntech Company show that private 
firms can not enjoy the same treatment as SOEs in terms of the acquirement of 
government funds, project bidding, and borrowing from banks. During the 
business expansion, the difficulties of private firms in raising funds are much 
more serious than SOEs. SOEs usually have good access to funds from the 
domestic stock market and banks. Private firms usually have good flairs for 
selecting projects, finding opportunities, and making profits. In these 
circumstances, mixed ownership helps both SOEs and private firms.  
Moreover, since the periodic business cycle and market fluctuations impose risks 
on enterprises, in comparison with large SOEs, private firms have poorer 
capability and fewer resources to tackle these risks. After the long-term gradual 
ownership reform, most of the small and lots of the medium-sized SOEs were 
sold out, nowadays SOEs are usually large-sized and are supported by the 
government. These large SOEs have good access to government support, and 
have great capability to resist the risks. In terms of obtaining assistance from 
government to resist the risk, private firms are still struggling to get the same 
national treatment as large SOEs. The cases of Xinhua Airline Holdings 
Company, Hainan Airline Group Company and Okair Airline Company are very 
good examples. In 2008, the global airline sector fell into a crisis, almost all 
airline companies in China faced cash flow crisis. At that time, state-owned 
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airline companies, such as Air China, China Southern Airlines, China Eastern 
Airlines, received tens of billions of RMB from the government and was able to 
weather the crisis as a result. In contrast, Okair Airline Company, a private firm, 
could not get funds from the government and stopped its business for a time. 
Another private airline, Dongxing Airline Company, was in a financial trouble in 
2009 and was sold to Air China, a SOE. However, Xinhua Airline Holdings 
Company, a MOE, also got funds from government. According to Mr. Chen Feng, 
the chairman of this company, the government of Tianjin City and Hainan 
Province infused hundreds of millions of RMB to Xinhua Airline Holdings 
Company and its subsidiaries (Li, Meilin. 2008). The support from the 
government in the global financial crisis demonstrates that how significant and 
how correct the decision of transforming Xinhua Airline Holdings Company to a 
MOE was. This company was established in 2004, and the management invited 
Hainan provincial government to be a shareholder. In 2006, Hainan provincial 
government invested 1.5 billion RMB and now holds 48.61% of the total shares. 
5.6  Summary and Discussions 
The analysis on the factors driving the emergence of China’s MOEs has been 
conducted through empirical observations. Now it is necessary to summarize and 
make some discussions. 
(1) The initial mixed ownership originated from the combination of the flexible 
operational mechanisms of private enterprises and the plentiful business 
resources of state-owned enterprises 
The analysis illustrates that the initial mixed ownership was not an intentional 
strategy designed by the state. However the initial mixed ownership naturally 
resulted from the economic co-operation and horizontal alliance in the 1980s. 
Once the co-operation and the alliance started, it could not be confined to SOEs, 
the co-operation and alliance among SOEs and collective enterprises as well as 
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private firms, naturally happened. The newly-born private firms in particular had 
flexible operational mechanisms, and the SOEs had rich business resources. The 
mixed ownership enabled them to mutually supplement their advantages. In fact, 
the mixed ownership demonstrated its vigour in reality. The synergy of different 
advantages of SOEs and non-SOEs, is an important factor driving the emergence 
of the MOEs in China. 
(2) The China Model of state owned enterprises reform catalysed a number of 
mixed ownership enterprises 
My studies demonstrate that the China Model of SOEs reform bred mixed 
ownership. Radical control reform of the SOEs and gradual ownership reform are 
liable to lead to partial rather than full privatisation. Meanwhile, the government’ 
incomplete trust in private ownership, the government’s incomplete releasing of 
its controlling powers on SOEs, the prejudice about private firms from the public 
and the employees of SOEs, the granting of some state shares for compensating 
insiders’ contribution to state assets formation, promoted the rise of MOEs. The 
unfair treatment to private firms also enhances the standing of mixed ownership. 
(3) The incremental transition pattern provided the basis for the formation of 
mixed ownership 
Without doubt, the incremental transition pattern, as defined by Wang, Mengkui. 
(2003), provided a firm basis for the formation of mixed ownership. This was 
because the rise of mixed ownership needs both SOEs and private enterprises. 
The incremental reform keeps the state sector for a time but encourages the 
development of the private sector. From time to time, the private sector will 
expand and more private firms will grow up. Once the opportunities arise, SOEs 
and private firms will collaborate and MOEs will emerge. On the contrary, in 
Russia and Eastern European countries, the transition pattern is not incremental, 
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meaning there were not enough private firms to be combined with SOEs to 
produce MOEs. 
(4) The governmental inexperience in administering private firms favours mixed 
ownership 
Why does not the government have complete trust in private ownership? Why 
does not the government want to completely release its’ control of SOEs? This 
can not only be attributed to the interests of government departments and 
officials, but also to the governmental inexperience in and unfamiliarity with 
administering private firms. Chinese government has the customs and the 
tradition to keep the controlling powers and influence on economic affairs. The 
government is experienced in and familiar with keeping some control and 
guidance on SOEs, but this is not the case with private enterprises. A simple 
example is, when the government faces inflation or unemployment, it can 
instruct SOEs not to raise the price and not to fire the workers, but it does not 
know how to handle these issues with private firms, or it does not believe it is 
capable of handling the situation well. While many SOEs, especially large and 
important SOEs, need ownership reform, the government does not want to 
completely lose its controlling powers and influence. Retaining some state shares 
and selecting mixed ownership will decrease these worries. Many cases show 
that how MOEs are more liable to accept governmental influence. Of course, this 
is also a corporate governance issue, which will be addressed in chapters 6 and 7.  
(5) More public trust in SOEs encourages some private enterprises to accept 
mixed ownership 
The studies show that not only the government itself selects mixed ownership, 
but some private firms who participate in the ownership reform of SOEs actually 
opt for mixed ownership. In China, although the economic transition has 
produced a great number of private enterprises, it is still difficult for them to 
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acquire enough trust from the public, customers, or banks. Even nowadays, SOEs 
are still regarded by the public as a more reliable kind of enterprises. While SOEs 
face efficiency problem, private firms face trust problem. The causes are 
complicated. Besides the long-history of social prejudice, private firms are often 
criticised. Indeed, they may be excessively lucrative, may neglect morals, and 
may defy social rules in certain circumstances. Since facing trust problem, 
private firms may select mixed ownership while participating in SOEs ownership 
reform and expanding their business. Mixed ownership may help them acquire 
more trust and facilitate their business. 
(6) The poor access to business resources makes some private firms select mixed 
ownership 
SOEs can acquire more business resources of many kinds than private firms. The 
major cause why private firms are unable to acquire enough business resources is 
that many business resources are still controlled by the government and it is 
liable to exercise preferential policies to SOEs. On the other hand, SOEs are 
more likely to follow government instructions on local economic and industrial 
development strategy and bear more social responsibilities, they have more 
reasons to attain these business resources from the government. Selecting mixed 
ownership can help private firms acquire more business resources from the 
government. 
(7) The governmental assistance and protection for SOEs may push some private 
enterprises to become MOEs 
The belief of “governmental protection may save state ownership from market 
hit” is a major factor driving private firms to accept mixed ownership. Market hit 
sometimes knock down firms. But SOEs are more likely to obtain funds or other 
kinds of supports from the government when market hit happens to them, then 
avoid the fate of collapse. Although SOEs are usually less efficient than private 
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firms and that is why SOEs need to be ownership-reformed, but SOEs have more 
connections with the government and are liable to resort to many kinds of 
supports from the government. Generally speaking, business partners and 
customers may have more confidence in SOEs because people believe SOEs are 
backed by the government. In the global financial crisis of 2008, even in the US 
some private giants managed to be supported by the government including 
obtaining state ownership in order to avoid the possible collapse. In China’s 
market economy, lots of people believe that “governmental protection may save 
state ownership from market hit”. In reality, it can be found that lots of private 
firms collapsed in the circumstances of market hit and cash shortage. As for those 
SOEs in difficulties, they usually can not be closed or go bankrupt, the 
government is likely to infuse funds and other resources to maintain their running 
as long as they can be saved. In comparison with private firms, it is more 
possible for MOEs to acquire funds and other business resources from the 
government when they are in difficulties. The case of Xinhua Airline Holdings 
Company who got the support from Hainan Provincial Government and Tianjn 
Municipal Government in 2008 crisis is a good example. In China, the collapse 
of the enterprises has another cause. Every few years, the government will carry 
out a round of industrial restructuring, some firms will be forced to close their 
business, and private firms tend to be the victims. Selecting mixed ownership 
will help enterprises to avoid this fate. 
(8) More lawful protection for SOEs leads some private enterprises to mixed 
ownership 
China currently is not a mature rule-of-law country. SOEs can usually get more 
lawful protection than private firms. This will attract some private enterprises to 
become MOEs. 
(9) Mixed ownership can alleviate SOEs insiders’ resistance to ownership reform 
to some extent 
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Mixed ownership is also a good way to alleviate SOEs insiders’ resistance to 
ownership reform. It seems that in lots of countries, privatisation is resisted by 
SOEs employees. SOEs employees want to hold firmly the iron rice bowl. In 
China, generally speaking, SOEs employees are reluctant to become the 
employees of private firms because their iron bowl may become an earth bowl 
under ownership reform, and they think private ownership can not bring them the 
sense of naturalisation. It is found that in the survey that in most of the 
fully-privatised enterprises, the employment status of their workers was usually 
transformed, namely, the workers did not have the standing of permanent 
employment any more. In many MOEs, however, the employment status of their 
workers usually was not transformed. Besides, it is more feasible for MOEs to 
set up party organisations and that will give traditional employees more of the 
sense of naturalisation. 
(10) Mixed ownership contains the traditional Chinese culture 
The rise of the mixed ownership in China is related to the traditional Chinese 
culture of adaptation, balance and fusion. As stated by Wu, Xinxin. (2005), the 
development of the MOEs in Ningbo City, Zhejiang Province, has something to 
do with the regional cultural traditions such as the openness, innovation, and 
pragmatism. The culture in Ningbo is also a part of Chinese culture. It is found 
that many people who participated in SOEs ownership reform often emphasised 
the doctrine of adaptation, and recognised the philosophy of “overrunning will 
not run”. Mr.Lin,Yutan. (2000) held that the major traits of Chinese people are 
roundness, flexibility, enduring, balance, and adaptation. He argued that these 
traits make Chinese people sensible and rational, and they are likely to select the 
approach of compromise and compatibility. Although the characteristics of 
adaptation, flexibility, roundness, enduring, and balance may not only belong to 
Chinese traditional culture, many other countries possibly have similar cultural 
traits, the rise of China’s mixed ownership is indeed related to Chinese traditional 
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culture in the background of the great economic transition and the certain 
ideological constraint.  
Selecting the mixed ownership means to share the controlling powers and the 
profits among the state shareholders and the non-state shareholders. Therefore, 
how to allocate the controlling powers and how to distribute the profits become 
very critical issues. Meanwhile, the existence of the state ownership makes the 
government-enterprise relationship more complicated. Mixed ownership may 
enhance the naturalisation sense for the enterprise employees and may maintain 
their iron bowl, but insiders’ interests may conflict with private shareholders’ 
interests. All these issues are related to corporate governance. The corporate 
governance of MOEs may be more complicated than the emergence of the MOEs 
in China. Therefore, the studies on the corporate governance of China’s MOEs 
should be conducted in the following chapters.  
5.7  Concluding Remarks 
This chapter analyses why the mixed ownership emerged in China. Some 
findings have been presented. In the 1980s the early mixed ownership resulted in 
the horizontal co-operation and business alliance, the SOEs’ advantage for 
business resources and the non-SOEs’ advantage for flexible operational 
mechanisms were combined in mixed ownership, and the positive synergy was 
created. Since the mid-1990s, many SOEs were ownership-reformed. Due to the 
ideological constraint, the granting of some shares for the insiders’ contribution 
to the formation of the state assets, mixed ownership was selected by lots of 
enterprises. Meanwhile, the government is willing to maintain some state shares 
to retain a hand. It is also found that private firms have poor access to business 
resources, and face more difficulties in obtaining the trust of the government, the 
public, banks and customers. That also favours mixed ownership. Furthermore, 
Chinese traditional culture expedites the rise of MOEs. 
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Chapter 6 
Understanding the Corporate Governance of 
the Mixed Ownership Enterprises from the 
Perspective of Institutional Arrangements 
6.1  Introduction 
The analysis of the major factors driving the emergence of China’s MOEs has 
been conducted. MOEs are becoming important in the market, it is necessary to 
know more about them, especially about their corporate governance. Chapter 6 
probes into corporate governance from the perspective of institutional 
arrangements, and set up a basic framework for the analysis of the corporate 
governance of China’s MOEs. 
6.2  Different Models of Corporate Governance 
As discussed in chapter 2, the term of corporate governance usually refers to the 
roles of board of directors, management, owners, stakeholders, and to corporate 
transparency as well as the independence of corporate business. Actually, this 
term is often deemed as the function of board of directors, shareholder rights, 
information disclosure and executive compensations (OECD, 2004).  
Corporate governance has been intensively discussed in the past 30 years. But 
there are different models of corporate governance because of different market 
environments, different juridical systems, and different cultural traditions. Vives 
(2000) stated that corporate governance can be usually distinguished into 
market-oriented model versus bank-oriented and relations-based model. Vives 
(2000) described the models. The former is also called Anglo-Saxon model. 
Large companies in Anglo-Saxon countries are usually listed in stock 
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markets ,the ownership are dispersed among many institutional and many 
individual investors, the ownership concentration is modest, the companies are 
controlled by managers. The latter is also called continental European model. In 
continental counties, especially in Germany, the large companies usually have 
long-term and close relations, and then banks play very important role in 
corporate governance. The public corporations over 500 employees usually have 
a two-tier system board. Furthermore, in many continental countries and some 
Asian countries, most large-sized enterprises are private, even the ownership of 
many listed corporations is quite concentrated, but the market for corporate 
control in thises countries is weak. Pyramidal control can be found in these 
companies. In Japan the main bank system is in place and the main banks play 
important role, the main bank usually holds some shares of the firm and they can 
intervenes in corporate business affairs, and the management usually controls the 
firm. Hansman and Kraakman (2004) argued that in the most time of the 20th 
century, the corporate governance in the US can be called the manager-oriented 
model, the corporate governance in Germany can be called the labour-oriented 
model, the corporate governance in France and in Japan can be called the 
state-oriented model, and the shareholder-oriented model is highly recommended, 
this model is not only applicable to Anglo-Saxon countries, but also applicable to 
continental and many other countries. Therefore, corporate governance is 
addressed intensively in relation to issues such as: taking single-tier board system 
and introducing independent directors or outside directors, enhancing 
information disclosure and promoting corporate transparency, encouraging 
shareholder lawsuit, and developing a take-over market.  
These models of corporate governance describe the features of corporate 
governance in different market economies quite well, but do not cover the case of 
China. China is a former planning economy and currently is still halfway in the 
process of economic transition. China even did not have its company law before 
1993. Some economists (La Porta et al, 1998) argued that corporate governance 
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model is related to law system. Common law countries dominate continental civil 
law countries in terms of legal protection the interest of stockholders (La Porta et 
al, 1997). China enacted its first company law in 1993, this law was basically 
developed from the UK corporation law with a lot references to the Japanese 
corporation law and Germany corporation law, therefore China’s corporate law is 
a mixed system of the UK and the continental countries. Its securities law 
enacted in 1998 is a continental-style law. But unlike Japan and Germany, banks 
do not hold equity in firms and play poor role in corporate governance in China. 
China’s company law says corporation takes two-tier board system, but the 
supervisory board in China’s corporations is not the same as in Germany, it is not 
a decision-making board but a monitoring organ. As a matter of fact, the 
supervisory board in China’s corporations is usually a flower vase and plays no 
role. In addition, the ownership structure for many large enterprises in China is 
quite different from in the US, the UK, and other capitalist countries. Many large 
enterprises in China are still SOEs or MOEs. The ownership structure is usually 
concentrated. Furthermore, the managers and workers in SOEs and in many 
MOEs have strong connection with the government, they may not follow law 
clauses but follow government documents.  
Allen and Gale (1999) argued that the effectiveness of company board, the 
juridical system, and the market for corporate control, is quite exaggerated by 
many people. In fact, internal and external governance mechanism could not play 
very good and expected role in overcoming the principle-agency problem. They 
pointed out the competition in goods market is critical to improve corporate 
governance and to promote corporate performance. But more literature 
emphasized the importance of board of directors and corporate transparency as 
well as lawful protection of shareholders. Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) found 
that board of directors is generally favourable to improve corporate performance. 
Denis and Sarin (1999) analysed board structure and found out in many 
American listed companies the board structure was from time to time under 
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change, and the introduction of independent directors was helpful to promote 
shareholder value. Rezaee (2007) stated that information disclosure, corporate 
transparency, and rigid regulations of securities market are very important to 
recover the trust from investors.  
In different models, the improvement of corporate governance faces different 
critical issues. In Anglo-Saxon countries, outside directors or independent 
directors are usually recommended to improve the governance of large-sized 
companies in response to the unchecked managerial abuses of the controlling 
powers and payments of excessive compensations, because these large-sized 
companies are usually listed in securities market and their ownership structure is 
quite dispersed among institutional investors and many individual investors. The 
insiders control is very common, outside or independent directors are expectted 
to act as a check against managerial powers (Lin, 1996). John and Senbet (1998) 
argued that the external mechanisms such as the market for corporate control are 
also important while the internal mechanisms including the board effectiveness 
and auditing system do not work very well. Aguilera (2005) also discussed the 
role of independent directors in different countries, and found that independent 
director system could still be relied on as a check mechanism though the 
independence of these directors was sometimes questionable. But in Germany, 
the banks and holding companies are recommended to sell stocks in order to 
decrease the ownership concentration and to increase the openness of 
shareholding structure, and the market for corporate control should be developed 
(Gilson, 1992). In Japan, since cross-shareholding is very common and main 
banks play an important role in enterprise groups (Kerretsu), one of the major 
solutions to improve the corporate governance of these enterprise groups is to 
enhance the corporate transparency. Furthermore, the liquidity of the equity of 
these enterprise groups is also important to improve the goveernance (Ramseyer, 
2004). In emerging markets and Eastern Asian countries, Josnson et al. (2000) 
argued that tunnelling and expropriation were very serious problems. They found 
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many instances of looting of firms by their controlling shareholders in these 
countries, good assets were sometimes transferred out of companies, profits 
might be siphoned off in purposeto escape creditors. Therefore, the critical issue 
of improving corporate governance for these countries is how to restrict the 
controlling powers of controlling shareholders instead of professional managers, 
and to prevent them from assets and profit tunnelling.  
However, corporate governance is still in change and under reform across 
countries in the past 10 year. In the late 1990s and the early 2000s, corporate 
scandals of Erron, Tyco, and WorldCom shocked the market, and then 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) was passed in the US in 2002. SOX unprecedentedly 
emphasizes the internal control and the auditing system for listed companies in 
the US stock market. CEO is held responsible to the credibility and reliability of 
the internal control and the auditing system. Moreover, government regulations 
form Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) plays a more important role (SEC, 
2002). Studies show that SOX helps with promoting internal control, information 
disclosure and corporate transparency (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2007). But 
Romamo (2005) criticized SOX and regarded SOX as quack corporate 
governance because it was enacted in a specific political environment and market 
atmosphere. In general, SOX is a milestone of corporate governance, it brings 
about the corporate governance revolution with influence on accounting, internal 
control, executives responsibility, corporate transparency, and the culture of stock 
although there have been disputes and criticism (Rezaee, 2007). 
While different models and best practices of corporate governance are widely 
discussed, it is worthy to ask how to identify the critical issues of the corporate 
governance in China. The ownership structure for many companies in China is 
quite different from Anglo-Saxon countries and continental European countries, 
it is easy to find the controlling shareholders, and the ownership concentration is 
usually very high. But unlike Germany and Japan, banks play a weak role in the 
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corporate governance of China’s companies. Instead, the government has a big 
influence both in SOEs and in many non-SOEs (Xu, Dianqing., 2000). Many 
instances of tunnelling can also be found in China, but it seems that the 
companies with large state shareholders face much less serious problem of 
expropriation than the companies controlled by private shareholders (Tenev, and 
Zhang, 2002). Especially, most of the listed companies in China have the state 
largest shareholders, the corporate governance in China is undoubtedly 
influenced by the strong government. Therefore, the enterprise-government 
relationship should be carefully taken into account. That is one of the most 
critical issues while analysing the corporate governance in China. In addition, the 
ownership reform of China’s SOEs often causes a big change in ownership 
structure and control structure, that also increases the complication of the 
corporate governance reform in China.  
6.3 The Corporate Governance of the State-Owned 
Enterprises and Private Enterprises in China 
As mixed ownership comes from the combination of SOEs and private 
enterprises, it is necessary to have a basic analysis on the corporate governance 
of the SOEs and the private firms in China before conducting studies on the 
corporate governance of MOEs. 
Throughout the past thirty two years, the governance of China’s SOEs has 
changed hugely. Some basic rules however, especially the rules of selecting 
managers by the ruling party, have not changed. Although the term of corporate 
governance had not been introduced to China before the early 1990s, in the 1960 
the Ordinance on State Enterprises Operation was circulated by the Chinese 
government which determined the relationship between the government and 
SOEs. This ordinance set up a preliminary governance framework for SOEs and 
stipulated that SOEs should be supervised by the party committee and managed 
 
 
129
                                         
by the factory chief. In 1979, the Ordinance on Expanding SOEs Operational 
Autonomy stipulated that SOEs should be supervised by the party committee, 
managed by the factory chief, and monitored by the congress of workers. In 1984, 
the Ordinance on Further Expanding SOEs Operational Autonomy clearly 
stipulated that the factory chief and the secretary of the party committee should 
be appointed by the government or the party department, but the deputy factory 
chief and deputy secretary could be nominated by the factory chief and party 
secretary, and the mid-level managers meanwhile could be appointed by the 
factory chief himself. In 1986, the State Council circulated the Ordinance of 
Factory Chief Mandates of SOEs, the Ordinance of Factory Party Committee 
Mandates of SOEs and the Ordinance of Factory Workers Congress Mandates of 
SOEs. These three ordinances stipulated that the factory chief should take the 
overall responsibility for the business operation of SOEs and he or she was the 
only legal representative. Factory chief was to be appointed by the government 
or the party department and the position was to have a term of between three and 
five years. In 1988, China enacted the State-Owned Enterprise Law, stating again 
that the factory chief should take the overall responsibility for the business 
operation of SOEs, and that he or she was to be the only legal representative of 
the enterprise. In reality however, struggles between the factory chief and the 
party secretary often occurred. In 1993, the first Company Law in China was 
enacted in which there was a chapter about solely-state-owned company. This 
law stipulated that shareholders’ meeting, board of directors, and board of 
supervisors, should be set up. In reality however, conflicts among the “new three 
committees” and the “old three committees” arose. The new three committees are 
the board of directors, the board of supervisors, and the shareholders meeting 
while the old three committees are the party committee, the workers congress, 
and the trade union.    
Many SOEs, especially the large SOEs, have not re-registered as corporations 
until now, but they do not maintain the old system in which the factory chief 
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takes overall responsibility. Some have tried to establish the system of board of 
directors since the mid-1990s, and in these circumstances the only legal 
representative is not the factory chief but the chairman of the board. This means 
the factory chief is not so powerful a person and the chairmen have become 
much powerful.  
Almost in all SOEs, especially in the large ones, the three important positions 
(president, chairman and party secretary) are still grabbed by the government or 
the party departments. Although some SOEs have established the board of 
directors and the president should be selected by the board according to the 
company law, as a matter of fact, the nominee has to be internally selected by the 
government or the party department before the appointment.  
The field surveys with Baosteel Group Company9, and Baotou Steel Group 
Company 10 , were informative. It is found that the positions of chairman, 
president and party secretary in these companies are still controlled by the party 
department, but the party department often honours the opinions of the insiders 
while doing the appointments. Since 2003 the central government and local 
governments have established their SASACs, the power of selecting the leaders 
of SOEs has been gradually transferred to SASACs. The selection of the leaders 
of some important large SOEs is still in the hand of party department though. 
Since 2004, the central SASAC has been trying to set up a new board system in 
central SOEs, Baosteel Group Company pioneered this trial in 2005. The new 
board of Baosteel Group Company consists of nine members, five are outside 
directors and one is an employee director. The trial has expanded to more than 
thirty SOEs administered by the central SASAC as of the end of 2009. It has to 
be pointed out however, the ultimate power of selecting the leaders in these 
SOEs is still in the hand of the party department.  
                                                        
9 The interviews with the strategy department head of Baosteel group Company in July 2008 
and the monitor board members in May 2009. 
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As the selection of high-level managers is still decided by the government, or the 
party, their status and compensations can not be fully marketised. Nowadays, the 
chairpersons, presidents and party secretaries of SOEs still hold the status of state 
cadre. It is the same case even in listed SOEs. The government, or the party, will 
exercise periodic examinations on their business performance and political 
performance, their compensations are also managed by the government, or the 
party. A field survey of the central SASAC11 showed that the compensations of 
SOEs executives began to be connected with the performance of the enterprises 
they manage. In late 2003, the central SASAC circulated the ordinance of 
performance examination. The examination targets include both basic targets and 
unique targets, the former are the assets appreciation ratio and ROE while the 
latter are determined separately by the SASAC according to the specific 
conditions of each SOE. The SASAC officials expressed that the compensations 
of SOEs’ executives ought to be controlled by SASAC, otherwise the gap 
between their compensation and the salaries of workers would soar and the 
public may not accept it. It is found that the CEO’s compensation of CNOOC, a 
listed company in overseas stock market, to be seemingly very high. But as a 
mater of fact, the published compensation is only nominal, while the actual 
compensation was determined by the central SASAC according to the 
achievements of the targets and was much lower than the published 
compensation.  
It is very important to point out the seriousness of the insiders control and 
insiders sharing in China’s SOEs, which should be highly considered when 
studying their corporate governance. During the progress of delegating powers 
and conceding profits, the implementation of the SOEs’ autonomous powers was 
very important for the SOEs to get rid of the planning economic system and the 
governmental intervention at that time. However, the autonomy was actually an 
unclear concept. In reality, insiders’ sharing and insiders’ control are very serious 
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in SOEs though the government and the party still hold some ultimate powers. 
The corporate governance of China’s private enterprises appears much simpler 
than SOEs. The appointment of managers and their compensations have nothing 
to do with the governmental control, the government does not intervene in the 
daily operation of private enterprises. However, private enterprises also face their 
own problems of the corporate governance. China has a very short history of 
private sector, most private enterprises are family firms, and the decision-making 
system is very simple: the founder of the firms, or the most influential member of 
the family, is the ultimate decision-maker. Even if these enterprises are a 
registered corporation which should run according to company law, as long as 
the majority equity is owned by family members, the decision-making system is 
the same. However, while some shares are owned by outside people, the 
governance becomes much more complicated. If all shareholders belong to the 
same circle, such as the classmates circle, the village mates circle or the friends 
circle, the circle relations and circle culture impact heavily on corporate 
governance. When all shareholders do not belong to the same circle, the fighting 
for controlling powers is very critical.   
The basis of the combat for controlling powers is the struggle for majority 
shareholding among the various parties. The majority shareholding brings the 
corresponding lawful voting rights and allow the controlling party to obtain the 
position of chairman and enough seats in the board of directors, as well as the 
positions of president and chief financial officer (CFO). In China’s company law, 
the chairman has the decisive power, while the president and CFO are also 
powerful people. It is found in the surveys that acquiring majority shareholding 
is the primary target for most important shareholders in private companies. In 
general, the founding shareholder, or the existing majority shareholder, 
absolutely hates to lose the standing of holding the majority shares. A field 
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survey was conducted with Shanshan Group Company 12 , a famous private 
company in China, founded by Mr. Zhen Yonggang who holds the majority 
shares. In 2009, he introduced a Japanese company, Yitengzhong, as a strategic 
investor to participate in his company. During ownership structure negotiation, 
he clearly expressed that if Yitengzhong wanted to obtain the majority shares 
there would be no need to proceed further. It is a clear statement of his intent to 
keep the controlling powers. Eventually, Yitengzhong acquired 28% of the total 
shares. However, if corporate shares are dispersively distributed in many 
shareholders, the combat for controlling powers will be very fierce. It is found in 
the field survey of Sina Company13, the combat for the controlling powers had 
been very fierce due to its shares being dispersively distributed. Since 2001 to 
present, Sina Company has seen four chairmen and four CEOs. During the 
struggle, insiders, instead of large shareholders, gradually obtained the 
controlling powers. The case of Sohu Company provides an opposite example14. 
Sohu Company is another famous internet company in China. Mr. Zhang 
Chaoyang, the company founder, holds the majority shares. He has been 
successfully maintaining the position of the chairman.   
While there are many small shareholders, the controlling shareholder is liable to 
abuse the controlling powers to harm the interests of small shareholders through 
related-parties transactions and tunnelling. These transactions are more common 
in private enterprises. Studies (Li, Zengquan. et al, 2005; Chen, Xiao., Wang, 
Kun. 2005) show that the abuse of the controlling powers by majority 
shareholders and the conveyance of interests, are a headache in China. Sun, 
Zhaobin. (2006) found that the probability of tunnelling by controlling 
shareholders is very high in China’s private companies. Tang, Qingquan. et al. 
(2005), Xu, Xiaodong., and Chen, Xiaoyuan. (2003), found that the largest 
shareholder often exploits other people’s interests through the transactions of 
                                                        
12 The interview with the president of Shanshan Group Company in June 2009. 
13 The interview with the vice president of Sina Company in June 2008. 
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related parties. Bai, Chong’en. et al. (2005) conducted studies on China’s listed 
companies, finding unbalanced ownership structure to be liable to cause 
tunnelling transactions. Su, Qilin., and Zhu, Wen. (2003) conducted studies on 
family-controlled listed companies in China, finding that family interests may 
conflict with company interests very often. Zhao, Jingwen., and Yu, Zengbiao. 
(2005) pointed out that corporate shareholding structure is very critical, and an 
appropriate shareholding structure is helpful to exercise the check and balance 
function.  
The emergence and development of China’s stock market have been favouring 
the reform and the improvement of the corporate governance of both SOEs and 
private companies. Shanghai Stock Exchange was established in 1990 and 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange was established in 1991. Until the end of 2009, more 
than 1800 companies have been listed in Shanghai Stock Exchange and 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange, about 65% of them have the state majority 
shareholder (Li Yang, 2010). China passed its first company law in 1993 and first 
securities law in 1998. All listed companies have to establish board of directors 
and board of supervisors according to the company law and the securities law 
while most of state-wholly-owned enterprises do not have their board of directors. 
Furthermore, China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) introduced an 
independent director system to China’s listed companies by executing the 
Principles of the Corporate Governance of Listed Companies published by CSRC 
in 2002, which stipulates that the members of independent directors in any listed 
company should exceed one third of the total seats in the board of directors. The 
second edition of China’s company law passed in 2005 stipulates that any listed 
company must have independent directors in the board. CSRC also published lots 
of ordinances about the information disclosure, the auditing and reporting, the 
rules of general meeting and the board of directors, and the voting system of 
listed companies. Once a company gets listed in the stock market, its 
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transparency, its decision-making regularity, and its checking mechanism, will be 
enormously promoted regardless of a SOE or a private company.  
But listed companies still face some similar governance problems to non-listed 
companies. For listed SOEs, the conflicts among the “new three committees” and 
“old three committees” are still there, and they can not escape the intervention 
from the government although the influence may be more cryptic. Listed 
companies additionally face their own specific governance problems. One of the 
serious problems is the tunnelling and expropriation. The ownership structure of 
listed companies in China is very concentrated, and pyramidal shareholding 
structure is quite common. In this circumstance, large shareholders are liable to 
transfer assets or profits from listed companies to their own non-listed firms, 
some parent companies even baldly embezzle and employ the funds of their 
listed subsidiaries. The camouflage way of infringing on the interests of listed 
companies is related-parties transaction. Accounting fraud and financial 
manipulation are other serious problems. In order to overcome these problems, 
the function of board of directors should be enhanced, especially independent 
directors should play more important role, and regulations by CSRS and stock 
exchange houses should also be emphasized (Qiu Yonghong, 2008).  
Some Chinese companies have been listed in overseas stock markets including 
Hong Kong stock market and the US stock market. The overseas listing is more 
helpful to improve the corporate governance of those companies because 
overseas stock markets have longer history, more rigid rules and more advanced 
juridical system. Most of Chinese overseas listed companies are in the US market, 
therefore SOX also has impact on some large Chinese companies. China Mobile 
Corporation is a state-owned company listed in New York Stock Exchange. The 
chairman, Mr. Wang Jianzhou, said in 2006 that China Mobile Corporation had 
been working hard to establish a strong internal control system and an 
independent auditing system in order to meet the requirements of SOX, and he 
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recognised this work would promote the transparency of China Mobile 
Corporation and earn more trust from the global investors (Gong, Weifeng., 
2006). But it should be noted that the overseas listing can not solve the problem 
of the “new three committees” and the “old three committees”, and the problem 
of the governmental selection of executives. The appointment and the retirement 
of Mr. Wang Jianzhou himself are of course determined by the government, the 
function of the board of directors is like paperwork.  
Generally speaking, although a big progress has been made in improving the 
corporate governance in China, there are still some serious problems. For China’s 
SOEs, the power of selecting managers and determining their compensations is 
still in the hand of the government or the ruling party. The conflicts among the 
“new three committees” and the “old three committees” actually reflect the 
complicated and unclear relations among the government, the enterprise, the 
management, and the labour. The underdevelopment of the market of managers 
makes these issues very difficult to deal with, the management and the labour 
have strong and complex connections with the government, which gives the 
excuse for the government to intervene and hold the government responsible to 
impose influence on SOEs governance. For China’s private companies, the 
selection of managers and their compensations are not critical issues, and they do 
not face the conflicts of the “new three committees” and the “old three 
committees”, but the fighting for majority shareholding proportion and 
controlling powers are very critical while there are two or more large 
shareholders in a company. This means that the relations among different 
shareholders should be highly concerned while looking at their corporate 
governance, the shareholding structure and the control structure will be decisive. 
But in many circumstances, the distribution of controlling powers depends not 
only on shareholding structure but also on some informal institutions and 
customs, such as the family authority structure. Moreover, looting transactions 
may happen very often in listed private companies. 
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Therefore, using the common framework to analyse the corporate governance of 
China’s companies is not sufficient. The corporate governance of China’s 
companies, especially China’s SOEs, of course primarily refers to the board of 
directors, the corporate transparency, and the regulations from securities market. 
However, it would be difficult to catch the other side of the corporate governance 
of China’s enterprises if the issues of the enterprise-government relationship, the 
relationship among different block shareholders, the relationship among the 
management and the workers as well as the government, and the arrangements of 
the controlling powers, were not probed into. Probing into those issues needs the 
analysis from the perspective of institutional arrangements on the basis of new 
institutional economics. Especially, in the circumstance of mixed ownership, it is 
more necessary to look at the corporate governance from the perspective of 
institutional arrangements because the introduction of the other kind of 
ownership attribute will make the institutions of corporate governance more 
complicated. 
6.4  Understanding Corporate Governance from the 
Perspective of Institutional Arrangements 
According to Williamson (2000), social analysis can be divided into four levels 
in the new institutional economics. Actually he developed this analytical 
framework in 1998 (Williamson, 1998). Williamson (2000) described that the 
first level is embededness: informal institutions and customs; the second level is 
institutional environment: formal rules of the game; the third level is governance: 
play of the game, especially contract; the fourth level is resources allocation and 
employment. The new institutional economics is concerned with level 2 and level 
3. He discussed the connections between governance structure and property 
rights, regulations, bureaus, contracts, and markets. He stated that the firm should 
be considered as a governance structure in which internal structure has an 
economic purpose and effect. He admitted that the attributes of mixed ownership 
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modes (alliances, joint ventures, franchising, and the like) as well as the 
mechanisms for supporting credible contracting between autonomous firms are 
incompletely worked. His analytical framework of four levels is very 
enlightening to my research, though his concept of governance structure is not 
identical to corporate governance. 
Roe (2004) discussed corporate governance in detail from the perspective of the 
institutions in his paper “The Institutions of Corporate Governance”. He means 
the relationships at the top of the enterprise by corporate governance: the board 
of directors, the senior managers, and the shareholders. And by institutions he 
means those repeated mechanisms that allocate authority among the board of 
directors, the senior managers, and the shareholders. He argued that core 
corporate governance institutions respond to two very important and distinct 
problems which chould not be avioded: the vertical governance and horizontal 
governance, the institutions interacts as complements and substitutes. He also 
listed the basic governance institutions of listed companies in securities markets: 
markets (product market, equity market, managerial labour market); the board of 
directors; information distribution and gate-keeping; coalescing shareholders; 
executive compensation; professionalism and norms; corporate lawsuits; capital 
structure; bankruptcy; complements and substitutes. He also pointed out that the 
institutions of corporate governance could sometimes be affected by political 
institutions. The political pressures would lead enterprises to have more 
concentrated ownership so that managers of enterprises could be more directly 
controlled. He also analysed the corporate governance institutions in their setting, 
such as contract, property rights, and control rights. His studies on the 
institutions of corporate governance is very shrewd, especially his analysis of ten 
issues is very helpful. 
Posner (2010) also did some analysis on corporate governance from the 
perspective of new institutional economics. He stated that the corporate 
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governance of business companies is quite weak and the agency problem should 
of course be overcome, and argued that the judiciary of common law is regarded 
very helpful. But regrettably, his discussions focused on legal systems. Allen 
(2005) discussed the corporate governance in emerging economies by using the 
new institutional economics approach, and argued that it is not always sufficient 
to focus on the issue whether the legal frame work and institutions ensure that 
firms are run in the interests of shareholders. His conclusions are interesting, but 
also focus on legal system.  
Corporate governance of course is related to corporate ownership. According to 
Grossman and Hart (1986), ownership can be regarded as a system of control 
rights, the appropriate assignment of property rights is determinative from the 
view of new institutional economics. A study by Fama（1980）is also widely 
acclaimed. He emphasized the deep significance of the arrangements of 
controlling powers, and pointed out that the board itself works as a controlling 
tool. Consequently, some economists studied corporate governance from the 
perspective of controlling powers. Tirole (2001) conducted a systematic analysis 
on the importance of the controlling powers in corporate governance by using the 
new institutional economics approach, and argued that the structure of 
controlling powers has a decisive impact on corporate governance. Dyck and 
Zingales (2004) also did analysis on corporate control, and pointed out that the 
transfer of controlling powers is a significant issue in corporate governance. 
Becht et al. (2002) reviewed the theoretical and the empirical studies on the main 
mechanisms of corporate control in their paper “Corporate Governance and 
Control”, discussed the main legal and regulatory institutions in different 
countries. They found a fundamental dilemma about the role of the controlling 
shareholders.  
Aoki（2001）pointed out that corporate governance is actually a set of institutional 
arrangements, and institutions are the system of shared beliefs that defines how 
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games will be exercised. The rules of game are formed by the participants during 
the game process, these institutions are then self-enforced. It is very shrewd to 
regard corporate governance as a set of institutions and the rules of game. North
（1990）also conducted deep analysis on institutions and the rules of game, 
although he did not conduct studies on corporate governance. He argued that 
institutions are actually the rules of game, and the rules of game can be divided 
to two categories: formal rules, such as law and formal contracts; and informal 
rules, such as customs and traditions. On the basis of the above analysis, 
corporate governance can be regarded as a set of mechanisms handling the 
relations of different parties and the power structure which are forged during the 
process of conflicts and frictions among different parties. This understanding of 
corporate governance is significant to my studies on the corporate governance of 
MOEs.  
In the process of conflicts and frictions among different parties a balance will be 
created, known as the corporate political mechanism (Pound, 2001). Hellwig 
(2000) conducted the studies on corporate governance from the perspective of 
political economics, arguing both shareholders and stakeholders strive to achieve 
the best possible outcome. Their activities lead to complicated game situations of 
corporate governance, in which the management are usually found to hold the 
advantageous standing. Hart and Moore (1989) also pointed out that different 
parties will struggle to achieve their own interests. The results of these struggles 
determine the distribution of their interests. The studies by Roe (1990, 1994, and 
2003) are very interesting. He analysed, in detail, how the corporate governance 
of American companies is influenced by the social politics, and explored how 
managers and workers employ the public opinions and the requirements of the 
politicians in order to protect their own interests and to strengthen their own 
standing. He argued that corporate governance is often influenced by political 
factors. 
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Thus, looking at corporate governance from the perspective of institutional 
arrangements on the basis of new institutional economics give me deep 
understanding of corporate governance. The institutional arrangements of 
corporate governance should include the following issues: company ownership 
and property rights arrangements; corporate controlling powers arrangements; 
contracts; markets (product market, equity market, managerial market and labour 
market); regulations from bureaus and political mechanisms; relations between 
owners and the management, relations among shareholders; and of course the 
role of the board of directors, information disclosure, executive compensation, 
corporate lawsuits. For non-publicly-traded companies, the issues of information 
disclosure, executive compensation, and corporate lawsuits are usually less 
concerned. Since mixed ownership in China results from the gradual transition 
and the institutional evolution of China’s economy, taking the perspective of the 
institutional arrangements to study the corporate governance of MOEs is more 
helpful to catch the institutional relevance of China’s enterprises reform. While 
discussing the corporate governance of MOEs from the perspective of 
institutional arrangements in next chapter, the focus will be the following issues: 
ownership; controlling powers and the board of directors; contracts; markets 
(especially the manager market and labour market); regulations from bureaus and 
political mechanisms; relations between owners and management, relations 
among shareholders. The issues of information disclosure, executive 
compensation, and corporate lawsuits will not be discussed because the MOEs 
this thesis is concerned about are not the publicly-traded companies, while the 
corporate governance of publicly-traded companies in China is regulated by 
specific laws and specific ordinances, and the existing literature on the corporate 
governance of publicly-traded companies in China is affluent.  
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6.5  The Institutional Arrangements of the Corporate 
Governance of the Mixed Ownership Enterprises: 
Literature Discussions and Empirical Observations 
Existing literature has pointed out that the corporate governance of MOEs is 
distinctive (Lin, 2000). The critical difference between MOEs and SOEs, as well 
as between MOEs and private enterprises, is that there are both state shares and 
private shares in MOEs. Namely, they have a distinctive shareholding structure. 
From the perspective of the institutional arrangements of MOEs’ corporate 
governance, shareholding structure is critical. On the issue of the relationship 
between shareholding structure and corporate governance, existing literature 
shows big disputes. Morck et al.（ 1998） found that while management 
shareholding proportion increases to an appropriate level, the consistency and 
compatibility of managers’ interests and other shareholders’ interests will 
increase. The study by McConnel and Servaes（1995）shows that Tobin’s Q is 
strongly correlated to the shareholding proportion of insiders. Some other studies, 
however, show that corporate governance and corporate value have nothing to do 
with shareholding structure. Holderness and Sheehan（1988）compared the 
dispersive-ownership companies with concentrated-ownership companies and 
found that corporate performance was not correlated to shareholding structure. It 
is regrettable that these papers do not look at MOEs. Hansmann (1996) 
conducted studies on the corporate governance of companies with numerous 
shareholders, and found the difference in interest orientations and business styles 
among various shareholders were very common. He claimed this would cause 
mutual distrust and poor cooperation among these shareholders. In comparison 
with common firms, the corporate governance of multi-shareholders companies 
is more complicated. Boubakri et al (2005) did studies on the post-privatisation 
corporate governance and discussed the role of ownership structure. They used a 
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sample of 209 privatised enterprises from 39 countries over the period of 
1989-2001, and found that the ownership tended to concentrate over time.  
Existing literature has also studied the conflicts of the interests among different 
shareholders. Some studies（Bai et al. 2005; Friedman et al. 2003; Johnson et al. 
2000;  Michaell et al. 2003）found that large shareholders may abuse their 
controlling powers in order to embezzle corporate resources and exploit other 
shareholders’ interests. Some studies（Maury and Pajuste, 2005;  Pagano and 
Roe, 1998）also found that a few large shareholders may check and balance each 
other and sometimes prevent tunnelling transactions to some extent. They found 
that the existence of several large shareholders often leads to the increase of 
corporate value. These papers explored the circumstance in which there are 
several shareholders. While these shareholders have high shareholding 
proportions or their shares are difficult to negotiate, the interests of these large 
shareholders are usually inconsistent. In general, large shareholders may abuse 
their controlling powers to embezzle corporate resources and exploit other 
shareholders’ interests, but if there are several large shareholders, they may play 
a role of check and balance. These studies pointed out the distinctiveness of the 
corporate governance of multi-shareholder companies, but it is regrettable that 
they did not touch upon the multi-shareholders situation with different ownership 
attributes.  
As for the corporate governance of China’s enterprises, Clarke（2003）conducted 
a simple analysis, and pointed out that China’s political system might destroy 
successful governance. Bai et al. ( 2004）conducted further studies on the 
corporate governance of China’s enterprises, but their focus was only on the 
listed companies and their market value. Liu（2006）pointed out China’s 
enterprises were often short of transparency, the government-enterprise 
relationship was unclear. Fan and Wong（2007）studied the corporate governance 
of partially-privatised SOEs, and found that they were still largely controlled by 
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the government. These findings are very valuable to my research, but regrettably 
their studies only focused on listed companies. The OECD（2006）also touched 
upon China’s enterprises while studying corporate governance in emerging 
countries, and found that a lack of transparency and a problematic 
government-enterprise relationship. Pistor and Xu（2005）found the independence 
of the boards of listed companies in China was poor. Shirley and Xu（2001）found 
that the effectiveness of the performance contract between the government and 
SOEs often decreased if the government-enterprise relationship was unclear. 
Aivazian et al.（2005）studied the corporatisation of China’s SOEs, and found that 
the corporatisation without ownership transformation might improve their 
corporate governance, but the sustainability of the improvement was dubious.  
Some studies on the corporate governance of privatised enterprises are 
interesting. Gupta (2005) analysed the performance of privatised enterprises. 
Estin and Wright（1999）compared the privatisation patterns of Ukraine and 
Russia. They pointed out that voucher privatisation was not helpful in 
establishing good corporate governance. Brada (1996) found that similar 
ownership reform might lead to different corporate governance. Studies by Caves 
(1990) found that the improvement of corporate governance was much more 
complicated than ownership reform itself. Boycko et al.（1996）found that the 
successful restructuring of SOEs needs not only ownership transfer, but also 
power transfer, in order to promote the commercialisation of those enterprises. 
Again, it is regrettable that the above papers do not touch upon the corporate 
governance of MOEs.  
In summary, existing literature does have studies on corporate governance from 
the perspective of shareholding structure, but the definition of shareholding 
structure in the existing literature is the shareholding proportion of insiders, or 
the shareholding concentration. The existing definition of shareholding structure 
and the research findings do not refer to mixed ownership. Lots of papers have 
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studied the corporate governance of China’s enterprises, but largely focused on 
listed companies and their market value. Much literature on the corporate 
governance is related to the privatised enterprises, but not related to MOEs’ 
corporate governance. 
In reality, China’s MOEs in the early 1980s developed different governance from 
traditional SOEs although the term of corporate governance was not used by 
people at that time. One of the most material changes was the presence of board 
of directors. The State Light Industry Ministry (1986) recorded the case of 
Zhanjiang Home Electricity Apparatus Company. When this company became a 
MOE from a SOE, the board of directors was established. In contrast, the SOEs 
were having the system of factory chief responsibility and party secretary 
supervision. The board of directors was a brand-new thing in China at that time 
and was of course brought about by mixed ownership. Almost all MOEs 
emerging in the 1980s and 1990s adopted the system of board of directors 
although China did not have its company law in the whole 1980s and the early 
1990s. Meanwhile, dividend distribution became common in China’s MOEs, 
which was exactly the case in Zhanjiang Home Electricity Apparatus Company. 
However, it is not clear how the seats of board of directors should be distributed. 
It is found in my field survey of Wake Company15 that at the early stage of its 
mixed ownership, the state shareholding proportion and non-state shareholding 
proportion were 60% and 40% respectively, but most of the board seats, and the 
position of chairman, were controlled by the management. In the case of Lenovo 
Holdings Company, though the state shareholding proportion was 65% while the 
management shareholding proportion was 35%, the position of chairman and the 
majority of the board seats were controlled by the management. Even if the board 
seats are distributed appropriately according to the shareholding proportions of 
different shareholders, they may fight for the positions of the chairperson and 
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core managers. A published case of Zhongshan Group Company (Wang, 
Chengbo. 2004), is a good case to analyse the fighting for important positions in 
MOEs. This company was transformed from a wholly-state-owned enterprise 
into a MOE in 2003, the non-state shareholding proportion was 90% and state 
shareholding was 10%. The board of Zhongshan Group Company had nine seats, 
six members were designated by the new private controlling shareholder, Tian’an 
Investment Company. Tian’an Investment Company also held the position of the 
chairman. The previous senior managers however, all retained their positions 
according to the ownership restructuring agreement. But the new controlling 
shareholder wanted to restrict the power of the previous management through the 
board of directors. However, most of the senior manager were the former 
bureau-level cadres, and did not treat the decision of the board of directors 
seriously. When the new controlling shareholder decided to designate a new CFO 
to the company through a decision by the board of directors, the president 
refused to make the nomination. Obviously, not only the director seats and 
chairman position, but also the office of core managers, are important. The 
complexity of the distribution of MOEs’ control powers is far beyond the 
distribution of the board seats and the office of core managers. The distribution 
of controlling powers is related not only to the distribution of board seats and 
management office, but also to the state-cadre status of the managers and to the 
ownership restructuring agreement.  
A field survey was conducted with Wujiang Hydropower Company and one of its 
subsidiaries, Qianyuan Power Company16. It was found that the combat for the 
controlling powers, and for board seats, was interwoven with the combat for 
management posts. It was also found that the actual controlling powers were 
more important than nominal controlling powers. Although Wujiang Hydropower 
Company was not a MOE, it had two state shareholders, China Huadian Group 
Company who held 51% of total shares and Guizhou Provincial SASAC who 
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held 49%. There were seven members in the board of Wujiang Hydropower 
Company, Huadian Group Company had four seats and Guizhou Provincial 
SASAC had three. Although the two shareholders were both state organisations, 
their interests and business preferences were quite different. Guizhou Provincial 
SASAC asked Wujiang Hydropower Company to invest more funds in the local 
area and develop diversified business in order to promote local economic 
development. Huadian Group Company on the other hand, asked it to expand its 
hydropower business to other areas of China. Meaningfully, Huadian Group 
Company had a fully-owned business branch in Guizhou Province in the coal 
power business. Although Huadian Group Company held 51% of the total equity 
of Wujiang Hydropower Company, it had an agreement with Guizhou Provincial 
Government that the selection of the chairman and the president of Wujiang 
Hydropower Company should be mastered by Huadian Group Company, but the 
appointment had to be agreed by Guizhou Provincial Government, and Huadian 
Group Company must select local people to be the chairman and the president. 
Qianyuan Power Company was a typical multi-shareholders company and a 
MOE. Its corporate governance was quite complicated. In 2008, Huadian Group 
Company held 13.3% of the total shares, Wujiang Hydropower Company held 
12% and the combined shareholding proportion of Huadian Group Company and 
Wujiang Hydropower Company was 25.5%. These two companies were the first 
and second largest shareholders. But another SOE, State Development 
Investment Company, held 12.9%. A group of individuals held 4%. Thus the 
control arrangements of Qianyuan Power Company were very complex. It had 
been actually controlled by the management, though Huadian Group Company 
and the State Development Investment Company had been fighting to grab the 
controlling powers. Huadian Group Company even decided to urge Qianyuan 
Power Company to issue new shares to Wujiang Hydropower Company in order 
to increase its shareholding proportion and then to achieve the firm control of 
this company. Apparently, in addition to shareholding proportion, the office of 
core managers is very critical in the control powers arrangements. 
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Interestingly, it is found that the corporate governance of MOEs is not always 
based on shareholding proportions and company law clauses. I found many 
shareholders of MOEs had agreements among the shareholders about their 
concerned issues, these agreements might be written, and might be oral or even 
cryptic. The government would often join in those agreements. Zhanjiang Home 
Electricity Apparatus Company was a good example (State Light Industry 
Ministry, 1986). There was an agreement that stipulated that the employees could 
buy shares of the company and the company must pay annual dividends. 
Furthermore, the agreement stipulated that the employees had the rights to sell 
back their shares to the company and they were entitled to get refunds. These 
clause, were of course not fitting to the common rules or laws. In fact, at that 
time, China did not have company law. Some local governments, such as Jiangxi 
province, struck the agreements to let the governments hold a golden share, again 
there was no lawful basis for that in China.  
The agreements concern the issues of selling shares, dividend payments, and the 
golden share. Actually, these agreements are covenants covering a wide range of 
issues. The case of Tianwei Yingli Company is very informative (He, Yifang. 
2007). Its non-state shareholder and state shareholder had the covenant 
stipulating that the state shareholder, as the first largest shareholder, would not 
intervene in the corporate business affairs of the MOE. The shareholding 
structure could be changed though there were additional conditions for the 
change in order to accomplish specific goals (such as getting listed in the stock 
market). It is found in my field survey of Fuxing Group Company17 that while 
participating in the ownership reform of SOEs, it usually struck covenants with 
the management and local government, covering the issues of the original and 
future shareholding structures, the successive engagement plan of the previous 
management and their incentives program, the distribution of controlling powers, 
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the commitments to local economic and social development, and government 
preferential policies.  
There are a few reasons for the government to join in the covenants. On one hand, 
the government itself is the owner of SOEs, while on the other hand, it is the 
administrator of local public affairs. The government aims to promote the 
development of ownership-transformed enterprises and local economy by 
setting-up the agreements. In the case of Little Swan Company18, the local 
government stipulated strictly that Little Swan Company must maintain its 
original major business, original brand name, original management, and original 
registration location unchanged after its ownership reform. These clauses might 
overrun the boundary of its interests as the state shareholder, but did help the 
government maintain social stability and promote local economic development. 
These clauses can be regarded as governmental special regulations. The case of 
Tianwei Yingli Company is another example (He, Yifang., 2007). Although the 
agreement between the non-state shareholder and the state shareholder stated that 
the latter would not intervene in the business affairs of Tianwei Yingli Company, 
there were other clauses between Tianwei Yingli Company and the local 
government stipulating that Tianwei Yingli Company must exercise the strategy 
of developing photovoltaic business in Baoding City, Hebei Province. This 
clause put a very tight constraint on Tianwei Yingli Company. If Tianwei Yingli 
Company swung away from this strategy, the government would intervene. 
However, the government may give some preferential policies and support to 
MOEs, particularly when MOEs were facing difficulties. The preferential 
policies and governmental supports can be found in the case of Xinhua Airline 
Holdings Company and Hainan Airline Company. Obviously, looking at the 
special regulations and the covenants helps to understand the institutional 
arrangements of MOEs corporate governance as they may determine the 
corporate strategy and define the government-enterprise boundary.  
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It is also found that not only the relationship between government and MOEs, but 
the relationship between MOEs and their employees, is very special. Most of 
China’s MOEs originated from ownership-reformed SOEs. Ownership reform is 
also called systematic transformation. The systematic transformation itself may 
cause the change in employment status of workers. It is found that the 
employment status of the workers in fully-privatised enterprises was usually 
transformed by paying compensation fees. In these fully-privatised enterprises 
the employment status changed from permanent employment to contractual and 
marketable employment, and the retirement treatment was pensioned and 
medical treatment was socialised. However, the circumstances were much more 
complicated in MOEs. There may be many types of employment status in MOEs. 
Many MOEs, especially those with state majority shareholders, have not 
achieved the employment status transformation. Moreover, many previous 
executives may still maintain the state cadre status, though the status of other 
managers designated by non-state shareholders is usually contractual. And, the 
employment status of newly-employed workers also tends to be contractual. It is 
found in the field survey of Fuxing Group Company 19  that it signed an 
agreement with Tianjin Municipal Government to prepare the systematic 
transformation of Tianjin Steel Company, a traditional SOE. The agreement 
stipulated that all executives would retain their posts, and their state cadre status 
would be maintained for two years. After two years their status would be 
re-considered. In addition, in many MOEs the management and the workers held 
shares, in this case their employment status is more complex because they are 
employees on one hand, but on the other hand they are shareholders. In this 
circumstance they may have a conflict of interest: as employees they may want 
to increase salaries, while as shareholders they may want to decrease salaries in 
order to control the cost and to increase the profit. Therefore, their thoughts and 
their activities have a big impact on enterprise operation. All in all, analysing the 
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employment status of managers and workers in MOEs, helps clarify the special 
relationship among the managers, the workers, the enterprises, and the 
governments.  
6.6  An Analytical Framework for the Institutional 
Arrangements of the Corporate Governance of Mixed 
Ownership Enterprises 
Since the analysis of the institutional arrangements of MOEs corporate 
governance in China is a new task, it is necessary to establish a basic analytical 
framework. It is not strange to establish an analytical framework for a specific 
research task. Roe (2004) put forth a research framework for the studies of the 
institutions of corporate governance that includes ten issues. Williamson（2000）
established a specific framework to analyze the new  institutional economics he 
described as four levels and drew a figure to show the logics of the four levels. 
Gillan (2006) also established a framework to depict corporate governance, he 
described the balance sheet model of the firm and the corporate governance 
framework, and the beyond balance sheet model and the corporate governance 
framework. All those analytical frameworks are based on theoretical discussions 
and empirical observations. I hereby put forth the basic analytical framework of 
the institutional arrangements of MOEs corporate governance in China from the 
viewpoint of my theoretical discussions and empirical observations in 6.2, 6.3, 
6.4, and 6.5. 
It is found through my empirical observations that the institutions of MOEs 
corporate governance are quite distinctive. The shareholding structure is 
particularly distinctive and results in a different pattern of controlling powers 
distribution. The allocation of board seats, the positions of chairman and core 
management posts, such as president and CFO, are very critical. Since the 
entrance of non-state shareholders, the conveyance of interests and tunnelling 
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seem to occur more often, meaning the prevention of conveyance of interests and 
tunnelling is an important issue. The government’s role in MOEs is also a very 
important issue. The employment status of employees in MOEs is very 
complicated and that should be deeply considered. According to these facts, I put 
forth hereby the basic analytical framework for the institutional arrangements of 
MOEs corporate governance. This analytical framework comprises the following 
five issues.  
(1)  Shareholding structure 
The shareholding structure has become an important research issue in corporate 
governance. In this thesis the shareholding structure of MOEs refers to the state 
shareholding proportion and non-state shareholding proportion. It is the basis of 
studying the corporate governance of MOEs.  
(2)  Covenant among different shareholders and the government 
MOEs are governed not only according to the shareholding structure and 
company law but also, in many circumstances, according to the covenant struck 
by different shareholders and government. This involves the issues of original 
and future shareholding structure, the distribution of controlling powers, 
successive engagement program of the original management, the incentives 
program, the corporate strategy and local economic development.  
(3)  Office of the core managers 
Shareholding structure impacts heavily upon the distribution of corporate 
controlling powers, the analysis of shareholding structure can not, however, 
substitute for the analysis of controlling powers distribution. The analysis of 
controlling powers distribution of MOEs should include not only the distribution 
of board seats, but also, the distribution of management posts, especially the 
office of core managers such as president and CFO. Since the chairman in 
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China’s company law is usually the only legal representative, his or her office is 
the pivot in the controlling powers system. Thus, the office of core officials such 
as chairmen, president and CFO, is very determinative in the control structure of 
MOEs. 
(4)  Special regulations 
Since there are still state shares in MOEs, the government-enterprise relationship 
in MOEs is very complex. Analysing the special regulations imposed by the 
government is crucial in clarifying the government–enterprise relationship. 
Although the special governmental regulations are sometimes connected with the 
covenant, the regulations are still regard as an independent issue in this thesis. 
The analysis of the regulations should be helpful to judge the commercialisation 
as well as the independence of MOEs. 
(5)  Employment relations 
Employees are the stakeholders of MOEs. The resorts of their interests are very 
complicated due to the complex employment status of employees in MOEs. The 
employment status of the workers in MOEs depends not only on state 
shareholding proportion, but also on covenants. Through studying employment 
status, people can truly understand the relationship between the employees and 
the MOEs.  
Shareholding structure, covenant, office of core managers, regulations, 
employment relations, are the 5 key issues of the institutional arrangements of 
MOEs’ corporate governance. The combinative word of the first letters of these 
five phrases is SCORE. Therefore，SCORE is the basic analytical framework for 
the institutional arrangements of MOEs corporate governance in China. 
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6.7  Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter, the understanding of corporate governance is deepened through 
literature review and theoretical discussions. Especially, corporate governance is 
discussed from the perspective of new institutional economics. The corporate 
governance of SOEs and private companies in China are also discussed. The key 
issues of the institutional arrangements of MOEs’ corporate governance are 
identified, and then a basis analytical framework for the institutional 
arrangements of MOEs corporate governance is established. It is the SCORE 
analytical framework. The next chapter will use the SCORE framework to 
conduct studies. 
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Chapter 7 
The Studies on the Institutional 
Arrangements of the Corporate Governance 
of Mixed Ownership Enterprises: Some 
Findings 
7.1  Introduction 
Since most of the MOEs are not listed companies, my analysis on the 
institutional arrangements of MOEs’ corporate governance in this chapter do not 
focus on the common issues listed companies usually face, such as the regularity 
of meetings, board composition and independent directors, information 
disclosure, internal control and accounting fraud. Actually, it is stressed in 
chapter 1 that the definition of the MOE in this thesis refers to the enterprise with 
the state block shareholder and the non-state block shareholder, and those listed 
state-controlled companies without non-state block shareholders are not my 
concern because the corporate governance of the common listed companies is 
regulated by specific laws and ordinances. This chapter uses the SCORE 
framework to intensively study the institutional arrangements of the corporate 
governance of China’s MOEs. A generalised analysis on the board of directors of 
China’s MOEs is conducted first. Afterwards the studies on the shareholding 
structure of the MOEs, the covenant, the office of core managers, the special 
regulations, and the employment relations are conducted. Lastly, some findings 
are presented and some discussions about the major features of the corporate 
governance of China’s MOEs are made. 
 
 
156
                                         
7.2  The Board of Directors 
Since any MOE should be a registered corporation, according to Chinese 
company law, a corporation must either establish its board of directors or set up 
the post of executive director if the corporation is a limited liabilities company. 
As Jensen (1993) pointed out, the board of directors is charged with advising and 
monitoring management and has the responsibility to select, replace and 
compensate the senior management team. With a fiduciary duty to shareholders, 
and the responsibility to provide strategic direction and monitoring, the role of 
board of directors in corporate governance is the cornerstone. Warther (1998) 
also regarded the role of board of directors as the monitor of, and the adviser to, 
corporate management. John and Senbet (1998) pointed out that the effectiveness 
of board of directors is the basic measurement of corporate governance. But 
Larcker et al. (2005) found that “cosy” relationship between board of directors 
and management will limit effective monitoring, so that the independence of 
board of directors is very important to enhance the role of board of directors and 
to improve the corporate governance. The board of directors in Chinese company 
law has the powers about the following issues: 1) convene the general meeting of 
shareholders and report to the general meeting; 2) execute the decisions of the 
general meeting; 3) decide the business plan and investment program; 4) 
formulate the annual fiscal budgeting and the final account; 5) formulate the 
dividend payment plan; 6) formulate the recapitalization plan; 7) formulate the 
restructuring plan; 8) decide the organizational structure; 9) appoint the managers 
and decide their compensation; 10) formulate the basic management systems; 11) 
other issues authorized the general meeting of shareholders. 
In the questionnaire survey, 950 enterprises provided the requested information, 
one issue of the requested information is the set-up of the board of directors. In 
these 950 enterprises, 813 enterprises, accounting for 85.6% of the total 950 
enterprises, established their board of directors, and the other 137 enterprises, 
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accounting for 14.4% of the 950 enterprises, did not establish board of directors. 
It is not known why those 137 enterprises did not set up the board of directors, 
one guess is either each of those 137 enterprises has few shareholders, or those 
137 enterprises are small-sized enterprises, which has no need to establish board 
of directors according to the Chinese company law. Since at least 77.3% of the 
950 enterprises are MOEs, the conclusion can be drawn that most of the MOEs 
in the 950 sampled enterprises have their board of directors. 
Table 7-1  Whether Or Not the Enterprise Set Up the Board of Directors 
(Sample: 950 Enterprises) 
 
The Number of The Enterprises Which 
Have the Board of Directors 
The Number of The Enterprises Which Do 
Not Have the Board of Directors 
813 
 
137 
 
One of the statutory powers for board of directors is to appoint managers. But as 
stated in 6.4, the management in some MOEs is still selected by the government. 
Especially, the post of chairman of the board may be decided by the government 
or the ruling party instead of by the board of directors. According to Chinese 
company law, the chairman of the board of directors usually is the only legal 
representative of a corporation, and then has more influential power than other 
directors. It is imaginable that the post of the chairman is often contested by state 
shareholders and non-state shareholders. Therefore, the covenant among the 
shareholders and the government are often used to tackle the allocation of the 
important posts and the controlling powers, which will be further addressed in 
7.4. 
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7.3  The Shareholding Structure 
Jensen and Meckling（1976）defined shareholding structure as the shareholding 
proportions of insiders, especially the management, against outside investors. 
Later literature then accepted this definition. Demsetz (1983) defined 
shareholding structure as shareholding concentration, his definition is also 
accepted by many economists. However, the definition of shareholding structure 
in this thesis is the comparison of the state shareholding proportion and the 
non-state shareholding proportion.  
The basis of controlling powers is shareholding structure, though the former is 
not absolutely corresponding to the latter. A study by Gomes and Novaes（1999）
showed if there were a few large shareholders in an enterprise, they would check 
and balance each other. Bennedsen and Wolfenzon（2000）found while several 
large shareholders co-controlled an unlisted enterprise, the corporate value would 
be increased. Wang (2005), and Wei et al. (2003), studied the changes in 
performance of ownership-transformed enterprises in China, and found that 
shareholding structure matters. Anderson and Reeb (2003), Sraer and Thesmar 
(2004), also studied the impact of shareholding structure upon controlling powers 
and corporate performance. They found that the shareholding structure and 
control structure of family companies were relatively stable, and the stable 
structure had a positive impact on corporate performance. A study by Block and 
Hedge（2001）demonstrated that when there were a few large shareholders in an 
enterprise, they tended to fight for the controlling powers, which often caused 
corporate instability. However, the fighting for controlling powers might prevent, 
to some extent, the problem of the conveyance of interests and tunnelling.  
The field survey20 showed that, in order to fight for the controlling powers, the 
shareholders, regardless of their ownership attribute, would strive to acquire 
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more shares. Kuming Pharmaceutical Company was a listed MOE and its first 
largest shareholder was Huali Group Company, a famous private company in 
China. The second largest shareholder was Yunnan State Assets Management 
Company, and its third largest shareholder was another SOE, Hongta Group 
Company. Their shareholding proportions in 2008 were 24.3％, 12.5％ and 
9.5% respectively. In 2007, the shareholding proportion of Yunnan State Assets 
Management Company was only 7.4%, it silently bought stocks in the securities 
market, resulting in the increase of its shareholding proportion to 12.5％ in 2008. 
Interestingly, Huali Group Company also increased its shareholding proportion 
by 1% through buying stocks in securities market. The purpose of accumulating 
shares in the securities market was to change the shareholding structure. Of 
course, they all wanted to control the company.  
Not every shareholder however has the ability to lift its shareholding proportion. 
I found that some MOEs were more willing to accept a balanced shareholding 
structure. A survey of Ping’an Group Company, one of the largest MOE in 
China21, was conducted. Its shareholding structure was very unique. In 2008, 
HSBC, a British company, held 16.7% of the total shares. These shares were 
divided between its two subsidiaries, HSBC Insurance Company, holding 8.3%, 
and Shanghai HSBC, holding 8.4%. The management and employees of Ping’an 
Group Company held 9.8%, but these shares were divided into two holding 
vehicles, Shenzhen Xinhaoshi Investment Company, holding 5.3%, and 
Shenzhen Jing’ao Industrial Company, holding 4.5%. Shenzhen Investment 
Management Company, a SOE, held 7.7%, while Yuanxinhang Investment 
Company, a domestic private company, held 5.2%. The remaining shares were 
negotiable stocks. It is found that this shareholding structure was intentionally 
designed by these shareholders. The balanced shareholding structure was good to 
diminish the qualms of different shareholders and to allow them to check and 
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balance each other. However, the dispersive shareholding structure was 
favourable for the management to control the company.  
 
 
 
 
 
Ping’an Insiders HSBC Holdings 
HSBC 
Insurance 
Shanghai 
HSBC 
Shenzhen 
Xinhaoshi 
Shenzhen 
Jing’Ao 
Shenzhen 
Investment 
Yuan Xin 
Hang 
8.3% 8.4% 5.3% 4.5% 7.4% 5.2% 
Ping’An Goup Company 
Figure 7-1  The Shareholding Structure of Ping’An Group Company 
Generally speaking, different shareholders have different interest appeals. Their 
ways and means of realising their own interests could be very different. Large 
shareholders often have more advantages to realising their interests, they may 
also abuse the controlling powers in order to loot the interests of small 
shareholders. A study by Burkart et al. (1997) demonstrated that when there was 
a controlling large shareholder in a company, it had the motivation to enhance its 
own inappropriate interests. A study by La Porta et al. (1999) demonstrated that 
in many countries large shareholders were liable to loot the interests of small 
shareholders.  
There are 42 MOEs in the 300 companies of Shanghai-Shenzhen Component 
Index. In 33 of them, the state shareholding proportion is higher than the 
non-state shareholding proportion. Within the top 10 shareholders of these 33 
MOEs, the mathematical average shareholding proportion of the state 
shareholders is 33.1％, while the mathematical average shareholding proportion 
of the non-state shareholders is 19.6％. 
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In the 950 surveyed enterprises, there are 486 enterprises in which a SOE is the 
majority shareholder, and the mathematical average shareholding proportion is 
63.6％. These 486 enterprises are all MOEs. The detailed shareholding structure 
of these 486 MOEs is in the table below.  
Table 7-2  The Second and Third Largest Shareholders and Their Average 
Shareholding Proportions 
        （Sample：486 Enterprises） 
 
The Second 
Largest 
Shareholder Is: 
The Number of 
the Enterprises 
(The Percentage 
in the 486 
Enterprises） 
The Average 
Shareholding 
Proportion（%）
The Third 
Largest 
Shareholder Is:
The Number of 
the Enterprises 
(The Percentage 
in the 486 
Enterprises） 
The Average 
Shareholding 
Proportion（%）
Government 7（1.4％） 24.0 Government 5(1.0 %) 19.0 
 
State Assets  
Company 
20（4.1％） 23.4 State Assets  
Company 
26(5.3%) 11.4 
State-owned 
enterprise 
126（25.9%） 16.2 State-owned 
Enterprise 
124(25.5%) 10.1 
 
Private Firm 42（8.6%） 24.0 Private Firm 59(12.1%) 8.6 
 
Management 6（1.2％） 37.6 Management 2(0.4%) 4.0 
 
Employees 157（32.3％） 34.8 Employees 61(12.6%) 16.1 
 
Individual 48（9.9％） 21.7 Individual 124(25.5%) 8.2 
 
Foreign Firm 17（3.5％） 33.9 Foreign Firm 12(2.5%) 14.2 
 
Collective  
Firm 
28（5.85） 13.3 Collective  
Firm 
17（3.5％） 19.7 
Others 35(7.2%) 24.0 Others 56（11.5％） 7.5 
 
From the above table, it can be found that in the MOEs with a state first largest 
shareholder, there are 157 enterprises whose second largest shareholder is the 
employees, the mathematical average shareholding proportion is 34.8%; there are 
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126 enterprises whose second largest shareholder is another SOE, the 
mathematical average shareholding proportion is 16.2%; there are 48 enterprises 
whose second largest shareholder is individual, the mathematical average 
shareholding proportion is 21.7%; there are 42 enterprises whose second largest 
shareholder is private firm, the mathematical average shareholding proportion is 
24.0%; there are 17 enterprises whose second largest shareholder is foreign 
company, the mathematical average shareholding proportion is 33.9%; there are 
6 enterprises whose second largest shareholder is the management, the 
mathematical average shareholding proportion is 37.6%. 
It is also found that there are 64 MOEs with a private first largest shareholder. In 
9 of them, the second largest shareholder is state assets management company, 
the mathematical average shareholding proportion is 25.6%; in 11 of them, the 
second largest shareholder is SOE, the mathematical average shareholding 
proportion is 34.8%. 
According to the above analysis, many MOEs in China have state majority 
shareholders and non-state minority shareholders. 
7.4  The Covenant 
Shareholding structure provides the basis for corporate governance, but it is only 
one of the numerous factors impacting on corporate governance. Judging 
corporate governance only on the basis of shareholding structure may be 
misleading. In many circumstances, covenant may be made between the 
shareholders of the MOEs and the government. Even in the US, covenants can be 
found in controlling powers arrangements and interests arrangements. Kaplan, 
and Stromberg（2003，2004）studied the corporate governance of those companies 
in which venture capital funds had invested, and found that covenants among the 
funds and the company promoters, as well company managers, were very popular. 
The clauses of the covenants include the shareholding proportion and the 
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conditions to change the shareholding proportion, the distribution of voting rights, 
and the exit arrangements. The studies by Lerner and Malmendie (2004) 
demonstrated that shareholders sometimes strike covenants with strategic 
business partners to share the powers and profits and to acquire critical support.  
In the case of Zhongshan Group Company (Wang, Chengbo. 2004), Tian’an 
Investment Company, a private firm, became the first largest shareholder and 
obtained six of the nine seats in the board of directors. According to the company 
law, it is expected that Tian’an Investment Company should control the MOE. 
But there was a covenant among itself and the local government as well as the 
previous management that stipulated the previous management would retain their 
positions for five years. As a result, Tian’an Investment Company could not 
realise their control of the MOE, and the CFO designated by Tian’an Investment 
Company was expelled out by the previous management. Furthermore, the 
previous management refused to execute the decisions made by the board if these 
decisions were deemed to be against the covenants or the interests of the 
previous management. It is clear there were severe conflicts between the 
company law and the covenant in this case. 
Generally speaking, covenant is usually designed to distribute controlling powers 
and exercise monitoring. The studies by Cremer (1995), Aghion and Tirole 
(1997), demonstrated how excessive monitoring could hurt the initiatives of the 
management, while the failure of monitoring could cause the loss of the interests 
of some shareholders. MOEs often try to tackle this problem by striking 
covenants, however it is not easy to find a balance point. A field survey was 
conducted with Fuxing Group Company. When participating in the ownership 
reform of Nanjing Steel Company in 2003, the management struck an agreement 
with the local government and Fuxing Group Company. According to the 
covenant, the management would not only keep their original positions but also 
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buy some shares at a preferential price in order to enhance the incentives22. In 
2008, Fuxing Group Company agreed to restructure Tianjin Steel Company into 
a MOE, the agreement stipulated that Fuxing Group Company would hold 47% 
of the total shares, Tianjin Municipal Government would hold 48%, Xin’Ao 
Company would hold 5%. Moreover, Fuxing Group Company and Tianjin 
Municipal Government could not purchase any shares from Xin’Ao Company 
and Tianjin Steel Company could not issue any new shares to Fuxing Group 
Company or Tianjin Municipal Government. Meanwhile, it stipulated that the 
board of the post-restructuring Tianjin Steel Company would have five seats, two 
would be occupied by Fuxing Group Company, two by the management, and one 
by Xin’Ao Company, while Tianjin Municipal Government would not occupy 
any seats but would have the power to select the chairman. The president would 
be selected by Fuxing Group Company, but it was agreed that the president 
would be the original one. The CFO would also be selected by Fuxing Group 
Company. Obviously, it was a complicated but well-designed covenant. 
In the 950 surveyed enterprises, most of them have covenants between the 
non-state shareholders and the government, as well as the management. The 
contents of these covenants include the successive engagement program of the 
previous management, the re-employment program of workers, and others.  
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Table 7-3  Whether the Enterprise Had Covenant about the Re-employment of 
Workers and the Successive Engagement Program of the Original Management 
（Sample：950 Enterprises） 
 
How Many Enterprises Answer “Yes”  How Many Enterprises Answer “No” 
Enterprises Number The Percentage 
in the Sample  
Enterprises Number The Percentage 
in the Sample 
530 
 
55.8% 420 44.2％ 
However, some enterprises do not have any covenants, especially those in 
financial sector and listed in stock market usually do not have any covenants. 
Many shareholders in those companies are financial investors instead of strategic 
investors, their aim is to sell shares at a higher price in secondary market. 
Beyond this, they tend not to care about the long-term arrangements of 
controlling powers or interests. 
7.5  The Office of Core Managers 
Hart and Moore（1989) studied the distribution of corporate powers among 
different shareholders, and found that different interest groups, often fought with 
each other. Aghion and Bolton (1992)， and Hart（1995）, studied the controlling 
powers in corporate governance. They argued that the arrangements of corporate 
powers were very critical because of the incomplete contract. Aghion and Tirole 
(1997)，and Lerner et al. (2003), studied the issue of multi-control, and found it 
was possible to distribute different classes of powers to different parties. For 
example, the controlling power of financial affaire, the controlling power of sales 
affairs, and the controlling power of strategic affairs, could all be allocated to 
different managers or board members. Harris and Raviv（1989）argued if a 
shareholder was not the true claimant of economic surplus, or was unable to truly 
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obtain the surplus, its voting rights would not be fully exercised. The state 
shareholder is applicable to this argument. Moreover, the state shareholder is 
liable to be influenced by the political system. Therefore, the decisions made by 
the state shareholder may deviate from commercial norms. If the state 
shareholding proportion is high and the state shareholder can easily acquire the 
office of core managers, the government-enterprise boundary probably is not 
clear, which will jeopardize the business independence of MOEs.  
According to China’s company law, the board chairman is usually the only legal 
representative of the company, and the convener of board meetings. Usually, the 
board chairman has the ultimate power to decide corporate affairs. Thus the 
chairman is in fact a core official, the president is another core official. The 
position of CFO, also a core official, may in fact be more critical than the 
position of president. The office distribution of these core officials should be 
analysed 
It is found that in the 950 surveyed enterprises, more than 60% of them did not 
change legal representatives or CFO after the ownership reform. Only 38% 
changed their legal representatives while 32% changed CFO. 
Table 7-4  How Many Enterprises Changed Legal Representative and CFO 
（Sample：950 Enterprises） 
 
 ”Yes” Answer ”No” Answer 
The Number of the 
Enterprises  
The Percentage 
in the Sample 
The Number of 
the Enterprises 
The Percentage 
in the Sample 
Did You 
Change Legal 
Representative 360 37.9％ 590 62.1％ 
The Number of the 
Enterprises 
The percentage 
in the Sample  
The Number of 
the Enterprises 
The percentage 
in the Sample  
Did You 
Change CFO 
300 31.6％ 650 68.4％ 
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However, even if the management is able to maintain their original positions, it is 
still possible for new private shareholders to obtain some positions of core 
managers. Fuxing Group Company successfully occupied the CFO position and 
the position of one deputy president in all of the MOEs in which it held shares23. 
In 2008, Fuxing Group Company signed an agreement to participate in the 
ownership reform of Tianjin Steel Company, stipulating the CFO would be 
designated by Fuxing Group Company after the ownership reform, although 
Fuxing Group Company would be the second largest shareholder. It is clear that 
obtaining the office of core managers is sometimes more important than the 
majority shareholding proportion. It is found that in the field survey of Yili 
Resources Group Company24, just how important the office of core managers 
could be. In those MOEs co-owned by Yili Resources Group Company and 
various SOEs, the shareholding proportions of the private shareholders and the 
state shareholders tended to be very close, meaning the role of the office of core 
managers was crucial. Initially, when establishing those MOEs, Yili Resources 
Group Company usually negotiated with its state partners about the distribution 
of the core management positions. In everyday business the situation was often 
different from the original design however. Yili Resources Group Company 
found if the core managers were designated by state shareholders, it would be 
difficult to cooperate well. Struggles for powers and interests, as well as disputes 
regarding strategy and business affairs, often happened. As a result, Yili 
Resources Group Company withdrew the core managers and allowed the state 
shareholders to manage these MOEs alone. 
If both state and non-state shareholders fail to strike a cooperation plan, they may 
take legal procedures in order to fight for the office of core managers. A 
published case is Jingu Forest Industry Company (Li, Hui., 2009). Jingu Forest 
Industry Company was a listed company, and in the middle of 2009 its largest 
                                                        
23 The interview with the vice president of Fuxing Group Company in July 2008. 
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shareholder, holding 24.42% of the total shares, was a SOE, Jingu Senda State 
Assets Management Company. The second largest shareholder was a private 
enterprise, Taiyue Guarantee Company, who used to be the largest shareholder 
from 2004 to early 2009. Since their shareholding proportions were very close, 
their combat for the office of core managers had been very severe since 2008. In 
May 2009, the state shareholder tried to take over the position of the chairman 
which had been occupied by the non-state shareholder since 2004. The non-state 
shareholder managed to use its position as chairman to block the proposal of 
holding a special board meeting to change the board members and chairman. 
This case demonstrates that the office of core managers actually determines the 
control structure. 
7.6  The Special Governmental Regulations 
The field surveys and the data analysis show that many MOEs are subject to 
special governmental regulations, though these regulations may not be long-term. 
It is found that the government imposed special regulations on the Little Swan 
Company while 65% of its shares was transferred to Siweite Company in 200425. 
The regulations included three “no changes” involving the original brand name, 
the original management and the original registration location. The regulations 
also included an agreement regarding business expansion that stipulated the sales 
of Little Swan Company would reach 14 billion RMB in 2004, 19.5 billion RMB 
in 2005, and 50.3 billions RMB in 2008. It is regrettable, however, the expansion 
plan was not achieved. 
The major cause of the special governmental regulations is, the government can 
not avoid its responsibilities to the safety and smoothness of the ownership 
reform and the post-reform development. Roe (1994) analysed the circumstances 
of ownership transfer and control transfer of American enterprises, and found 
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even in the US, employees, creditors, suppliers, community residents were all 
concerned about and afraid of the transfer, and might resist the transfer. The 
government might impose pressure on the politicians to interfere. Furthermore, 
anti-transfer stakeholders might form an alliance to stop the transfer. Their 
arguments would include seemingly noble reasons such as social justice and 
public rights. The Chinese government is more liable to interfere in business 
transactions. While restructuring SOEs to MOEs, the government is usually 
concerned about the stability of the enterprises and society, as well as the 
interests of the stakeholders including employees and suppliers. Furthermore, the 
government wants to attract more funds to invest in local areas through 
ownership restructuring in order to promote local economic development. 
Therefore the government is in favour of setting up special regulations regarding 
the above issues. While the government is still one of the owners in a MOE, 
these special regulations help supervise corporate operation and the activities of 
private shareholders. Studies by Bottazzi et al.( 2005), Casamatta (2003), Kaplan 
et al. ( 2003), Lerner and Schoar (2005), Schmidt (2003), showed that these kind 
of regulations and monitoring could help the economic development, but might 
also cause conflicts. The long-term effects of the special regulations still need to 
be further observed.   
The government usually wants to attract more funds to invest in local areas. 
Regarding the financing of companies, existing literature is abundant. Studies by 
Borio (1990), Corbett and Jenkinson (1994), Eckbo and Masulis (1995), Kojima 
(1994), Kotaro (1995), Rajan and Zingales (1995，2003), showed that corporate 
financing had different patterns in different countries. Since the capital market is 
underdeveloped in China, it is a reasonable choice for the government to attract 
more funds by promoting mixed ownership. 
It is found from the questionnaire survey that more than half of the 950 surveyed 
enterprises made commitments to the government to ensure that the major 
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business would remain unchanged after the ownership reform. In addition, some 
enterprises made commitments not to move to other regions. Commitments not 
to sell the shares to third parties were also made.    
Table 7-5  How Many Enterprises Had the Special Regulations  
on the Following Issues 
（Sample: 950 Enterprises） 
 
The Commitment The Number of the Enterprises 
Making the Commitment 
The Percentage 
in the Sample 
Not Moving to Other 
Regions 
713 75% 
Not Changing the 
Major Business 
616 58% 
Increasing Funds 
Input 
304  
However, the private shareholders in MOEs are intelligent. While the 
government set up the special regulations, non-state shareholders often 
co-operate. But at the same time, they will negotiate with the government to 
acquire preferential support, often in the form of price discount, land grant, and 
pre-emptive rights of contracting large public construction projects. 
It is still questionable however, whether these special regulations are effective or 
not. Studies by Mako and Zhang（2003) demonstrated how similar special 
regulations were adopted during the process of SOEs reform in other countries, 
but the government was difficult to monitor the effectiveness of the regulations 
and to punish those who were against the regulations.  
7.7  The Employment Relations  
According to the theory by Blair（1995） , employees are the important 
stakeholders in enterprises, their interest orientation and interest protection will 
impact upon corporate governance. The employment status of SOEs workers in 
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China is inherited from the planning economy. In MOEs, the entrance of private 
shareholders will bring a shock to the original employment status and produce 
new employment relations, which has a huge impact on the corporate governance 
of MOEs. 
While restructuring SOEs to MOEs, the new private shareholders usually ask the 
government and the SOEs to transform the employment status of the workers. 
However, the transformation of employment status has its cost. Employees have 
to be paid with the compensation fees. 
The questionnaire survey showed that in the 950 surveyed enterprises, the 
transformation of employment status was very prevalent when private 
shareholders were the majority shareholders. In the enterprises with the non-state 
shareholder as the first largest shareholder, 70.2% of them transformed the 
employment status by paying the compensation fees, 13.2 % of them did not 
transform the employment status but made commitment to guarantee the 
re-employment, 16.6% of them did not supply information about this. In the 
enterprises with the state shareholder as the first largest shareholder, only 13.6% 
of them transformed the employment status by paying compensation fees.  
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Table 7-6  How Many Enterprises Transformed the Employment Status  
of Their Workers 
（Sample: 950 Enterprises） 
 
 The Percentage in the 
Enterprises Whose First 
Largest Shareholder Is a 
Non-state Shareholder 
The Percentage in the 
Enterprises Whose First 
Largest Shareholder Is  a 
State Shareholder 
Transformed by Paying 
Compensation Funds  
70.2% 13.6% 
Not Transformed but Committed 
to Guaranteeing Re-employment 
13.2% 41.0% 
Others 
 
16.6% 45.4% 
Since the entrance of private shareholders may cause employment status 
transformation and threaten the positions of the original management, the 
workers and the management sometimes unite to resist the entrance of private 
shareholders. Studies by Cespa and Ceston (2002), Pagano and Volpin (2005), 
found that both management and workers did not like the entrance of new large 
shareholders from the outside and might establish an alliance to resist. It is true 
in China. Therefore, in order to dissolve this alliance or diminish the obstruction, 
the new shareholders and the government may negotiate with the management 
and the workers, usually resulting in the commitment to the future employment 
and future position retaining. 
In the 950 surveyed enterprises, 55.8% of them made re-employment 
commitments. The table below shows the contents of these commitments. In the 
companies who made the re-employment commitments, 68.0% committed to 
re-employ more than 80% of the workers, 19.1% committed to re-employ 50% to 
80% of the workers, and 12.9% committed to re-employ less than 50% of the 
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workers. Furthermore, in the companies who made re-employment commitments, 
80.3% committed not to fire any re-employed workers in 3 years, and 3.6% 
committed not to fire any re-employed workers in 5 years. 
Table 7-7  The Re-Employment Commitments 
（Sample: 950 Enterprises） 
 
How Many Enterprises Made 
the Commitment 
Percentage in 
the Sample 
Re-Employ More Than 
80% Workers 
646 68.0％ 
How Many Enterprises Made 
the Commitment 
Percentage in 
the Sample 
Re-Employ 50%-80% 
Workers  
181 19.1％ 
How Many Enterprises Made 
the Commitment 
Percentage in 
the Sample 
Commitment 1 
Re-Employ Less Than 
50% Workers  
123 12.9％ 
How Many Enterprises Made 
the Commitment 
Percentage in 
the Sample 
Agreeing Not to Fire 
Re-Employed Workers in 
3 Years 763 80.3％ 
How Many Enterprises Made 
the Commitment 
Percentage in 
the Sample 
Agreeing Not to Fire 
Re-Employed Workers in 
3-5 Years  153 16.1％ 
How Many Enterprises Made 
the Commitment 
Percentage in 
the Sample 
Commitment 2 
Agreeing Not to Fire 
Re-Employed Workers in 
Five Years  34 3.6％ 
Most of the sampled enterprises whose first largest shareholders were private 
shareholders transformed the employment status by paying compensation fees, 
but most of the enterprises whose largest shareholders are state shareholders did 
not transform the employment status, the employees in the latter enterprises 
could still hold iron rice bowl. In those MOEs whose employees still hold iron 
rice bowl, one of the key task of improving the corporate governance is how to 
enhance the protection of shareholders’ interests because the iron bowl may 
erode the regular interests of shareholders. Especially, when the managers of 
those MOEs still enjoy the iron chair, the entrance of new private shareholders 
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may not shake the entrenchment of them, and the control structure may not be 
restructured according to the new shareholding structure. 
In the MOEs whose employment status is transformed, their corporate 
governance faces other challenges. One possible challenge is that the prevalent 
employees’ shareholding will lead to the confusion of the employees’ role. In the 
enterprises whose employment status was transformed in the 950 enterprises, 
75% paid cash for the compensation fees, and 21% paid the shares as the 
compensation funds. That means lots of MOEs with the employment status 
transformation contain employees shares. Employment status transformation on 
one hand promotes the commercialisation of the enterprises, but on the other 
hand produces lots of employee shareholders, which makes the institutional 
arrangements of MOEs corporate governance more complicated than those 
enterprises without any employee shareholders and may jeopardize the 
commercialisation of the corporations. 
7.8  The Findings and the Discussions 
On the basis of the above analysis, some findings can be drawn as follows. 
First, the largest shareholder in most of the MOEs is still a state shareholder, 
meaning most MOEs are still state-controlled enterprises. In the 950 surveyed 
enterprises, there are 652 enterprises whose first largest shareholders are state 
shareholders, accounting for 68.6%. In the 42 MOEs out of the 300 listed 
companies in the Shanghai-Shenzhen Component Index, the average state 
shareholding proportion of the top 10 shareholders is 34.7% while the average 
non-state shareholding proportion is only 17.3%. 
Second, the control structure sometimes fails to correspond to the shareholding 
structure, thus the controlling powers system and the liabilities system can 
deviate from the normal situation, which may cause contradictions and conflicts 
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among shareholders and insiders. Then the enterprises may be in an unstable 
position. The unstable position may cause government intervention. 
Third, the employment status transformation, on one hand can rectify the 
enterprise-employee relationship, but on the other hand may produce more 
complex enterprise-employee relations if the compensation fees are paid in form 
of shares instead of cash. 
Fourth, special governmental regulations are common, the intention of these 
regulations is understandable but the effects need to be observed because the 
agreements and commitments are difficult to monitor. These regulations are 
difficult to execute, increase the governmental discretionary power and provide 
an excuse for governmental intervention in the operation of MOEs. 
Based on the above findings, it can be concluded that the institutional 
arrangements of the MOEs’ corporate governance in China has some marked 
features. The first feature is that most MOEs have a state majority shareholder 
instead of non-state majority shareholder. Therefore the traditions inherited from 
the SOEs are influential, the government still maintains some interventions, the 
management is somewhat bureaucratic, the labour force is not marketized 
enough. And some outdated governance mechanisms are not completely replaced 
yet, the “old three committees” still play their roles and often have conflicts with 
the “new three committees”, some senior managers are still selected by the 
government in the bureaucratic manners, and the government tends to interfere in 
the business disputes between managers and shareholders instead of encouraging 
them to appeal to lawful system. The second feature is the insiders control is 
interwoven with large non-state shareholders control. Insiders control often 
contradicts with large non-state shareholders control, but neither the board of 
directors nor the general meeting has become the effective platform for resolving 
those contradictions although most MOEs have set up their board of directors. 
Moreover, covenants are often used to complement and amend the control 
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structure. It is fair to say that the control arrangements of the MOEs have an 
interim and mixed structure which is not stable. The third feature is the 
marketization of the management and the labour force is taking place, but the 
progress is slow and unbalanced. In some MOEs, managers are appointed by the 
board of directors and their compensations are marketized, but in other MOEs I 
see the opposite. In some MOEs the employment status is transformed and the 
workers have the market-styled contract with the enterprises, but in other MOEs, 
workers still enjoy the planning-economy-styled iron rice bowl. The fourth 
feather is that the special regulations from the government are strong, but it is 
difficult to make the assessment of it. In China, the special regulations probably 
are positive because the legal system is still immature.   
All in all, the corporate governance of China’s MOEs is in a mixed, transitional, 
and unstable situation. This situation can be named the incomplete 
commercialisation of the corporate governance. By the commercialisation of 
corporate governance I mean the governance mechanisms are based on 
commercial laws, common business rules, and profound marketization. 
Apparently, the improvement of the MOEs’ corporate governance in China needs 
more commercialisation. Fortunately, most of the MOEs have established the 
regular platform, namely, the board of directors, and are practising the rules of 
the board of directors. Therefore I believe China’s MOEs is in the correct 
direction to better corporate governance.  
In the past thirty two years, China’s SOEs have achieved a great extent of 
operational commercialisation. That means their business operation is run on the 
basis of commercial laws, common business rules, and profound marketization. 
However, the governance commercialisation is far behind the progress of the 
operational commercialisation. Developing mixed ownership is a very important 
step to promote governance commercialisation, but is not the last step. The 
covenant, the successive engagement program of the previous management, and 
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the complicated employment relations, all are in favour of the original 
management and the workers to entrench their posts. If private shareholders’ 
penetration to the office of core managers causes conflicts with the original 
management and the existing governance framework does not provide a solution, 
then governmental intervention is highly possible. The government may use 
special regulations to interfere in MOEs’ business strategy and corporate 
operation, which increases the difficulties in clearly defining the 
government-enterprise boundary. It is fair to say, the corporate governance of 
MOEs is in an immature state, the MOEs have not established sustainable 
corporate governance. In the future, the critical task for China’s MOEs is 
undoubtedly to promote the commercialisation of their corporate governance. 
7.9  Concluding Remarks 
The shareholding structure of MOEs, the covenant among shareholders and the 
government, the office of core managers, the special governmental regulations, 
and the employment relations are analysed in this chapter. In most Chinese 
MOEs, the state is still the majority shareholder, and their corporate governance 
can not immediately wipe out the colour of SOEs. The corporate governance of 
China’s MOEs is in the situation of incomplete commercialisation. 
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Chapter 8 
Do Mixed Ownership Enterprises 
Outperform Others? ---Empirical Estimation 
8.1  Introduction 
Since the major factors driving the emergence of the mixed ownership in China 
have been explored and the institutional arrangements of MOEs’ corporate 
governance have been studied, a further issue to investigate is the performance of 
the MOEs. Are they performing better or worse than wholly-owned enterprises 
(non-MOEs)? Is there a significant performance difference between MOEs and 
non-MOEs? This chapter takes the listed companies in China’s stock market as 
the sample to conduct the analysis on the performance of the MOEs and 
non-MOEs.  
8.2 The Sample and the Identification of Mixed 
Ownership Companies 
8.2.1  The Sample and the Data 
In order to conduct the comparative analysis on the performances of MOEs and 
non-MOEs, I use the data of China’s listed companies. In the early 1990s, China 
established both Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange. China 
Centre for Economic Research (CCER), Peking University, developed a database 
of the listed companies, which contains the accounting information and 
shareholding information of listed companies during 1998-2007. It is a panel data 
set. The number of those companies is 1087. In these 1087 companies, 517 were 
listed in Shanghai Stock Exchange and 570 were listed in Shenzhen Stock 
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Exchange. These 1087 listed companies are the sample of the performance 
studies carried out in this chapter. There are a total of 8089 observations made on 
these 1087 companies, which I use in the analysis along with some accounting 
data and shareholding data from both Shanghai Stock Exchange website 26 and 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange website 27  in order to supplement the necessary 
information missing from the CCER database. 
Therefore, there is a different data set of companies in chapter 8 from the data set 
in chapter 4. The reason for using listed companies as the research sample in this 
chapter is that all listed companies have to publish both their accounting 
information and their shareholding information. This information reveals the 
identity and the ownership attribute of the first to tenth largest shareholders. The 
data based on the questionnaire survey used in prior chapters can not provide a 
panel data set over 10 years and covering thousand of companies. Actually, no 
other databases than the database of the listed companies can do that. Some other 
authors, such as Xu, Xiaonian. and Wang, Yan. (1999), Chen, Xiao. and Wang, 
Kun. (2005), also used the data of listed companies to conduct the performance 
analysis and ownership structure analysis of China’s enterprises. 
8.2.2 Identifying Mixed Ownership Companies and 
Wholly-Owned Companies 
All these sampled companies published the information of the first to tenth 
largest shareholders, including the identity of those shareholders. In order to 
identify the MOEs and non-MOEs, I first need to identify the ownership attribute 
of the shareholders. All shareholders can be divided into 2 categories, one is the 
state shareholder category and the other is non-state shareholder category.  
Furthermore, all sampled companies are classified into 2 groups, one is 
                                                        
26 http://www.sse.com.cn/ 
27 http://www.szse.cn/ 
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wholly-owned enterprise, or called non-MOE, the other is MOE. In this chapter, 
the wholly-owned enterprise, or called the non-MOE, is defined as the listed 
company whose first largest, second largest, and third largest shareholder are all 
state shareholders, or are all private shareholders. Other enterprises excluding the 
wholly-owned enterprises are MOEs. Of course, the first, the second and the 
third largest shareholders in any wholly-owned enterprises have the same 
ownership attribute, either private or state ownership attribute. On the contrary, 
the ownership attribute among the first, the second, and the third largest 
shareholders in each of the MOEs, is different. The code 0 is given to 
wholly-owned enterprise group, and the code 1 is given to mixed ownership 
enterprise group. The definition of MOE in this chapter is slightly different from 
the definition in chapter 4. The definition of MOE adopted in this chapter 
simplifies the identification of listed mixed ownership companies because a 
listed company may have too many small shareholders. 
In this sample, there are totally 8089 observations, in which 59.77% are the 
mixed ownership and 40.23% are the whole ownership. It is worth noting that 
state ownership is dominant both in the mixed ownership group and in the whole 
ownership group. 91.42% in the whole ownership group are state-owned 
enterprises (accurately speaking, state-controlled enterprises, because there must 
be tradable shares held by individuals in these companies), and only 8.76% in the 
whole ownership group are private enterprises (accurately speaking, 
private-controlled enterprises, because there may be some smaller state 
shareholders in these companies). In the mixed ownership group, 92.37% have 
the state majority shareholder, only 7.63% have the private majority shareholder.  
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Table 8-1   The Percentage of Whole Ownership and Mixed Ownership 
 
 Whole Ownership (0) Mixed Ownership (1) 
Code 0_0(Private) 0_1(State) 1_0 (Private) 1_1 (State)
Observations 285 2969 369 4466 
Percentage 8.76% 91.24% 7.63% 92.37% 
Total 3254 4835 
Total percentage 40.23% 59.77% 
 
8.3  Methodology 
8.3.1  The Grouping of the Companies 
The grouping should be done first and then the comparative studies on the 
performance among different groups can be conducted. Firstly, all companies in 
the sample are grouped into 2 classes: wholly-owned enterprise (whole) and 
mixed ownership enterprise (mixed). Secondly, the wholly-owned enterprises can 
be classified into 2 sorts: state whole ownership enterprise (whole-state) and 
private whole ownership enterprise (whole-private). It is still worth noting that 
the so-called whole ownership is not truly wholly-owned by the state or by a 
private owner because there must be some other individual stockholders in these 
listed companies. Thirdly, the mixed ownership enterprises can also be classified 
into 2 sorts: the mixed ownership enterprise with a state majority shareholder 
(mixed-state) and the mixed ownership enterprise with a private majority 
shareholder (mixed-private). 
8.3.2  Measurement Indicators 
I use return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), Tobin’s Q, sales growth 
rate (SGR) to measure the performance of different groups of companies. 
 
 
182
                                         
1. ROA 
 
Where =return on assets 
      NI=net income  
      IE=interest expense 
      IT=interest tax saving 
      ATA=average total assets 
2. ROE 
 
Where = return on equity  
      OP=operating performance 
      AT=asset turnover 
      DEMR=debt-equity management ratio 
      NIAT=net income after tax 
      TR=total revenue 
      ATA=average total assets 
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      ASE=average shareholders’ equity 
3. Tobin’s Q 
Tobin’s Q is a ratio of the corporate market value against the replacement cost of 
corporate assets. While Tobin’s Q is between 0 and 1 (low Q), it indicates the 
replacement cost of corporate assets is higher than the corporate market value. 
While Tobin’s Q is above 1 (high Q), it indicates the corporate market value is 
higher than the replacement cost of corporate assets.  
 
Where Q= Tobin’s Q 
      TMV=total market value 
      TAV= total assets value 
4. Sales growth rate 
 
Where   = sales growth rate  
        =sales in this year 
        =sales in last year 
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8.3.3  Control Variable  
Controlling variables in regression analysis is very important, because one small 
overlooked factor may result in a big difference. While controlling variables, 
four factors are introduced. The four factors are net margin (NM), earnings 
before interest and taxes (EBIT), sales growth rate (SGR), and total cost (TC).  
Net Margin: 
 
Where NP=Net Profit   
      OR=Operating Revenue 
EBIT: 
EBIT=OP+II+NOI-OE+PYIA 
Where OP= operating profit 
      II= investment income 
      NOI= non-operating income 
      OE= operating expenses 
      PYIA= prior year income adjustment   
 
 
185
                                         
8.4  Hypotheses and Model  
8.4.1  Hypotheses  
There are six hypotheses that I believe cover all possible performance scenarios. 
The six hypotheses are as follows.  
Hypothesis 1: 
There is no relationship between mixed ownership and corporate performance.   
Hypothesis 2: 
There is a negative relationship between mixed ownership and corporate 
performance.  
Hypothesis 3: 
There is a positive relationship between mixed ownership and corporate 
performance.  
Hypothesis 4: 
The transformation from whole ownership to mixed ownership is helpful to 
improve corporate performance. 
Hypothesis 5: 
The transformation from whole ownership to mixed ownership is harmful to 
improve corporate performance. 
Hypothesis 6: 
The transformation from whole ownership to mixed ownership is neutral to 
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improve corporate performance. 
8.4.2  Model  
The multivariate regression is used to test the above hypotheses. It is a common 
way to use the multivariate regression to check the relations between the 
corporate performance and the concerned factors, such as ownership structure, or 
ownership transfer. It is also very common to use the indicators of ROE, ROA, 
and Tobin’s Q to measure corporate performance. In order to control variables, 
net margin (NM), earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT), sales growth rate 
(SGR), and total cost (TC) must be introduced. That is helpful to get more 
reliable results.  
There are three regressions. Regression 1 is used to test hypothesis 1, 2, and 3. In 
regression 2, a  dummy is used to test these hypotheses further, that 
helps understand the relationship in more detail. Regression 3 is used to test 
hypotheses 4, 5, and 6.  
Regression 1:  
α +  +   + +  + 
 +  +   +  
Regression 2:  
α +  +   + +  + 
 +  +   +  
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Regression 3:  
α +  +   + +  + 
 +  +   +  
Where  is a measurement of performance in year t for company i. Return on 
assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), Tobin’s Q and sales growth rate ( SGR) 
are used to measure corporate performance.                                  
----- return on assets for company i in year t. 
-----return on equity for company i in year t. 
 ----- Tobin’s Q for company i in year t.  
----sales growth rate. 
 is constant, , , , , , ,  are correlation coefficients and 
correspond with , , ,  and . 
---- a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if company i has mixed 
ownership and 0 otherwise.  
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---- a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if company i has whole 
state ownership and 0 otherwise.  
---- a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if company i is 
transformed from whole ownership to mixed ownership and 0 
otherwise. 
----the shareholding percentage of the first largest shareholder for 
company i in year t. 
----total assets lagged one period for company i in year t. 
----net margin for company i in year t. 
---- total cost lagged one period for company i in year t. 
---- earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) for company i in year t 
----the residuals in this regression for company i in year t.  
These three regressions are common ways of correlation analysis. 
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8.5  Data Analysis 
8.5.1  All Variables 
In this section the performance of each group is presented and the comparative 
analysis on the data is conducted.  
Table 8-2 presents the minimum and maximum values for each variable, the 
mean and the standard deviation, the obviations, the shareholder’s identity (ID), 
and their ownership attribute. There were some uncommon minimum and 
maximum values for variables, thus the outliers with extraordinary values were 
removed when running models in STATA software.  
Table 8-2  The Values of All Variables 
(Sample: 1087 Companies) 
 
Variable Obviations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Year 10870   1998 2007 
ID 10870   2 601991 
Nx1 9285   10 21 
Nx2 8089   10 21 
Nx3 8089   10 21 
DUM_Mixed 8089   0 1 
DUM_State 8089   0 1 
Total assets 9546 3.66E+09 2.47E+10 222849.1 9.94E+11 
Total cost 9553 2.20E+09 1.95E+10 -3412904 1.01E+12 
Tobin’s Q 7944 2.015502 1.962812 0.1376041 47.86974 
Return on assets 9528 0.142767 0.102418 -0.2116036 0.966565 
Return on equity 9529 0.339887 1.025284 -41.27379 61.74834 
Net profit 9572 2.11E+08 2.96E+09 -3.72E+09 1.36E+11 
EBIT 9572 6.09E+08 6.48E+09 -1.19E+09 2.84E+11 
Sales growth rate 8459 0.882992 41.54487 -4.411048 3782.713 
Net margin 9555 -30.0057 2944.027 -287764.3 1999.105 
Note: NX1, 2, 3 denote the first to third largest shareholders, DUM_Mixed and DUM_State display dummy variables. 
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8.5.2  Correlation Analysis 
Table 8-3 presents the correlation matrix for a group of variables or for the 
coefficients of their most recent estimations. It is found that EBIT is strongly 
related to both total assets and total cost as the correlation coefficients are 
0.9618 and 0.7705. They are close to 1. Similarly, the total assets and the total 
cost have a pairwise correlation coefficient of 0.8471, that means these two 
variables are highly correlated. Therefore, I introduce the total cost and the total 
assets lagged by one period into the model. Other variables have very small 
pairwise correlation coefficients. 
Table 8-3  All Pairwise Correlation Coefficients 
 
 Dum1 Dum2 TA TC Q ROA ROE EBIT SGR NM 
Dum1 1          
Dum2 0.0203 1         
TA 0.0127 0.0273 1        
TC 0.0148 0.0169 0.8471 1       
Q -0.0041 -0.074 -0.0303 -0.0255 1      
ROA -0.0595 -0.0779 0.0519 0.0564 0.1586 1     
ROE -0.0082 -0.0393 0.0265 0.0371 0.0034 0.2077 1    
EBIT 0.0164 0.0157 0.9618 0.7705 0.0006 0.0858 0.0197 1   
SGR -0.0152 0.0032 -0.0006 -0.0009 -0.0014 -0.001 0.0027 -0.0008 1  
NM -0.0091 -0.0033 0.0011 0.0012 0.0094 0.0143 0.0034 0.001 0.0005 1 
Note: When the correlation coefficient is close to 1, the relationship between the variables is strong. Dum1: mixed 
and whole dummy variable, 1 for mixed ownership and 0 for whole ownership; Dum 2: state and private dummy 
variable, 1 for state ownership and 0 for private ownership; TA: total assets; TC: total cost; Q: Tobin’s Q; ROA: 
return on assets; ROE: return on equity; EBIT: earnings before interests and tax; SGR: sales growth rate; NM: net 
margin. 
 
8.5.3  Tobin’s Q 
Figure 8-1 presents the average value of Tobin’s Q for both the mixed ownership 
group (mixed) and the whole ownership group (whole) between 1998 and 2007. 
It can be found that the Tobin’s Q of mixed ownership group is higher than the 
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Tobin’s Q of the whole ownership group between 1998 and 2003. Interestingly, it 
is then lower for the period between 2005 and 2007. But the differences between 
the mixed group and the whole group are not marked, and the differences are not 
consistent during the period of 1998-2007 and the period of 2005-2007. It is clear 
from these illustrations that Tobin’s Q is not strongly related to mixed ownership. 
 
 
 Q mixed 
Q whole 
Figure 8-1  Tobin’s Q of the Mixed Group versus the Whole Group 
Figure 8-2 presents Tobin’s Q of the group of mixed ownership with the state 
majority shareholder (mixed-state) and the group of the whole state ownership 
(whole-state). It is found that there is no significant differentiation between the 
two groups. 
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Q Mixed-State 
Q Whole-State 
Figure 8-2  Tobin’s Q of the Mixed-State Group versus the Whole-State Group 
Figure 8-3 presents the Tobin’s Q of the group of the mixed ownership with the 
private majority shareholder (mixed-private) and the group of the whole private 
ownership (whole-private). The Tobin’s Q has no significant differentiation 
between the two groups although it is sometimes higher for the latter group and 
sometimes higher for the former group. 
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Q Mixed-Private 
Q Whole-Private 
Figure 8-3  Tobin’s Q of the Mixed-Private Group versus the Whole-Private 
Group 
8.5.4  ROA 
Figure 8-4 presents the mean value of ROA of mixed ownership group (mixed) 
and whole ownership group (whole). It is easy to find that the ROA of the whole 
ownership group is higher than mixed ownership group in most years, but the 
differentiation is not significant.  
 
                 
ROA Mixed 
ROA Whole 
Figure 8-4  ROA of the Mixed Ownership Group versus Whole Ownership 
Group  
Figure 8-5 presents ROA of the group of the mixed ownership with the state 
majority shareholder (mixed-state) and the group of the whole state ownership 
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(whole-state). It seems the ROA of the latter tends to be higher than the former, 
though again the differentiation is also insignificant. 
 
 
ROA Mixed-State 
ROA Whole-State 
Figure 8-5  ROA of the Mixed-State Group versus the Whole-State Group 
Figure 8-6 presents ROA of the group of the mixed ownership with the private 
majority shareholder (mixed-private) and the group of the whole private 
ownership (whole-private). In most years the ROA of the latter is much higher 
than the former. 
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ROA Mixed-Private 
ROA Whole-Private 
Figure 8-6  ROA of the Mixed-Private Group versus the Whole-Private Group  
8.5.5  ROE 
Figure 8-7 presents the mean value of ROE for the whole ownership group 
(whole) and for the mixed ownership group (mixed). It can be found the ROE 
for the mixed ownership group is higher than the ROE for the whole ownership 
group between 2000 and 2003, but lower between 1998 and 1999, and between 
2004 and 2007.  
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ROE Mixed 
ROE Whole 
Figure 8-7  ROE of the Mixed Ownership Group versus the Whole Ownership 
Group 
Figure 8-8 presents ROE of the group of the mixed ownership with the state 
majority shareholders (mixed-state) and the group of the whole state ownership 
(whole-state). It can be found in most years the former is lower than the latter.  
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ROE Mixed-State 
ROE Whole-State 
Figure 8-8  ROE of the Mixed-State Group versus the Whole-State Group 
Figure 8-9 presents ROE of the group of the mixed ownership with the private 
majority shareholder (mixed-private) and the group of the whole private 
ownership (whole-private). It can be found that in most years the former is lower 
than the latter. But in 2000, 2001, 2003 and 2004, the former is higher than the 
latter.  
 
          
ROE Mixed-Private 
ROE Whole-Private 
Figure 8-9  ROE of the Mixed-Private Group versus the Whole-Private Group 
Based on the above comparisons, it is fair to say there is no solid evidence 
showing the performance of mixed ownership companies is higher than the 
performance of whole ownership companies or vice versa. Sometimes, the 
performance of whole ownership companies is higher than the performance of 
mixed ownership companies, but the differences are not very noted. In general, it 
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is difficult to find the relationship between the corporate performance and the 
ownership structure.  
8.6  Empirical Test Results 
8.6.1  Empirical Test Approach 
In this section the empirical tests on regression 1, 2, and 3 are conducted. The 
results of the empirical tests are shown in the following tables.  
Table 8-4, 8-5, 8-6, 8-7 present estimated the results of different groups. Firstly, 
the sample is totally analysed through the introduction of a mixed dummy 
variable. Secondly, the sample is divided into the whole ownership group and the 
mixed ownership group, and then the performance correlation with the 
ownership structure is checked. Thirdly, the relationship between the corporate 
performance and the transformation from whole ownership to mixed ownership 
is checked. A variable, the shareholding percentage of the first largest 
shareholder, is introduced to the regression.  
8.6.2  ROA Empirical Test 
Table 8-4 presents ROA empirical test results of different groups. The first 
column shows the total sample results of five variables, all the variables are 
significant at the 95% confidence interval, with the exception of the net margin 
variable. The dummy variable coefficient for mixed ownership group and the 
whole ownership group is -0.0081068, that tells the dummy variable of mixed 
ownership group has a significant negative relationship with ROA. This means 
the whole ownership group has better performance than the mixed ownership 
group. Besides the dummy variable of mixed ownership group, EBIT is 
positively and significantly related to ROA.  
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Moreover, the dummy variable is used to analyze the relationship between 
ownership structure and corporate performance.  
In the whole ownership group, all variables are significant except net margin, 
dummy variable and EBIT of the companies with the state majority shareholder 
have positive coefficient. Thus, the whole state ownership group (whole-state) 
has better performance than the whole private ownership group (whole-private). 
The shareholding percentage of the first largest shareholder shows negative 
significance both in the total sample and in the whole ownership group.  
In the mixed ownership group, the dummy variable of the companies with the 
state majority shareholder (mixed-state) shows positive insignificant relationship 
with corporate performance. EBIT still plays a positive and significant role, 
however, the variable of the shareholding percentage of the first largest 
shareholder is no longer significant at 5% level.   
Further, the issue whether the transformation from whole ownership to mixed 
ownership affects corporate performance, should be studied. Since lots of 
wholly-owned enterprises were transformed to MOEs during 2002 to 2007, I 
consider the period of 2002 to 2007 in the model. In the column of 2002-2007, 
dummy variable of ownership transformation shows positive but insignificant 
relationship with corporate performance. While singling out those companies in 
which the shareholding percentage of the first largest shareholder is higher than 
40%, the test result presents a positive significance on the dummy variable. That 
means even an ownership transformation occurs, the proportion of transferred 
equity matters very much. Low proportional equity transfer usually does not 
affect corporate performance, but high proportional equity transfer does. That 
implies the controlling powers and the shareholding structure matter in terms of 
improving performance. It is fair to say that the change in corporate governance 
is far more important than the ownership transformation itself. To prove this 
result more accurately, the robust testing can be applied. 
                                         
  
Table 8-4  Dependent Variable: Return on Assets 
 
 Total Whole Mixed 2002-2007 2002-2007>40% 2004-2007 2004-2007>40% 2006-2007 2006-2007>40% 2004-2005 2004-2005>40% 2002-2003 2002-2003>40% 
dum_mixed 
-0.0081068  
(0.000) 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 
dum_state - 
.1561075  
(0.000) 
.0019354  
(0.465) 
- - - - - - - - - - 
d_mixed - - - 
.0053045   
(0.167) 
.0130825     
(0.011) 
.0084656   
(0.093) 
.0197662     
(0.016) 
.0054664   
(0.385) 
0.23785      
(0.005) 
.0026923   
(0.689) 
.0073567     
(0.426) 
.000614   
(0.917) 
.0041711     
(0.565) 
total assets 
-3.18e-12   
(0.000) 
-5.08e-12  
(0.000) 
-3.69e-12  
(0.000) 
-3.12e-12   
(0.000) 
-1.50e-12     
(0.084) 
-2.91e-12   
(0.037) 
-1.54e-12     
(0.366) 
-7.66e-12   
(0.000) 
-6.41e-12     
(0.000) 
-1.01e-11   
(0.000) 
-9.35e-12     
(0.000) 
-6.62e-12   
(0.035) 
-5.12e-12     
(0.202) 
total cost 
-1.61e-12   
(0.000) 
-4.62e-12  
(0.000) 
-6.31e-13  
(0.012) 
-3.90e-12   
(0.003) 
-3.88e-12     
(0.010) 
-1.38e-12   
(0.577) 
-1.09e-12     
(0.746) 
-1.01e-13   
(0.935) 
3.33e-13     
(0.777) 
5.15e-12   
(0.194) 
4.87e-12     
(0.366) 
5.23e-12   
(0.195) 
7.57e-12     
(0.118) 
net margin 
1.93e-07   
(0.266) 
-1.42e-05  
(0.408) 
1.93e-07  
(0.235) 
-1.04e-05   
(0.533) 
.000084      
(0.230) 
.0000151   
(0.393) 
-.0017149     
(0.037) 
.0384033   
(0.008) 
.0991885     
(0.000) 
.0034064   
(0.269) 
-.0000684     
(0.000) 
.0049801   
(0.000) 
.004392      
(0.003) 
EBIT 
1.94e-11   
(0.00) 
5.53e-11   
(0.000) 
1.43e-11   
(0.000) 
4.05e-11   
(0.000) 
2.24e-11     
(0.000) 
2.62e-11   
(0.000) 
1.52e-11     
(0.004) 
5.25e-11   
(0.000) 
3.82e-11     
(0.000) 
1.52e-10   
(0.000) 
1.36e-10     
(0.167) 
3.48e-11   
(0.001) 
2.52e-11     
(0.260) 
N1_share 
-0.0221688  
(0.002) 
-7.66e-02  
(0.000) 
.00232   
(0.829) 
-.0569032  
(0.003) 
-.0350033     
(0.299) 
-.0533631  
(0.062) 
.0131173     
(0.815) 
.0625158   
(0.154) 
.1956662     
(0.030) 
.0438464   
(0.239) 
.1049703     
(0.659) 
.0324908   
(0.458) 
.1248632     
(0.562) 
observation 7472 2077 3851 1378 645 864 375 673 290 616 362 595 371 
R^2 0.0198 0.0245 0.0015 0.1560 0.0652 0.1495 0.1417 0.2173 0.0869 0.1512 0.1526 0.2749 0.1539 
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Note: The table in brackets is the p-value of t-statistic. Total assets, total cost and EBIT are lagged one period. Dum_mixed is used to compare the performance of the mixed 
ownership group and the whole ownership group, Dum_state is used to compare the performance of the companies with the state majority shareholder and the companies 
with the private majority shareholder. D_mixed is used to compare the performance of the companies with ownership transformation from whole ownership to mixed 
ownership and other companies. N1_share is the shareholding percentage of the first largest shareholder。 
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8.6.3  ROE Empirical Test 
Table 8-5 presents the empirical test results for ROE of different groups. The 
dummy variable of mixed ownership group and whole ownership group is 
negatively significant at the 95% confidence interval. This shows the 
performance of whole ownership group is better than mixed ownership group. 
While the first largest shareholder owns more than 40% of the total equity after 
the ownership transformation, the ownership-transformed companies from whole 
ownership to mixed ownership are positive and significant at the 5% level in the 
period of 2002-2007, 2004-2007 and 2006-2007. Other groups have positive 
insignificant relationship with the performance. ROE test results are similar to 
ROA test results.      
                                         
 
Table 8-5  Dependent Variable: Return on Equity 
 
  Total Whole Mixed 2002-2007 2002-2007>40% 2004-2007 2004-2007>40% 2006-2007 2006-2007>40% 2004-2005 2004-2005>40% 2002-2003 2002-2003>40% 
dum_mixed 
-.0097583  
(0.237) 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 
dum_state - 
.3742461  
(0.000) 
.0205602   
(0.057) 
- - - - - - - - - - 
d_mixed - - - 
.0337059   
(0.099) 
.0766564     
(0.002) 
.035953   
(0.160) 
.1170968     
(0.000) 
.0408094   
(0.243) 
.1332606     
(0.000) 
.0086674   
(0.843) 
.0236843     
(0.743) 
.0225786   
(0.460) 
.0086336 
(0.629) 
total assets 
-8.80e-13  
(0.536) 
-8.98e-12  
(0.000) 
-1.20e-12  
(0.600) 
-7.91e-12   
(0.075) 
-4.06e-12     
(0.343) 
-8.43e-12   
(0.234) 
-1.67e-12     
(0.779) 
-1.83e-11   
(0.012) 
-2.20e-11     
(0.000) 
-9.54e-12   
(0.436) 
-1.09e-11     
(0.580) 
9.42e-12   
(0.560) 
8.53e-12 
(0.387) 
total cost 
-7.03e-12  
(0.000) 
-1.51e-11  
(0.000) 
-6.13e-12  
(0.000) 
-1.39e-12   
(0.843) 
-7.86e-12     
(0.288) 
1.08e-13   
(0.993) 
-1.14e-11     
(0.338) 
6.49e-13   
(0.927) 
-9.30e-13     
(0.858) 
7.56e-12   
(0.761) 
1.30e-11     
(0.757) 
4.82e-12   
(0.817) 
1.10e-11 
(0.357) 
net margin 
4.66e-07   
(0.566) 
-8.36e-06  
(0.900) 
4.62e-07   
(0.487) 
.0000362   
(0.686) 
.000354     
(0.310) 
-.0000106  
(0.907) 
-.0086125     
(0.003) 
.0000317   
(0.758) 
-.1901098     
(0.000) 
-.0001109  
(0.783) 
-.0000985     
(0.851) 
.003639   
(0.606) 
.0014896 
(0.679) 
EBIT 
5.08e-11   
(0.000) 
1.66e-10   
(0.000) 
4.69e-11   
(0.000) 
1.17e-10   
(0.000) 
8.91e-11     
(0.000) 
8.69e-11   
(0.000) 
5.97e-11     
(0.001) 
1.45e-10   
(0.003) 
1.54e-10     
(0.000) 
2.61e-10   
(0.006) 
2.33e-10     
(0.097) 
4.56e-11   
(0.376) 
2.73e-11 
(0.313) 
N1_share 
-.1854165  
(0.000) 
.3560211  
(0.000) 
-.1477546  
(0.001) 
-.1423103  
(0.166) 
-.2901866     
(0.077) 
-.1131745   
(0.432) 
.0145481     
(0.940) 
.4091295   
(0.105) 
1.179629     
(0.004) 
.1247185   
(0.605) 
.0715525     
(0.904) 
.0513555   
(0.803) 
.7430536 
(0.007) 
observation 7493 2107 3864 1404 694 882 387 730 302 638 369 605 375 
R^2 0.0067 0.0375 0.0306 0.0930 0.0709 0.1144 0.0469 0.0744 0.1057 0.0582 0.0256 0.0228 0.0114 
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Note: The table in brackets is the p-value of t-statistic. Total assets, total cost and EBIT are lagged one period. Dum_mixed is used to compare the performance of mixed and 
whole ownership group; dum_state is used to compare the performance of companies with the state majority shareholder and the companies with the private majority 
shareholder. D_mixed is used to compare the performance of the companies with the transformation from whole ownership to mixed ownership and other companies. 
N1_share is the shareholding percentage of the first largest shareholder. 
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8.6.4  Tobin’s Q and Sales Growth Rate Empirical Test 
Tobin’s Q in table 8-6 also shows that the dummy of the mixed ownership group 
has negatively significant relationship to corporate performance. However, the 
dummy of the group with the sate majority shareholder and the group with the 
private majority shareholder is not significant in the whole ownership group but 
is significant for the mixed ownership group. These findings differ from the 
analysis for ROA ROE. And the dummy variable for the companies with 
transformation from whole ownership to mixed ownership is positively 
significant for the period of 2002-2007, 2004-2007, 2006-2007. This is also true 
for the companies whose first largest shareholder holds more than 40% of the 
total equity for these periods. This implies that the group with transformation 
from whole ownership to mixed ownership has better performance than those 
without ownership transformation in recent years.  
The test result on sales growth rate is similar to the results for ROA and ROE. 
The dummy variable of the mixed ownership group is not significant in the total 
sample. The dummy variable of the ownership-transformed group is positively 
significant only in those ownership-transformed companies whose first largest 
shareholder owns more than 40% the total equity after the transformation in the 
period of 2002-2007, 2004-2007, 2006-2007.
                                         
Table 8-6  Dependent Variable: Tobin's Q’ 
 Total Whole Mixed 2002-2007 2002-2007>40% 2004-2007 2004-2007>40% 2006-2007 2006-2007>40% 2004-2005 2004-2005>40% 2002-2003 2002-2003>40% 
dum_mixed 
-.1084312     
(0.023) 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 
dum_state - 
.7045646   
(0.352) 
.1505946   
(0.034) 
- - - - - - - - - - 
d_mixed - - - 
.2472373   
(0.006) 
.4180974     
(0.042) 
.9192072   
(0.000) 
1.129463     
(0.002) 
1.430904   
(0.000) 
1.035706     
(0.014) 
-.1431807  
(0.061) 
-.1523994     
(0.081) 
-.3589472    
(0.002) 
-.1369622     
(0.184) 
total assets 
-6.48e-11     
(0.000) 
-9.70e-11   
(0.000) 
-8.33e-11   
(0.000) 
-9.85e-11   
(0.000) 
-6.65e-11     
(0.065) 
-1.18e-10   
(0.004) 
-1.05e-10     
(0.170) 
-6.70e-11  
(0.192) 
-1.43e-11     
(0.826) 
-3.29e-11  
(0.122) 
-5.96e-11     
(0.012) 
-1.10e-10    
(0.064) 
-1.05e-10     
(0.047) 
total cost 
-4.00e-12     
(0.416) 
-5.30e-11   
(0.020) 
1.13e-11   
(0.090) 
3.62e-11   
(0.224) 
-4.08e-11     
(0.512) 
1.75e-10    
(0.017) 
1.05e-10     
(0.488) 
-1.34e-11  
(0.787) 
-3.15e-12     
(0.956) 
-3.91e-11  
(0.365) 
2.34e-11      
(0.643) 
-4.09e-11    
(0.591) 
1.52e-11     
(0.812) 
net margin 
4.56e-06     
(0.326) 
-.001311   
(0.123) 
4.62e-06   
(0.287) 
-.0011005  
(0.126) 
.0018561     
(0.527) 
-.0016273   
(0.079) 
.0028675     
(0.938) 
-.0013587  
(0.275) 
1.511776     
(0.517) 
.0007867   
(0.262) 
.0007449     
(0.237) 
-.041022    
(0.363) 
.0058071     
(0.869) 
EBIT 
2.07e-10     
(0.000) 
8.45e-10   
(0.000) 
1.49e-10   
(0.000) 
9.14e-10   
(0.000) 
1.00e-09     
(0.000) 
8.06e-10    
(0.000) 
8.78e-10     
(0.000) 
1.07e-09   
(0.003) 
6.36e-10     
(0.158) 
2.77e-10   
(0.093) 
2.83e-10      
(0.093) 
4.06e-10    
(0.032) 
2.48e-10     
(0.088) 
N1_share 
1.423278     
(0.000) 
.4520685   
(0.313) 
1.740212   
(0.000) 
-2.488114  
(0.000) 
-4.865488     
(0.000) 
-3.437227   
(0.000) 
-6.080009     
(0.015) 
-.9579719  
(0.585) 
-5.489715     
(0.209) 
.9781333   
(0.020) 
3.38137      
(0.000) 
1.037536    
(0.175) 
-.0629238     
(0.966) 
observation 7377 2096 3841 1618 693 857 385 677 290 636 368 593 354 
R^2 0.113 0.0186 0.0065 0.0122 0.0434 0.0052 0.0093 0.0008 0.0002 0.0861 0.0116 0.0475 0.0378 
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Note: The table in brackets is the p-value of t-statistic. Total assets, total cost and EBIT are lagged one period. Dum_mixed is used to compare the performance of the mixed ownership 
group and the whole ownership group; dum_state is used to compare the performance of the companies with the state majority shareholder and the companies with the private majority 
shareholder. D_mixed is used to compare the performance of the companies with the transformation from whole ownership to mixed ownership and other companies. N1_share is the 
shareholding percentage of the first largest shareholder. 
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                                            Table 8-7  Dependent Variable: Sales Growth Rate 
 
 Total Whole Mixed 2002-2007 2002-2007>40% 2004-2007 2004-2007>40% 2006-2007 2006-2007>40% 2004-2005 2004-2005>40% 2002-2003 2002-2003>40% 
Dum_mixed 
-.169707   
(0.301) 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 
dum_state - 
.5653078   
(0.019) 
.0368609   
(0.185) 
- - - - - - - - - - 
d_mixed - - - 
.0236834   
(0.534) 
.117751     
(0.040) 
.0571557   
(0.255) 
.1883411     
(0.039) 
.0848181   
(0.260) 
.2140582     
(0.165) 
-.0465587  
(0.653) 
.0430683     
(0.743) 
.0117289   
(0.895) 
.0679817     
(0.390) 
total assets 
-1.11e-11   
(0.000) 
-1.59e-11   
(0.017) 
-1.87e-11   
(0.001) 
7.20e-12   
(0.385) 
3.57e-11     
(0.001) 
1.61e-12   
(0.907) 
5.12e-11     
(0.014) 
-1.61e-11   
(0.312) 
-1.89e-11     
(0.434) 
-1.29e-11   
(0.657) 
-2.14e-12     
(0.952) 
-6.35e-12  
(0.892) 
6.27e-13     
(0.988) 
total cost 
-1.50e-11   
(0.000) 
-4.79e-11   
(0.000) 
-8.55e-12  
(0.001) 
-7.60e-11   
(0.000) 
-5.89e-11     
(0.001) 
-9.38e-11   
(0.000) 
-5.91e-11     
(0.110) 
1.40e-12   
(0.926) 
8.47e-12     
(0.693) 
2.31e-11   
(0.659) 
-9.61e-12     
(0.901) 
1.19e-10   
(0.051) 
9.78e-11     
(0.064) 
net margin 
3.36e-06   
(0.036) 
-.000084   
(0.633) 
3.36e-06   
(0.049) 
.0000198   
(0.907) 
.0010279     
(0.214) 
.0000468   
(0.808) 
-.0191255     
(0.070) 
-.0000521  
(0.808) 
.3811346     
(0.665) 
.0001688   
(0.860) 
.0001711     
(0.857) 
.0690725   
(0.001) 
.0521352     
(0.001) 
EBIT 
1.20e-10   
(0.000) 
3.19e-10   
(0.000) 
1.01e-10   
(0.000) 
2.21e-10   
(0.000) 
-1.89e-10     
(0.013) 
2.63e-10   
(0.000) 
-2.39e-10    
(0.094) 
2.11e-10   
(0.048) 
1.72e-10     
(0.293) 
3.17e-10   
(0.159) 
3.13e-10     
(0.219) 
-1.26e-10  
(0.400) 
-1.34e-10     
(0.261) 
N1_share 
.0849696   
(0.209) 
.003969   
(0.00980) 
.3883634   
(0.001) 
.1098001   
(0.564) 
.5485507     
(0.149) 
.2870156   
(0.305) 
1.030908     
(0.090) 
.8590385   
(0.109) 
3.645301     
(0.031) 
1.38956   
(0.016) 
1.942162     
(0.082) 
-.3074362  
(0.609) 
-.3009447     
(0.803) 
observation 7456 2100 3869 1397 690 875 383 695 297 636 367 604 375 
R^2 0.0024 0.0349 0.0075 0.0108 0.0721 0.0088 0.0803 0.0421 0.0143 0.0170 0.0171 0.0342 0.0390 
Note: The table in brackets is the p-value of t-statistic. Total assets, total cost and EBIT are lagged one period. Dum_mixed is used to compare the performance of the mixed 
ownership group and the whole ownership group; dum_state is used to compare the performance of the companies with the state majority shareholder and the companies with 
the private majority shareholder. D_mixed is used to compare the performance of the companies with the transformation from whole ownership to mixed ownership and other 
companies. N1_share is the shareholding percentage of the first largest shareholder. 
                                         
8.7  The Explanations and Discussions 
Although it is a difficult task to justify the mixed ownership from the perspective 
of performance, it is still necessary to compare the performance of the MOEs and 
non-MOEs in terms of the empirical results. In this chapter, I use the companies 
listed in China’s stock market during the period of 1998-2007 as the sample to do 
the comparative analysis on the performance of MOEs and non-MOEs. It is 
found that there is no significant relationship between mixed ownership and 
performance, although there might be a tendency for the whole ownership group 
to exhibit better performance than the mixed ownership group, but the correlation 
is weak and the results are very inconsistent. Sometimes the mixed ownership 
group has better performance than the whole ownership group, but this result 
only covers a few time periods and contains few indicators. To summarise, 
hypothesis 1 is supported by the empirical estimation, but hypothesis 2 and 3 are 
rejected.  
Corporate performance is decided by various complicated factors, ownership 
structure is only one of them. Besides, the capability of management, the 
effectiveness of board of directors, the business opportunities, the market power, 
the R&D ability, the brand name influence, and the access to obtain funds and 
other resources, are all important to corporate performance. Ownership structure 
may have impact on the above factors, but it takes time. As for private ownership 
itself, it may bring vigour to SOEs, but the ownership restructuring may make 
the corporate governance more complicated, say, tunnelling may happen after the 
entrance of the private controlling shareholder and the profit may be transferred 
away.  
However, the establishment of good corporate governance is more difficult than 
the ownership restructuring itself and needs more time. As cited in 5.5 of this 
thesis, Little Swan Company, a very famous company in China, became a MOE 
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from a SOE in 2004, while a private company, Siweite Company, became the 
controlling shareholder of Little Swan Company. But afterwards Siweite was 
accused of embezzling funds from Little Swan, and Little Swan was caught in a 
financial distress. Apparently, mixed ownership did not bring better performance 
to Little Swan. Business strategy may also have an impact on corporate 
performance. While a company makes intense investments, its financial 
performance may drop down for a period. Usually the investments are very 
intense for lots of MOEs after the ownership restructuring. Moreover, more 
business opportunities, stronger market power, higher R&D ability, better brand 
name influence, and smother access to obtain funds and other business resources, 
are not always corresponding to mixed ownership, sometimes the real 
circumstances are the opposite. Anyway, it takes long time and enormous effort 
for a MOE or any other kind of enterprise to establish high R&D ability, good 
brand name influence, smooth access to obtain business resources, strong market 
power, even if the MOE has a good management team and good corporate 
governance.  
All in all, the entrance of new non-state shareholders and the accomplishment of 
mixed ownership do not necessarily mean outperforming the whole ownership, 
but as stated in chapter 5, there are indeed strong factors to drive the emergence 
of mixed ownership in China, and mixed ownership is favourable to combine the 
advantages of state ownership and private ownership. The most important thing 
which should be kept in the mind is, mixed ownership is rapidly rising in China 
because of some strong driving factors rooting in China’s economic transition 
and China’s social environment. It is extremely necessary to know more about it 
and its corporate governance, in order for the MOEs to be treated properly, to be 
assessed well, to be led to improve the corporate governance, to be encouraged to 
establish high R&D ability, good brand name influence, strong market power, 
unimpeded access to obtain business resources, and eventually to have good 
performance. 
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The sample in this chapter for the dada analysis of the corporate performance is 
different from the sample in chapter 4 and 6 for the analysis of the commonness 
degree and mixture degree of mixed ownership as well as the analysis of the 
institutional arrangements of MOEs’ corporate governance. It is understandable 
that the different samples are used. Since most of the MOEs originate from the 
ownership transformation, I have to check how many ownership-transformed 
enterprises have become MOEs so that I can assess how prevalent the partial 
privatization is in China. Therefore, I conducted the questionnaire survey that 
gives me the sample of 950 systematically-transformed enterprises. The 
questionnaire survey provides not only ownership structure information but also 
other useful information, such as the changes of the legal representative and CFO, 
and the establishment of board of directors because I intentionally designed the 
questionnaire to satisfy my analysis of the corporate governance of the 
enterprises. Consequently, I use the sample of 950 enterprises to study the 
institutional arrangements of MOEs corporate governance. But while doing the 
comparative analysis of the performance of MOEs and non-MOEs, the sample of 
950 questionnaire-surveyed enterprises is not appropriate. This sample does not 
provide the performance data for a period of quite a few years because it is 
impossible to receive enough well-answered questionnaires if the questionnaire 
design is too complicated. The best way of conducting the comparative analysis 
is to use the national statistical data collected by the State Statistics Bureau of 
China, but as a matter of fact it is impossible. Firstly, the data of the State 
Statistics Bureau contains millions of enterprises, so that the data processing will 
be very difficult. Secondly, the data of the State Statistics Bureau does not 
contain the information of shareholding structure and shareholder’s ownership 
attribute I need to identify the MOEs and non-MOEs. The data of China’s listed 
companies is good and convenient to conduct the comparative performance 
analysis because the data provides the information of financial indicators and 
shareholding structure as well as shareholder’s ownership attribute. The analysis 
results of the comparative performance by using the sample of the listed 
 212
                                         
companies may deviate from the analysis if the national data of the State 
Statistics Bureau can be used, but this is a common problem of using samples. 
For corporate performance analysis, using the data of listed companies is very 
common and a feasible choice. 
This chapter has a meaningful finding. The transformation from whole ownership 
to mixed ownership promotes the corporate performance while the first largest 
shareholder owns more than 40% of the total ownership after the transformation. 
Namely, hypothesis 4 is supported empirically, but with a very important 
precondition of more than 40% of shareholding proportion of the first largest 
shareholder. Hypothesis 5 and 6 are rejected. The significance of the 40% 
shareholding proportion is found by a few trials. This signifies the higher 
shareholding proportion is material to make changes of the corporate 
performance in response to the ownership transformation. That is to say, even if 
an enterprise is transformed from whole ownership to mixed ownership, its 
performance may not have a noted change if the new first largest shareholder 
own less than 40% of the equity of the company. Why 35% and below do not 
show the noted change of the performance is unknown, one possible explanation 
is that the 40% shareholding proportion may be the lowest threshold to 
effectively control a listed company in regular circumstances and then to impact 
on corporate performance. Usually, it is well-know that 51% shareholding 
proportion will lead to the control of a non-listed company in regular 
circumstances, but for listed companies, the 40% shareholding proportion seems 
a threshold for the control of the business because there are a number of tradable 
stocks in the market besides.    
From the perspective of corporate governance, the 40% shareholding proportion 
reflects the importance of corporate control. That signifies the transfer of 
corporate controlling powers is very important for the transformed companies 
from whole ownership to mixed ownership to improve the performance. As 
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stated in chapter 6 and 7, the transformation of corporate governance of MOEs is 
more important than ownership transformation itself. Therefore, the critical task 
in the future for China’s MOEs is to transform the institutional arrangements of 
corporate governance and to establish good corporate governance, although that 
will take a long period of time.  
8.8  Concluding Remarks 
This chapter checks the performance of MOEs and non-MOEs in China, and it is 
found that there are usually no notable performance difference between MOEs 
and non-MOEs. Corporate performance is determined by a set of factors. It is not 
appropriate to expect soon better performance after the transformation from 
whole ownership to mixed ownership. The critical issue is to encourage the 
MOEs to improve the corporate governance in the future.  
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Chapter 9 
Conclusions and Further Thinking 
9.1  Introduction  
Mixed ownership is a result of China’s economic transition. Little English 
literature on China’s MOEs can be found. However, the existing literature on 
firm theory, economic transition, ownership reform, new institutional economics, 
and corporate governance, is enlightening. This thesis has studied the driving 
factors of the emergence of China’s MOEs, their corporate governance, and their 
performance, and some findings have been drawn. 
9.2  The Summary of This Research and the Major 
Findings 
Since most of the MOEs in China originate from SOEs’ ownership reform, this 
thesis first analyses the background, the policies, the progress, and the 
characteristics of China’s SOEs reform. On this basis, the China Model of SOEs 
reform is generalised, which refers to the combination of the radical control 
reform and the gradual ownership reform, the strong path dependence, the 
exploitation of ever-growing private sector, and the dual transformation mode. 
The discussions about the path dependence and the employment status 
transformation as well as the cost payment are original. Mixed ownership is 
rooted deeply in the China Model. A large scale questionnaire survey covering 
950 ownership-transformed enterprises is conducted, then the commonness 
degree of mixed ownership and the mixture degree are analysed. It is found that 
in the 950 ownership-transformed enterprises, 77.3% are MOEs, and in the 300 
listed companies in Shanghai-Shenzhen Component Index, 14% are MOEs. 
Mixed ownership is quite common in China. 
 215
                                         
The driving factors of the emergence of China’s MOEs have been explored. It is 
found in the 1980s, the mixed ownership budded in the economic co-operation 
and horizontal alliance, and it combined SOEs’ advantage of obtaining business 
resources and non-SOEs’ advantage of flexible operational mechanisms. The 
mutual supplement of different advantages achieved good synergy in mixed 
ownership. Since the mid-1990s, lots of SOEs have been restructured to MOEs 
instead of fully-privatised enterprises. The government’s incomplete trust in 
private ownership, the government’s incomplete releasing of its controlling 
powers on SOEs, the granting of some shares to SOEs’ insiders, the unfair 
treatment to private enterprises, and the Chinese traditional culture, promoted the 
emergence of China’s MOEs. In comparison with SOEs, China’s private 
enterprises have more difficulties in obtaining business resources and acquiring 
the trust of the government, banks, customers and the public. China is still not a 
country ruled by law, as a result private firms are not confident in acquiring the 
protection from the authorities. The government is very powerful and controls 
lots of business resources. These are also the factors driving the rise of China’s 
MOEs. 
The institutional arrangements of MOEs’ corporate governance in China have 
been studied. From the perspective of new institutional economics, the 
institutional arrangements of corporate governance should include quite e few 
issues such as ownership structure, control arrangements, contracts, markets, 
regulations, and a set of relations. After taking some theoretical discussions and 
empirical observations, a basic analytical framework for the studies of the 
institutional arrangements of MOEs’ corporate governance is established, namely, 
the SCORE framework. It includes five issues: shareholding structure, the 
covenant, the office of core managers, the special governmental regulations, and 
the employment relations. Based on the SCORE analysis for the institutional 
arrangements of MOEs’ corporate governance, it is found that most of the MOEs 
have the state majority shareholder, and many of the MOEs have the covenants. 
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In the control structure of the MOEs, insiders have big advantages and privileges, 
they maintain noted powers and rights even after the entrance of new large 
private shareholders. Nevertheless, the new private shareholders can gradually 
penetrate the office of core managers. The government often sets up special 
regulations on MOEs in order to guarantee the stable operation of the MOEs and 
to promote local development, though these regulations may not be as effective 
as expected. The employment relations in MOEs are quite complicated, some 
employees still enjoy their iron rice bowl. Meanwhile, many employees hold 
shares in the enterprises they work for. Generally speaking, the corporate 
governance of China’s MOEs is in an unstable and immature situation, and is not 
commercialised enough.  
The comparative analysis on the performance of MOEs and non-MOEs has also 
been conducted. The five hypotheses about the performance of different groups 
of enterprises were tested empirically. One major finding is that the ownership 
transformation from whole ownership to mixed ownership promotes the 
corporate performance with a precondition that the first largest shareholder owns 
more than 40% of the total ownership in the company after the ownership 
transformation. That signifies the transfer of corporate controlling powers is 
meaningful for the improvement of the performance. 
9.3  Contributions 
The contributions of this research are as follows. 
First, the comprehensive analysis on the background, the policies, the progress, 
and the characteristics of China’s SOEs reform has been conducted, the 
distinctiveness of China’s SOEs reform has been explored, the China Model of 
SOEs reform has been generalised and explained. Although lots of similar 
research results and arguments are present in the existing literature, this research 
still have some particular analysis and discussions, say, the path dependence of 
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China’s SOEs reform, the insiders’ mastering in the ownership reform, and the 
employment status transformation. Mixed ownership is rooted deeply in the 
China Model of SOEs reform.  
Second, the commonness degree of the mixed ownership in China and the 
mixture degree have been analysed. Though the calculations of these two 
indicators are not very sophisticated, the analysis is still necessary. The analytical 
results show that the mixed ownership is indeed quite common in China, and the 
mixture degree is quite high. Therefore, the mixed ownership in China deserves 
more research attention. Furthermore, the large scale questionnaire survey 
covering 950 ownership-reformed enterprises is very informative and provides 
lots of data for the following studies. 
Third, the driving factors of the emergence of mixed ownership in China have 
been studied in this research. These factors are meaningful. My studies show that 
the mixed ownership can combine SOEs’ advantage of obtaining business 
resources and non-SOEs’ advantage of the flexible operational mechanisms, and 
private enterprises are still treated unfairly in China. That means there still a long 
way to go for China to establish the market system. Furthermore, mixed 
ownership also reflects the moderate and balanced philosophy of Chinese 
traditional culture. 
Fourth, the SCORE analytical framework was established to conduct the studies 
on the institutional arrangements of MOEs corporate governance. This analytical 
framework is original although I draw on a lot from the works by Roe (2004) and 
Williamson (2000). It is found that the corporate governance of China’s MOEs is 
unstable and immature, and is not commercialised enough. It is an important 
conclusion. 
Fifth, the comparative analysis on the performance of MOEs and non-MOEs is 
meaningful. It is found that there is no noted relationship between corporate 
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performance and mixed ownership, but the transformation from whole ownership 
to mixed ownership with a precondition that the first largest shareholder owns 
more than 40% of the total equity promotes the corporate performance. It implies 
that the transfer of corporate controlling powers is critical for the 
ownership-transformed companies to improve the performance. 
9.4  Academic Value and Policy Implications 
The findings about the mixed ownership commonness degree and the mixture 
degree, about the driving factors of the rise of China’s MOEs, about the 
comparative performance analysis, bring value to the existing literature of the 
studies on the Chinese economy, and enrich the existing literature of the studies 
on economic transition. The establishment of the basic analytical framework of 
SCORE is original, and the analysis findings are meaningful.  
This thesis also brings policy implications. Promoting mixed ownership is a 
strategy determined by China’s central government and the ruling party. More 
and more MOEs are expected to rise in China because there still are many SOEs 
expected to take ownership restructuring. As the strategy is clear, mixed 
ownership will persist in China for long time. Therefore, understanding and 
improving their corporate governance is undoubtedly very important. This 
research tells people that more attention should be paid to the corporate 
governance of MOEs than to mixed ownership itself. My studies present that the 
corporate governance of China’s MOEs is in an unstable, immature situation, and 
is not completely commercialised. The covenants and the special regulations may 
be helpful in the smooth ownership transformation in the short term, but is not 
helpful in the regular transfer of the controlling powers to new shareholders. The 
entrenchment of the original management obstructs the market-based selection of 
managers. Special regulations will be difficult to be enforced and will obscure 
the government-enterprise boundary line. The complex employment relations, 
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especially the maintenance of the iron rice bowl, are harmful to the future 
development of MOEs. The maintenance of the state cadre status of some 
managers obstructs the normal change of their positions and the marketisation of 
their selections and their compensations. Therefore, the MOEs need to establish 
sustainable and completely commercialised corporate governance. First, the 
special regulations should fade out. Second, the employment status should be 
transformed to the largest possible extent. Third, the normal transfer mechanism 
of the controlling powers and the normal replacement mechanism of the 
managerial positions should be established to the largest possible extent. In the 
past thirty two years, China’s SOEs have almost achieved the commercialisation 
of their operation, but China need to push forward the commercialisation of the 
corporate governance of the MOEs for the next step. By commercialisation of 
corporate governance, I mean that the governance mechanisms are set up on the 
basis of commercial laws, common business rules, and profound markets. I think 
the most urgent task in the future is to gradually decrease the state shares in 
MOEs, allowing more and more MOEs to become the companies whose major 
shareholders are of private ownership attribute. This work will promote the 
commercialisation of MOEs corporate governance. Only the commercialisation 
of the corporate governance of MOEs is realised, the stable, and then the 
sustainable corporate governance can be established. 
9.5  Concluding Remarks 
Although mixed ownership has been emerging in China for many years, it is still 
new in comparison with the typical private ownership and the typical state 
ownership. My research on China’s MOEs is only a start. China’s MOEs, as a 
new group of enterprises, will becoming more and more active, their activities 
and their corporate governance will attract more and more attention. I hope my 
research will open the curtain for further discussions and studies on MOEs. I am 
looking forward to more, and better, studies to surface in the future. 
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Appendix 
The Questionnaire of Systematic 
Transformation (Gai Zhi) 
Definition: The systematic transformation (Gai Zhi) is defined as the transaction 
that introduces non-state equity to SOEs through selling existing state shares or 
issuing new shares to private investors, then accomplishes full privatisation or 
partial privatisation. 
Name of the enterprise: 
Name of the head of the enterprise:__________, His or her 
position:____________. 
Has the enterprise implemented Gai Zhi: Yes____, No____. 
Please proceed if the answer is Yes. 
1. Gai Zhi happened in the year of _______. 
2. The size of the enterprise at the time of Gai Zhi (enter “ √” in the selections): 
Large____, Medium____, Small____. 
3. The major proposer of the Gai Zhi (enter “ √” in the selections):  
(1) The government____. 
(2) The parent company____. 
(3) The management of the enterprise____. 
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(4) The workers of the enterprise____. 
(5) The outside investor____. 
(6) Others____. 
4. The pattern of the Gai Zhi (enter “ √” in the selections): 
(1) Selling the existing state equity____. 
(2) Introducing additional non-state capital____. 
(3) The combination of (1) and (2)____. 
5. The information of the first, second, and third largest shareholder. 
The category of the shareholder status The shareholding proportion 
  
  
  
The categories of shareholder status are as follows: 
(1) The government                  (2) State assets management company 
(3) State-owned enterprise             (4) State-participated enterprise 
(5) Non-profit organization            (6) Collective enterprise 
(7) Private firm                     (8) Foreign company 
(9) The management                 (10) The workers 
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(11) Financial institute                  (12) Individual 
(13) Others 
6. Whether or not the legal representative of the enterprise was changed after the 
Gai Zhi(enter “ √” in the selections): (1) Yes____, (2) No____. 
7. Whether or not the CFO of the enterprise was changed after the Gai Zhi(enter 
“ √” in the selection): (1) Yes____, (2) No____. 
8. The distribution channel of the information of the Gai Zhi proposal (enter 
“ √” in the selections): 
(1) Distributed among the insiders____. 
(2) Published in nationwide newspapers____. 
(3) Published on internet____. 
(4) Published in property exchanges____. 
9. Whether or not the enterprise (or the controlling shareholder) made 
commitments about the post-Gai Zhi employment of the workers(enter “ √” in 
the selection): Yes____,  No____. If the answer is Yes, in how many 
years____(enter the number) the enterprise will not fire the workers, and the 
proportion____% of the total workers will be retained in the enterprise. 
10. Whether or not the enterprise (or the controlling shareholder) made 
commitments about the following issues (enter “ √” in the selections): 
(1) The enterprise will not move to other places____. 
(2) The enterprise will not change the major business____. 
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(3) The enterprise or the controlling shareholder will make further investment 
____. 
11. Whether or not the enterprise (or the controlling shareholder) get preferential 
policies from the government based on the commitments of question 9, and 10 
(enter “ √” in the selections): 
(1) Yes____. 
(2) No____. 
Please specify the preferential policies if the answer is Yes: 
(1)_______________________. 
(2)_______________________. 
(3)_______________________. 
12. The economic compensations for the employment status transformation of 
the workers (enter “ √” in the selections): 
(1) The enterprise become non-SOE (the state is the minority shareholder or 
there is no state equity), all workers transformed their employment status and 
received the economic compensations____. 
(2) The enterprise become non-SOE( the state is the minority shareholder or 
there is no state equity), all workers are guaranteed for further employment but 
received no economic compensations____. 
(3) The enterprise is still state-controlled enterprise after the Gai Zhi, all workers 
transformed their employment status and received the economic 
compensations____. 
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(4) The enterprise is still state-controlled enterprise after the Gai Zhi, the 
employment contracts of all workers were changed, and all workers received no 
economic compensations____. 
(5) The eneterprise become a company with a non-state majority shareholder, all 
workers transformed the employment status and received the economic 
compensations____. 
(6) The enterprise become a company with a non-state majority shareholder, the 
workers did not transform the employment status____. 
(7) Others (please specify)___________________________. 
13. The proportion____% of the total workers left the enterprise after the Gai 
Zhi. 
14. The average economic compensation is______RMB for one person. 
15. The ways of economic compensations (enter “ √” in the selections): 
(1) Cash____. 
(2) The stocks of the enterprise____. 
(3) The debt to the workers. 
16. Has the enterprise established the board of directors (enter “ √” in the 
selections): 
(1) Yes____. 
(2) No____. 
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17. The redundant workers in the enterprise after the Gai Zhi (enter “ √” in the 
selections): 
(1) None____. 
(2) Few____. 
(3) Many____. 
 
                                Thank You! 
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